THE GERMAN ARMY.

Sun (Christchurch), Volume I, Issue 163, 15 August 1914, Page 14

THE GERMAN ARMY.

AN UNSPARING CRITIC. ITS MANY SERIOUS DEFECTS. The defects of the German Army, as well as some of its unquestioned merits, were* dealt with in an interesting article by i i The Times'' military correspondent on the German manoeuvres of 1911. Unfortunately "The Times" correspondent, whose views are held in consid-. erable respect, has not. since - reviewed manoeuvres of the Kaiser's Army, but he has written of the working of the German Army Bills of 1912 and increasing the strength of the army, and he goes so., far as to say that the changes, great as they have been, have not made for any marked changes in German . strategy and administration, while they have created many new difficulties. In view of this, his remarks on the Army of 1911 are interesting, especially as recent events would seem to prove his adverse criticism justified. MISTAKES IN HIGHER LEADING. "The German General Staff is so concerned with the spectacular success of Kaisermanover that it allows encouragement of initiative, to: sink into the second place," he writes. "On the other hand, it gains what it desires; general actions take place at the appointed places and hours; the staff gains European'credit for the satisfactory co-oper-ation of all arms; and. the German reporters go away happy in the belief that all is for the best in the best .of all possible armies. There was nothing in

iority of German arms, in the ability of the German Army to crush all opposition. The sharpness of the German sword and the weight of the German fist are well-known figures in Imperial speeches. It is possible that Germany may possess officers who recognise that the overweening confidence of the German Army is not wholly warranted by the facts of the ease, but it seems likely that up to a comparatively recent date there were none who cared to risk their careers by uttering unpalatable and inconvenient truths. From highest to lowest the word passes that everything military in Germany is superlatively excellent, and that nothing which takes place in foreign armies is worth troubling about. A STALE -ARMY. "The German Army appears to the writer to have trained itself stale. Year in, year out, the same ceaseless round of intensive training has reduced the whole army to a machine by which individuality, initiative, and freshness have been rigorously crushed out. The effort, to create initiative by regulation has not succeeded. The training of the year, always the same, has become a form of somnambulism. Everybody does the same thing every hour of every day every year, and officers who have to wait 16 or I' 7 years for their companies are spent and tired long before they rise to high command. The majority "of senior regimental officers do not possess the physical qualifications necessary for effective service during the arduous strain of the infantry fight, and until the eadres are rejuvenated these conditions will remain unaltered. There are some great thinkers and some hard workers among the officers, but. the impression conveyed is that only a select few really work, that all individuality has been'crushed out of the rank and file, and that both absolutely, pnd still more relatively, the German Army is not so good as its forerunner which achieved the union of the German States. ' A bloody war and a sickly season' venerable toast of our port-drinking ancestors —might reinvigorate the army or might destroy it. Failing such extreme measures, the best thing to restore new life to the army would be to disband it for a year in order to give everybody, from, top to bottom, a much-needed rest. The German Army is still a great and formidable machine. No one should entertain any illusion on this subject. In numbers, in organisation, and in the absorption of all the best elements of the State for its own end it has few, if any, equals. But it asserts a. claim of superior efficiency, and the proofs which ■it gave at the Kaisermanover of 1911 to substantiate this claim were not convincing.

SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS. "The iron discipline of the German Army, the strong Imperialism of tlve well-to-do classes, and the submissiveness of the lower orders, prevent the undermining of , military authority by the Socialistic tendencies of large blocks of the working people. But in the nation in arms, the Army is the microcosm, of the people, and in time of stress the results of Socialistic teaching will not be suppressed so readily as in, peace. The; Character Of the German people is greatly changing. The . increase of wealth and luxury has an enervating effect upon all classes, and has its reflex action upon- the Corps of Officers, which is less simple in its life and tastes'and less exclusively professional than it was a score of years ago. Commerce begins to attract the class which has hitherto regarded the Army as the only career open to a gentleman, while in the Army itself there is a steady increase of the non-noble element. The nation, "which, after all, gives up .little more than half of its able-bodied, sons to the service of the Army, is becoming muchness militarist thr.a formerly.

closer fire-fight ground is disregarded, firing lines lie out in thick swarms upon the open, machine guns seldom seek cover, and mounted officers ride up and down with dignity as they would in the shady avenues of the Tliiergarten. The artillery, it is true, has this year for the first time betaken itself to cover, but on the first excuse comes up to the forward crest of its position, and slogs away merrily with every gun in view. The huge military escort of Princes, generals, and guests, which follows the! Emperor stations itself conspicuously in the midst of this gala army, and appears to cover tho whole display with the mantle of Imperial consent." IN 191.'! NO CHANGE. The same correspondent in 1913 writes:—"Broadly speaking, there is no evidence of any marked change in the principles which have hitherto guided German military administrators, nor in the strategical use of the great army which has been fashioned with such splendid continuity of purpose the past 40 years. There is still the underlying design, academic thuugli present it be, to crush France by a vigorous offensive before the weight of Russia can be brought to bear. There is still a very plain temptation on military grounds to traverse neutral States in an offensive campaign against France. There is still the obvious intention to fight a defensive campaign at first against Russia, and this intention is madfc more manifest by the plans for improving the fortresses in East Prussia. The determination to wage offensive war with the utmost energy and ruthlessness remains to-day as always the central idea of the Gerjnan strategist, and the main effect of the new naval and military laws is to second offensive policy by placing.in the hands of German diplomacy a weapon fashioned for offensive war." "RUSSIA'S WEIGHT." On the question of whether Germany could hope to crush France before Russia 's weight can be brought to bear, the Paris correspondent of "The Times" wrote in August of last year:—"lt has hitherto been, supposed that Russia would be nearly three weeks behind France in completing her mobilisation, but in a telegram from St. Petersburg, M. Jules Hedeman "informs the 'Matin' that the situation is now completely altered. The construction of fresh railways and the reorganisation of the Russian Army, Mr Hedeman states, have greatly reduced the period of mobilisation, and the Russian Army will be able to take the field only a few days after that of France."

MEDITERRANEAN FLEETS. STRENGTH OP THE POWERS. FULL LIST OF THE SHIPS. The strength of the fleets regularly. i« commission ill the Mediterranean, according to the latest advices, is given in the following table:— BBITAm. . Inflexible.—Battle cruiser; 17,500 tons, eight' 12-inch and sixteen 4-inch guns; live 21-inch torpedo tubes; 2H knots; built in 1908. • Indefatigable.—Battle cruiser, 18,750' tons; eight 12-inch and sixteen 4- • inch guns; two 21-ineh torpedo tubes; 25 knot,a;, built in ; 1911. - Indomitable.—Battle cruiser, same - class' as Inflexible. • . Invincible.—Battle cruiser, as Inflexible (undergoing refit). Defence. Ai-moured cruiser, 14,600 tons; four 9.2-inch and ten 7.5-inch guns; five 18-inch torpedo tubes; 2,5.5 knots; built in 1909.. Black Prince—Armoured cruiser, 13,550 tons; six 9.2-inch and tpn 6-inch guns; three 18-inch torpedo £ubes; 23.65 knots; built in 1906. -%

the higher leading at the manoeuvres of a distinguished character, and mistakes were committed which tended to shake the confidence of foreign spectators in the reputation of-'the command. The staff work, though usually good, was not by any means above suspicion. The infantry lacked dash, displayed no knowledge of the use of ground, entrenched themselves badly, were extremely slow in their movements, offered vulnerable targets at medium ranges, ignored the service of security, performed the approach marches in an - oldtime manner, were not trained to uu-; derstand the connection between fire and movement, ami seemed totally unaware of the effect of modern fire. The cavalry drilled well and showed some beautifully-trained horses, while the Cavalry of the Guard was well handled from the Army point of view, but the arm was in many ways exceedingly old-fashioned, the scouting was bad, and mistakes were made of which our Yeomanry would be ashamed. The Artillery, with its out-of-date material, and slow and ineffective methods of fire, appeared so inferior that it can have no pretensions to measure itself against the „F«ench on anything approaching level terms. Finally, the dirigibles and aeroplanes presented the fourth arm in a relatively unfavourable. Tight. The German Army, apart from its numbers, confidence in itself, and high state of organisation, does not present any signs of superiority over the best foreign models, and in some ways dees not rise above the level of the second rate. CONFIDENCE OF THE ARMY. 1 'The confidence of the German Army in itself is in one sense a source of strength and in another of weakness. It will doubtless enable the army and the nation to embark upon a war with a firm belief in victory, but all the greater will be the disillusionment if victory is not speedily obtained. The methods by which the Germans sedulously propagate in foreign countries the idea that German arms are invincible are useful in their way, for they enable German diplomacy to secure by peaceful means results which would otherwise ou'y be obtained by great sacrifice.* in war. There seems no reason to doubt that the Emperor himself firmly believes in the super

A PEACE-BRED ARMY. . "The German Army has -seen less of modern war than any other . Arifiy which stands in the front rank. It practices and carries 011 year to year, with far too scant regard for modern progress, the methods which were good enough .in their day but are no longer practicable under the fire of modern arms. Theory may recognise that great and even fundamental changes are required in tactics and in training to meet the new conditions with success, but all evidence shows that an Army which has not been tried in the fire is constitutionally unable to profit by the experience of others and to adapt itself to the ordeal of modern war. 'Most of all is this true of the German Army, which supposes itself to be the military salt of the earth, and fondly believes that it will have 110 difficulty in carrying out military operations which other people and other armies have discovered to be impracticable. For the cause of true progress, 110 attitude could be more fatal. No other modern Army displays such profound contempt for the effect of modern fire. Were this contempt due to the proved superiority of German troops over others, there would be something to be said for it, but the military history of Prussia and the Federal States did not begin, nor will it end, with the war of 1870-71. Viewing military history as a whole, we do not find that German arms have greater triumphs to their credit than those of Britain and of France. The contempt which the German Army displays for the effects of modern fire, and professes to hold for the armies of rival Btat.es with which it may come in conflict, can only be set down to ignorance and to nothing else. DISREGARD OF EFFECT OF FIRM. "Not by any arm, nor by tlje staff, is the effect of modern fire take'n into account. Cavalry scout with blissful disregard of it, and trot about within close range of hostile infantry, while regiments bump along a high road into hostile entrenchments as if it were all in the day's work, aud not the least likely to end in annihilation. Infantry masses are seen in beautiful but vulnerable array exposed to the fire of guns at long aud medium while iu the

Duke of Edinburgh.—Armoured cruiser; same class as Black Prince; 22.84 knots. Warrior.—Armoured cruiser, 33,550 tons; six 9.2-inch and four 7.5-inch guns; three 18-inch torpedo tubes; 22.9 knots; built in 1907> • There are also four light cruisers in, Mediterranean waters. FRANCE. Courbet.—Battleship, 23,100 tons; twelve 12-inch and twenty-two 5.5irich guns; 4 18-inch torpedo tubes; 20 knots; built in 1913. Jean Bart.-—Battleship; same class as Courbet. Condorcet.—Semi-Dreadnought battleship, 18,028 tons; four 12-inc.lv and twelve 9.4-inch guns; two JS inch torpedo tubes; 19.8 knots; built in 1911. 0 Danton.—Seini-Dreadnouglit battleship; same class as Condorcet. Diderot.—Semi-Dreadnought battleship ; same class as Condorcet. Mirabeau.—Semi-Dreadnought battleship; same class as Condorcet. Vergniaud.—Semi-Dreadnought battleship; same class as Condorcet. Voltaire. Semi-Dreadnouglit battleship; same class as Condorcet. Patrie. —Battleship, 14,635 tons, four 12inch and 18 0.4-inch guns; five 18inch torpedo tubes; 19.12 knots; built, in 1906. Democratie.^—Battleship, 14,635 tons; four 12-inch and 10 7.6-inch guns; four 18-inch torpedo tubes; 19.4 knots; built in 1907. Justice. —Battleship; same class as Democrat ie. • Republique.—Battleship; same class as Patrie. Veritic. —Battleship; same class as Democratic. Bouvet.—Battleship, 12,007 tons; two 12-inch and two 10.8-inch guns; four 18-iiich torpedo tubes; 18.2 knots; built-in 1898. Gaulois. —Battleship, 11,105 tons; four 12-inch and 1.0 5.5-inch guns; four torpedo tubes; 18 knots; built in 1898. St. Louis.—Battleship;' same class as Gaulois. Waldeck Rousseau.—Armoured cruiser, 13,780 tons; .14 7.6-inch and 20 2.4incb guna; two 18-inch torpedo tubes; 23.1£ knots; built in 1911.

Eugard Quinet.—Armoured cruiser; same class as Waldeek Rousseau. Ernest Eenan. —Armoured cruiser, 13,427 tons; four 7.6-iuch and 12 6.4-iueh guns; two 18-ineh torpedo tubes; 25.5 knots ; 4juilt. in 1909. Jules Ferry.—Armoured cruiser, 12*351' ' tons; four 7.6-inch and 16 18-inch torpedo•tubes; 22.8 knots;-built in 1906. "• , loon Crambetta.—Armoured i cruiser;; same class as Jules Ferry. Victor Hugo.—Armoureil cruiser; same class as Jules Ferry. There are also "three, light cruisers in these waters. ITALY. Dante.—Battleship, 19,400 tons; twelve 12-inch and twenty 4.7-inch guns; three 18-inch torpedo tubes; 23.8 knots; built in 1912. Leonardo da Vinci.—Battleship, 22,340 tons; thirteen 12-ineh and eighteen ; 4.7-inch guns; three '-'IS-inch, torpedo Guilio Casare.—Battleship; same class as the Leonardo. Kegina Elena.—Battleship, 12,425 tons; 1 two 12-inch arid twelve 84iich guns; r ; 18-inch torpedo tubes; 22 knots.; built in 1907. Vittorio Emanueic.—Battleship; same class as Regma: Elena. Roma.—Battleship; same class as Regina Elena. Napoli. same class as Segina- Elena. Reg. Margherita.—rßattleship, 13*214

tons; four 12-inch, four 8-inch, and twelve 6-inch guns; four 18-inch torpedo tubes; 20.2 knots; built in 1904. Benedetto Brin.—Battleship; same class as Eegina Margherita. Emanuele Filiberto.—Battleship, 9645 -tons; four 10-inch and eight 6-inch guns; lour 18-inch torpedo tubes; 18.3 knots; built in 1901. Gr. Garibaldi.—Armoured cruiser, 7294 tons; one 10-iuc-h, two 8-inch, and fourteen - 6-inch' guiis; four 18-inch torpedo tubes; 20 knots; built in 1901. Varese. Armoured cruiser; same class as G. Garibaldi. F. Ferruccio.—Arnioured cruiser; same class-as G. Garibaldi. Pisa.—Armoured cruiser, 9956 tons; four 10-inch and eight 7-5-incli guns; three 18-inch torpedo tubes; 23 knots; built in 1909. Amalfi.—Armoured cruiser; same class as Pisa., Sari Giorgio.—Armoured cruiser; same class aS Pisa, but 22.5 knots. There are also five light cruisers attached to the Italian fleet. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. Viribus Unitis.—Battleship, 20,000 tons; . twelve 12-inch and . twelve 5.9-inch • guns; four 21-inch torpedo tubes; 20.7 knots; built in 1913. Tegetthoff.—Battleship; same class as Viribus Unitis. Radetzky.—Battleship, 14,226 tons; four 12-inch and eight 9.4-inch guns; three 18-inch torpedo tubes; 20.5 knots; built in 1911. Zrinyi.—Battleship; same class as Badetzky. Erz. Franz Ferdinand.—Battleship; same class as Radetzky, but built in .19.10. Erz. Friedrich.—Battleship; 1p,433 tons; four 9.4-inch and twelve 7.5-inch guns; two 18-inch torpedo tubes; 20.5 knots; built, in 1906. Erz. Ferdinand Max.—Battleship; same class as Erz. Friedrich.