THE 'WHY' OF THE CONFLICT Causes Of The Present War.

Sun (Christchurch), Volume I, Issue 269, 17 December 1914, Page 3

THE 'WHY' OF THE CONFLICT Causes Of The Present War.

By Leon Goidmerstein.

LIEN history writes many, whoso more word could hare Spared civilization its mo*t. awful spee- {'( faciei. Germany, II which tailed to realVk ize why any war _ Si was possible at this time. The German people and German fovernuient did not understand the fundamental WHY? WHY England might be expected to figiit. WHI" Italy was certaiu to maintain bcr neutrality. ' WllY;Uirstsia was safe from revolution. ■'■' i'}/ ■■■ WHY EiWc'e poekion fvom that W ; lien sbe faced tlie ' ® runes of Moltlte and .on" Koon, .'in 'IB7O. . . . : . " If CJSmuany lia'd only foreseen the incendiary causes .underlying this con-flict-had sensed them as have the American people, with their marvellous instinct • bred by life under democratic regime—the world would not to-day be waging its most destructive war. Two immediate causes of this tragic struggle coining at this time are the German system of government and German methods of thought—the very ' Antithesis of those .of democracy.. The foregoing statements being true, it gives . ttu* reason why Germany relied upon .England's Home Rule quarrel to prevent • British interference: t'he reason for Ger--. 1 man belief that French socialists would not- .fight and Iter certainty, that Hitstiifii! revolutionists would seize on the Tsar's dilemma to revolt. But the tremendous conflict had to come sooner or later, find a ifmuber of causes in addition to the impulsiveness of Germany, ■contributed brinsrit abmjt. now rather, s.-- than -at an later.-nitOirjient Here, -separated -into;jthreegroup* «I reasons. are. jpKsentefl the chief cuiism • vrbieli. made the war inevitable:The balance of European power la - the last tea yearn wm destroyed by XOngiaod ecterln;; Into a Knropeaa alliance. Austria has been gradually setting weaker and Turkey as a Power bait been eliminated from the llsiropean ront'erl. . Commercial ■ competition between Ens' and and Germany has been l«i«n----wffied and Germany ha.* shown a strovg tendency 1" become a power oa tht hlfiii seas. Kurnpena nationti iiaye become coavulsed by eompJlratloii!* In their internal polities linii] racial nail das* KtrncsleM have reached a point where ft is more and more apparent that these Issiaes cannot be adjusted except by remaklni; the map of K.urope. The chief- and most far-reaclilng problems now beius fought out on the plains of J'ranee and al»ng the frontiers of Russia are not WHO SH\T/I. GUVKKN Alsace and I.orraine, but 3IJAJ.fi THE if 3BFI GOVKUM KM BV A MII.ITAKY AITTOORAC'V OR A RK'PUBMCAJt ])KMOPKACV ? The same buitim will decide If the Russian Jew •Is to have the right to live outside the pale; if Ireland is to have, Home Rule, arnd if the Prussian Pole can hold n»luolesied the land he has paid for. Because all these varieties of causes have vigorously exerted their influence, at fl/i; present moment was war declared. But before the causes of the war are elaborated let us see what kept war away for so long and allowed Germany to take wherever she pleased. These .were the reasons:— The European balance of power was based on the assumptions, that the Triple Alliance was approximately equal jto the Dual Alliance of Prance and Russia; that England would remain in her "splendid isolation;" that if war did occur it would be limited essentially to operations on the land, the Russian fleet , being a negligible quantity in aggressive warfare, while the French, navy was not sufficiently strong to seriously interfere /with German commerce on the sea; that tinder such conditions war w'as unlikely, since with German ports open it might last for years, something no European Power could stand financially, and France and Russia would be the principal sufferers. While this situation as to the balance of power lasted Europe was at peace, and the Tsar Alexander 111. had the right, on his deathbed, to thank God that he had reigned in pence with all other nations.

THEN SUDDENLY THERE DEVELOPED THE FIRST FLAW IN THIS -SYSTEM OF BALANCE OF POWER. It was.created when Russia was being -beaten in the, Japanese war. With Manchuria lost, and the political situation bad within Russia, there could he no more any talk of such aggressive politics as a move agaiust India. Gone were the days.of Skobeleff, who had asserted that the sight of a Cossack uniform in the Bazaar of Peshawar would be enough to set on fire the eutire land from the Himalayas to the sea. Russia had learned the danger of setting nations on fire; especially '-when her own people were still a bad fire risk. Serious problems lay right at her own door, in Persia —problems not to be properly solved without (he collaboration <>! England. Russia had become willing to guarantee tbe integrity of India in a way which convinced England that Russia was siuderstandings" having a profound bearing on the destiuy of Europe. I'ivst, for; instance.' such as the creating of a committee to promote the Trans-Pamir railway that would very largely relieve India's northern border from danger of attack, and thus convert, the old bugaboo (Cossacks issuing from (he Himalayan passes and driving the British Lion from India* into the more modern picture of the same Cossacks driving before them rebellious Afghans, to be dealt with according to Great Britain's will. Next came ilie Persian agreement, one of the most profitable of arrangements for England and Russia. Then the Russo : Japanese convention, and finally the entente between and Japan, Great Britain's ally, with respect to Mongolia. England was thus brought into a rather close alliance with Russia. It led naturally to England joining the Dual Alliance of France and Russia and the Triple Entente resulted. And by this time the German peril bad already become a fairly staple subject of conversation in England. Now, the moment that England became a Power to be reckoncc 1 with in Continental politics the balance of power in Europe was gone. Two things were now clear:— Whale Italy might be relied upon to make war against France, Italy would never dare to declare war against England. This left Germany and Austria against Russia, France and England. Moreover, it entirely changed the possible aspect of what war would now mean to Germany, because with' England on the other side the German navy would be bottled up and its oversea trade would be destroyed. The period of 1907 to 1909, therefore, witnessed frantic attempts by Berlin to come to some sort of arrangement either with. France or with England. It was during this period tliat the Kaiser visited London, and it was not entirely his fault that he did not succeed in provoking an. estrangement between the Allies. Failure is attributed by some partly to the fact that he did not go high enough in bis offer and partly to events beyond liis control. In any event Europe's equilibrium received its first heavy blow when England became the friend of Russia and France. The situation was still more intensified by the gradual decline during the last ten years of the efficiency of the Austrian army and by Turkey's elimina-

tion as a Power of military importance. This latter fact was an especially-heavy blow to German plans. For the Kaiser, with consummate skill, worked up a "friendship"- between himself and the Sultan of Turkey. This friendship brought Germany not only important advantages in Asia Minor, which threatened for a time to become practically a German province, but it also allowed the German Emperor to hope that in the event of trouble in Western Europe Russia might be forced to keep busy protecting its own border from invasion by hordes of hashi-ba'/oulcs. It is nov history that Turkish liberals, with friendly British collaboration, created a constitutional government which, while inclined to remain frifendly with I Germany, could not go to the extent ot declaring war with Russia pour lea beaux \ yemr du Ttoi de Prusse. It is also a matter of history, though as yet unwritten in it;S most, interesting, phase?. that : under Russian influence the Balkan League was, formed ai.d defeated the Turks In a series * of biootiy battles, and later oitßulgaria: was by Roumanian troops (also more .friendly to Russian advances) for .listening over-, much to the charming melodies sung at Berlin. Instead of counting Turkey against Russia, Germany lound' the Balkan States, more or less a «jiiit, must be reckoned with on the side oi the new alliance, and this finally go ve the better side of the balance of power to the present Allies. Now there is a v law in the life of nations as inexorable as all law.; of nature. Two nations, or two groups of nations —the one strong and the other weak—cannot live side by side without the strong nation crushing the weaker one. TO BE WEAK IS A CHIME; THE PRESENT WAR IS THE TRIAL; THE PUNISHMENT WILL COME I,ATE II ON. The balance of European power had to be restored. But it could not be accomplished without a change in the frontiers. This in turn could not be effected by peaceable means. Ilence the present painful method of adjusting (he new European balance of power. We come to the next cause of the war, and this cause is much better understood in the United States. "Made in Germany"' has become too promiscuous in the world's markets to please England. So long as that motto stood simply for cheaper classes of goods, carried to their destinations in British bottoms, it did not matter much to England. But when German goods became as good as English goods, in some cases better than those "made in England," and when. Germany, in addition to building a world's trade, also began with her characteristic vigor to create a world's navigation, the case, in British eyes, became very threatening. Now, Germany had a perfect right by every honorable means to seek trade wherever it conld be found, and German commercial men as a rule are as good as those of other nations. But in the world of to-day it is not enough to have the right; you must also be able to enforce the right—a thing Germany proceeded to attempt to create by building a powerful fleet. Here again Germany was acting within her full right; but England, against whom both German commerce and the German fleet were aimed, had

the same right to protect its own interests. In short. Germany came in too late. The dinner table had been laid and all the seats were taken. Germany had an equal right to a place at the table with the rest and She attempted to get what she was entitled to. So long as she was satisfied to snatch bits over the shoulders of the other guests nobody minded much, but when she tried to shove the others aside and occupy :t seat a scuffle ensued. Manners at the great table of the world's commerce are not overnice. With all this true concerning the balance of power and the struggle lor Commercial supremacy, yet it is .just a.s true that the overshadowing influence which forced this war was the pressure inside each nation. War was certain to solve a great many problems with which each country was suffering in a .sort of internecine attrition. Not that. European nations deliberately went to war to escape complexities of their' domestic politics which could' not be settled otherwise. But it a fact thaf in altrwisfci every country the with an' alignment of Powers like that which appeared certain at the end of July could only improve the internal strife of each country. In Austria, aside from her usual slate of-national discord, the assassination ol the heir apparent threatened to create an extremely grave situation, lie left.a son, the issue of a morganatic marriage not recognized in Austria, but perfectly valid in Hungary, which knows 110 morganatic marriages. With the Austrian Emperor fourscore and four years old and a powerful movement; alrqost openly organized in Hungary to break up the dual monarchy, the tragic end of the Crown Prince was a greater danger than it might have been under less exceptional conditions. Austria had to decide quickly whether it; was to be Germanic or Slavonic and if it was to ..continue one with Hungary. She sealed her decision with her ultimatum to Servia. By crushing Servia the Austrian Empire would also crush tihe dream of millions of its people—the dream that one day Bosnia, Herzegovina and the Skiv lands of Hungary would be united in a great Slavonic monarchy holding its own against German encroachment on the one side and Turkey 011 the other. War in Austria could not be popular among Austria's Slav population, and by declaring war the Austrian government revealed that it would hereafter rely on the German and pro-German (e.g., Polish) clement of its population. War against Servia, a difficult military operation, would also permit flooding Hungary with Austrian troops and so keep gentlemen of the Karolyi type within bounds of good behavior. It is not yet apparent why Austria believed that she would be permitted to wage war against Servia without interference, since it can scarcely be doubted now that Austria would give much to take back what she did in July, 1914. We can only venture a guess. Since fche regime of Baron Aerenthal as Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg the Embassy on Serguievska street always managed to maintain the best of relations with the most conservative element, in the upper Russia administration, mainly men of German blood. While they were at the helm of Russia's administration tliey could not avoid leaning toward

the countries in whose language they couched their innermost thoughts and among whose leading men they counted friends to whom they were tied by bonds of family and intermarriage. It was a secret only to the during Baron Aerentlial's Ambassadorship Schwenebaeh, the then auditor general of the empire, took the most important measures of his administration to the Austrian Ambassador for consultation. even when these matters concerned vital topics of internal politics. Of late, however, persons who in a friendly spirit were li-'oly to keep the German and Austrian embassies -informed of the views of Russia grew more and more out of touch real Russian view, and | these persons were apt to give what ! then thought of a Servian invasion instead of what Russia was likely to think about it. I To understand thoroughly the tremen- , dous significance of this it must be remembered thai, these same revolutionists J heartily favored the Japanese beating ! the Russian airmy. Then every defeat < of Russia in Maneliuria was hailed as j a step toward the creation of a new , Russia, free from its internal oppression. Now the people feel that they can reach their goal sooner by working with the government. The Russian government has never fc|cen very brilliant at understanding its own people, but it can hardly avoid : it in iliis case. Here, for the first time since the Avar' to liberate Servia and Bulgaria from the Turkish yoke, is a case and cause where the government and the people can meet on common ground./ The government, realizing that its people are becoming more and more unmanageable, has seized its opportunity. From the day that the workmen in St. Petersburg went back to the mills because the government'had to have a free hand to. protect the brother Slav war could be considered as declared, he pettple le vcult, Dieu la veult, and if it had not been declared in August, 1014. it would have been in one of the following months. Those who have followed Russian politics during this generation express frequent astonishment at the Russia is court's evident animosity against Berlin—that Berlin for so many years its ally and friend. There is an explanation for this great change:— In the lasL years of the reign of Alexander 111. and up to the close of the Japanese war Germany was regarded as Russia's best ally despite much popular resentment against such an alliance. Germany's altitude during the Russo-Japanese War, when the Kaiser guaranteed the safety of Russia European frontier and kept his friendly promise, strengthened still more the "traditional friendship" ol the two nations. , The break came after Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia, while protesting against this act. never intended to insist on her protest because it appears that she had previously made statements that could be interpreted as agreeing, under certain conditions, that the two countries should be annexed by Austria. Russia's protest and her threat to support this understanding by force of arms was to a very great extent, therefore, a bluff thrown out for home consumption at a time when the mere shadow of a diplomatic victory was most welcome at St. Petersburg. Russia expected that/lier protest would lead to

long diplomatic correspondence, ending in Austria keeping Bosnia and Herzegovina, and at the same time giving Russia the right' to claim annexation was made on conditions that provided for t&e protection of the Slav population, and that she Lad obtained it for this purpose. The outcome was entirely different from what St. Petersburg had confidently expected. It appears that Germany's internal affairs at that very time were somewhat unpleasant. The German Kaiser came out in "shining armor" to protect' German- interests throughout the world, against Slavonic aggression. Russian bluff >vas called in an unpleasant manner, and the Russian government was forced to bcai back in an extremely undignified way. This neither improved Russia's internal conditions nor left pleasant memories at the Peterhof court. Putting it somewhat baldly, the Kaiser did not play the game of kings in the fashion that he should have played it; at least, lie did not according to the views of cousin Nicholas of Russia. And nows days, when it has become increasingly difficult to keep the "job" of emperor, any attempt to gain advantage at the other fellow's expeuse in the field, where royal families should pull together rather than work with any regard for the "peepul," must rankle worse than anything else can. Unpleasant relations between Germany and Russia were further f-Q to another fact:— Germany of lale has been much 100 active along the Russian border. It is significant of this activity, finding its expression in many ways, tliat out of nine main stations of the Zeppelin war dirigibles, six of the largest and best equipped have been suggestively located along the frontier of these "traditional friends." Not les.s curious was the internal situation in England—a situation which seems not to have been fully understood by Germany, or else misinterpreted. The German newspapers have more than once expressed the opinion that with Ulster arming against the rest of Ireland and the British army refusing to interfere the British government would not be likely to take part in any European complication. Great Britain, indeed, was facing the gravest situation in its history—not the possibility of revolt within her army or clanger of civil war troubled British sta fcesinen. but the possibility of bloodshed betweeu Oatiiolies and Protestants in Ireland This latter would have -reaied a condition forbidding conciliation '.or generations. A year\s \yar in Europe CAN I>o ENGLAND LESS HARM THAN A WEEK OE UEAL EiGFIT TN ULSTER Of course, the Irish question is only delayed and wi 11 have to be solved, but the war will probably change the political situation to such an extent that a solution may easily be discovered for a problem apparently unsolvable less than two months ago. Besides, men who fight side by side for a common Britain must acquire on the field of battle that respect for each other which will lead them to some form of agreement acceptable to all sides. But' why did Germany accept the fight at a time when it was apparently so convenient to its opponents*' When the full history of the eventful vcar is written it will probably be shown

through some irony of fate tliat Qw* many, waiting for more than thirty, years for a chance at its enemies when i| iiad caught them single-handed, was "compelled to accept the challenge when nearly all Europe was allied against it • ' : f Germany did not seek to evade a fight on general principles. She was for it. Twice in the eighties she attempted t*o repeat her raid on Franc© and was stopped only by fear of Russian interference. Germany threatened Russia ioith icar when the 'Kaiser did not expect France to interfere. Germany ~ threatened France in the Agadir incident when she Relieved Russia had not sufficiently re- • covered-from- her heating J>y Japan. . L ■ IN 1914 THINGS WENT TOO FAST FOB GERMANY TO DISCOVER A WAY OUT OF A SITUATION CREATED BEFORE SHE FULLY APPRECIATED ITS SERIOUSNESS. Germany certainly did not expect Russia to go to the length of actually declaring war because of the Austrian move in Servia. But when Russia began to mobilize against Austria; Germany could not, without gravely endangering her position, both at home and in the Triple "Alliance, insist on Austria/stopping its onward march. This ' would have been equivalent to the loss of the German cause in the dual monarchy. In the long run, the effect of Austria going back on its declaration of war against Servia, at ' the order of Russia, would have been scarcely less disastrous' to German politics than, after a gallant fight, haying Russian and fcYench armies rafcet in -Berlin.' ' Russian behavior was disappointing and unexpected at Berlin, and if the story is true that an official'telegram referring- to , "semi-Asiatic " barbarians" was sent from Germany one can easily understand the train of thought that . led to this quaint exhibition of feeling. Again, Germany did not believe England v.ould stand by lier allies, or Germany might have acted differently.' That. 1 Great BHtain. was. not'formally obliged to this,> and that ra ••"(wwtSpful-'.de-meiit --rher-w;aiS. against interfercnCtV'is shown by the resignations from the I>ril;is!rCabiuet of Lord John Burns. That the war would have assumed ah entirely different aspect if_ the German fleets were on the high season * the North Sea was free cannot be"w)ubted. Until the last minute BorHrf'was firmly persuaded that Great Britain, with grave problems confronting her at hpme and with little to gaiti from the- war, would not make the tremendous sacrifice of interference without presenting the opportunity for a barter. Sununiug up, it may be said that the Allies stood firmly against the Kaiser because they believed that they were strong enough to crush the menace of Prussian militarism, and that, whatever its outcome, this war will tend to make life easier at home. Austria believed that the conflict would be strictly local, and would tend to prevent hazardous internal trouble. Germaay, THE ONLY NATION THAT COULD HAVE AVERTED WAR.- refused to do so, not only because this would weaken or kill the Triple Alliance, on which Germany strongly relied, but because it failed to understand the position of Russia and believed England would remain neutral, giving Geruiauy an advantage over France and Russia. Nor did the Kaiser anticipate the neutrality of Italy. None of the parties in this conflict is entitled to a Nobel peace prize. But; every one behaved practically - as any one would have behaved in similar circumstances. To put the situation concisely:— GERMAN!" FORCED RUSSIA'S HAND BECAUSE SHE DID NOT BELIE VIC THFJ ALLIES COULD EFFECT A COM B I NATION STRONG ENOUGH TO BEAT THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE. THE ALLIES JOINED AGAINST GERMANY BECAUSE THEY BELIEVED THAT TOGETHER THEY WE R 111 STRONG ENOUGH TO MAKE GERMANY HARMLESS FOR ALL TIME. I.eou ttoldiuorstela, hu<liot of this liriiele, wan from li>os to IJWB in the .service of the Rnssiau fiovernment nilii the Auditor General of the empire. Mr. fiolilmerstein: is Master of Arts* in lOeonomies of the University of Illinois. He is one «'f the contributors to the American Year Boole.