THE ISSUES OF THE WAR.

Sun (Christchurch), Volume I, Issue 273, 22 December 1914, Page 6

THE ISSUES OF THE WAR.

SHALL THE JAPANESE ARMY COME TO EUROPE. LONDON, November 6. Dr E. J. Dillon has a most interesting article in the "Contemporary Review," in which he summarises the main issues of the war. He points out the hopeful aspects, and equally forcefully those which are not so hopeful, and he makes some very useful suggestions which he claims would, if adopted, make for the success of the Allies. Of these the most notable is that we should accept the help of the Japanese Army. Our Army Making. "The British Empire has an army in the making. It will be ready some time in the first half of the coming year. But the million men that we shall then put into the field will be of much less relative value than five hundred thousand sent to the fighting line to-day. Events are moving fast. The situation is changing continually. Much of what is now happening can be remedied but some events "'are irremediable. Speed, therefore, is almost as valuable to us as it is to our foes. "It behoves us to do to-day what we should not hesitate to attempt if we were very hard set six or eight months hence, 'whether this be the transformation of the Government into a Committee of National Safety, or an arrangement which would secure for us the valuable co-operation of our Japanese-allies, here in Europe, or both. It has been frequently said that we'* have no real need of men, that there are millions throughout the Empire eager to join the colours. Happily this is true, But this splendid fighting force is not available at once- The men lack arms, ammunition, equipment, and have not v yet been sufficiently trained. Japan's Available Army. "Now the causes that make it impossible for them to tiake the field at once are inoperative in *Tapan. I possess no first-hand knowledge as to how the Tokyo Government would respond to a request of this nature, but I have been assured by some whose opinion carries weight that the project is workable. It will hardly be gainsaid that five hundred thousand thoroughly trained Japanese soldiers would turn the scale at the present conjuncture. It peems equally true that .no hesitation should be felt about inviting them over, provided that the scheme is feasible. If these assumptions be correct, the sooner negotiations on the subject are opened the better. "It would make all the difference between a speedy: complete victory and whatever the alternative may be. "Faith, lively faith, in our ability to win the day is an indispensable condition of success, "says Dr. Dillon. "More than this, it is a puissant factor of success. And it is the privilege and the duty of all public men in, the Empire to ; foster and intensify this saving faith by every means in their power. " At thp 'sa^^ul^ef^ i -e4Mot > 'blink-' the fact that unless reinforced by herculean efforts'the liveliest faitll is unavailing. It is, therefore, a matter of supreme importance that such efforts should be made, and that the resources I of the Empire at home and abroad should be utilised not only to the fullest, but at once. It has been said, that time is oxir ally and Germany's foe, and that we cafe afford to wait. "Well, there is some truth in the statement. But it is equally true that the most favourable time for energetic exertion is the present. Every additional hundred thousand well-armed, well-trained, well-oflicered men we hurl against the foe to-day are worth twice that number to be dispatched in six months' time. By protracting the war Ave are certainly exhausting the Teutons, but we are not facilitating our "own task. What We Aim At. "It has been truly said that the object for which we are now struggling is not merely to defeat the Teutonic armies or to be able to call the war a draw. Neither consummation would avail us aught. For it would not free us from the Upas tree of Prussian militarism, under whose poisonous shade all European. State organisms wither. What we aim at and what alone can. satisfy us is the annihilation of Prussianism, together with all its by-products, the tearing out of its nethermost roots. "It is fair to enquire whether the magnitude of this task has been fully realised by the British nation, or even by their leaders? I do not ask whether it is understood, but whether it is realised. Sure to Win. "That we and our co-partners in this titanic struggle are sure to win the day at last is become, if not a selfevident proposition, at least a saving dogma which has never yet been openly questioned. And how could it be doubted'? Right must necessarily triumph over might when backed by the fighting resources of six States, including the two mightiest Empires the world ever held. With law, justice, and democracy on our side, combined with the resources of nations numbering in all 318 million people, not including our Empire, beyond the seas, how could we fail of victory? ' "Our principal .source of weakness lies in our Quixotic respect - for broken . compacts, out exaggerated deference to the desires of neutrals, and the absence of a military organisation on" a scale sufficiently large to deal with | our ever-growing army. ' "This war is characterised by features of a hideousness never before encountered in history, and these features, it should-.-not be forgotten, form one of the deadly weapons of the fight. Yet to these and other unwonted arms we oppose the chivalrous methods of a hundred years ago. We are concerned to avoid everything that our sensitive enemies could fairly construe as not 'playing the game,' they being, free to operate with ' f rightfulness.' At the outset of the war we placed ourselves at obvious disadvantages rather than fail in our imaginary duties towards them. Slowly we are beginning to economise, tlii« self-denying Quixotism. Slowly and partially. . , • Are We Too Quixotic? "It runs counter to our generous conceptions of what we owe to neutral States to adopt a more stringent procedure towards them. It would be a painful wrench to exercise our belligerent rights to the full. But the Kaiser goes to work with greater thoroughness and at the cost of heavier sacrifices—his heart's blood not being grudged for

the cause. Thus he lacerated his heart in order to dealt culturally with Louvain; he bled it again for Malines, Rheims, and Antwerp, a stimulus to the zeal of his generals. "Not one among us can picture in liis mind's eye the unparalleled transformations which this awful clash of nations, races, and civilisations, will | have wrought in the -organisation of Europe and the world. Whatever the event, a new political and social synthesis will be its sure sequel. If the Allies accomplish this purpose, this syncratic conception of national and international life and intercourse, and co» stitute a marked advance ,in ethical motive om the present ordering of things. But if corrosive Teutonism emerged victorious from the ordeal of war, absolutism rooted in military violence would' reign supreme from the Baltic to the Adriatic.

"As sOon as Germany's self-con-fidence has fallen to' this degree, she will have ! recourse to diplomatic intrigue, begin a campaign against the continuation of the war, on the ground that it is ruining the neutral nations, and accuse Great Britain—not the Allies—of prolonging it wantonly.''