A "BOTTLED" NAVY.

Sun (Christchurch), Volume I, Issue 218, 19 October 1914, Page 11

A "BOTTLED" NAVY.

GERMAN NAVAL INACTION. The long-continued inaction of the capital ships of the German High Sea Fleet is still the subject of vexed speculation and theoretical discussion, observes a Sydney journal. Whatever may be the true reason of Admiral von Ingenohl's refusal to accept the gage of battle, thrown down by Sir John Jellicoe, and his fleet of warships, that generally accepted by naval officers contains no reflection upon the wisdom of his masterly inactivity. Indeed, taking all and every phase of the position into consideration, the German Commander-in-Chief is distinctly worthy of sympathy. Germany, we are told, intends to keep an overwhelming force in the Baltic, so long as there may be danger of a Russian army being transported by sea. It is true that the Tsar's ships are hoplessly outnumbered by the enemy at present, and the chance of an attempted move of this description is but vague and uncertain, still the Kaiser has declared that the Baltic is, for all time, to be known as a German lake,, and the duty is cast upon Admiral Ingenohl of making good the utterances of his master's voice. Undoubtedly if the German High Sea Fleet did happen to meet with disaster in the Baltic, or, for that matter,, in. the North Sea, it is contended, with some reason, that Russia might then transport her hordes to some point on the German Baltic coastline. It might equally bis added that the day the German High Sea Fleet meets doom at the hands of Britain's Navy, Germany could be invaded from the North Sea.

This may, or may not, be the true reason of the German stay-at-home policy, but if it be the Kaiser's orders that an undoubted supremacy is to be maintained in the Baltic, until such time as the Russian dreaded menace is eliminated, then in the time to come Germany will know a little more of the value of naval strategy and perhaps a little less of her lost colonies and vanished trade. The High Sea Fleet, the Kaiser has repeatedly assured us, was, as its name implies, created as an instrument of offence, ready to be used and to give battle to the foe long before it sighted the German coastline. Consideraions of local defence were never to fetter its freedom of action. Minefields, land batteries, and torpedo flotillas were to be responsible for the safety of the Fatherland's shores, and without doubt have been energetically created for that very purpose, not only on the Baltic side of the Empire, but also in the North Sea and Heligoland. They certainly constitute an effective ring against the British Fleet in the North Sea, and are, presumably, a barrier to any formidable movement on Russia's part in the Baltic. Hence it is difficult to believe that a strict adherence to programme is responsible for tire "bottling up" of the German Navy in the preserving pans at Kiel and Wilhelmshaven.

With the exception of the loss of three armoured cruisers, we have, happily, up to the present escaped any serious defeat at sea. With this exception no serious effort appears to have been made by the Germahs to press home any torpedo or submarine attack of and if the Kaiser is relying on such methods to prune down Britain's numerical superiority in ships, he must be most bitterly disappointed with the performances of his fleet. True it is that a few cruisers, which, owing to the exigency of the moment, have escaped capture by our squadrons, have taken and sunk several harmless merchant vessels, some of which were caught at sea before they knew war was declared; but, outsidethis, the toasted "Tag" of the German Fleet does not appear to have yet materialised.

The question may well be asked why the German Fleet allowed the British Army to cross the Channel without some attempt to destroy the transports. The High Sea Fleet would then indeed have justified its existence. The answer, however, is simple. The whole of Kitchener's operations were conducted with such secrecy and with such celerity that it is now known that Germany was quite unaware of any movement until the Expeditionary Force actually faced its advance corps in France. Had the intelligence leaked out, Admiral von Ingenohl would, it is presumed, have risked a battle even against the great numerical superiority of the British Fleet.

Summing up the position, and the course of events so far, it behoves us to look for some other reason for German inactivity on the sea. Apart from the lack of trained personnel, which has already been referred to in these columns, there exists a more serious cause for the Kaiser's lack of enterprise. Indeed, the matter would appear to be capable of the simplest of explanations. Admiral von Ingenohl, however much he may personally regret the cause, finds himself absolutely incapable of giving battle. As a prudent general he recognises that the odds against him are far too great to offer the most remote chance of victory, and he has to be contented to accept the help of a fortified and mine-guarded harbour, where his ships may lie safely at their moorings.

Whether the German Fleet will ever emerge to give battle or not is quite another proposition. It may be that it will yet be driven out by. the pressure of economic exigency, but it would appear to be more probable that the recent success of the submarines has created a hope in the German breast that a continuation of the tactics may lead to a diminution of British supremacy and make it possible to give action. We are told that the enemy is working night and day on the construction of submarines and aircraft, so in some day to come it is not improbable we shall witness a vigorous onslaught upon the British Fleet by these latter-day methods of warfare which appear to be particularly agreeable to the Teutonic temperament. When, however, the day does come it will undoubtedly find our officers and men very much on the alert, and the issue can be awaited by us with confidence. Meanwhile the German Navy ia still stewing in its own juice.