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A NATIONAL POLICY.

e - NEW ZEALAND AND NAVAL DEFENCE. r . . j [Specially written for The Sun.] > ' • " ,K "" ' i ' V. r In a previous article' it was sug : 1 gested that as far as New Zealand is . concerned, the defence problem simply ; resolves itself into- a matter of a L patriotic obligation to assist the Mother } Country in providing adequate;, defences I for the Empire. The danger of invasion is decidedly remote, and the "King's enemies" cannot do us much harm except ; through our overseas commerce. 5 That alone is our vulnerable spot; and } it is a niatter of the first ihiportance, r that we should maintain trade relations > with the Mother Country in war as well i as in peace, in order to protect our > credit; and/> secondly, "to assist'in keeps ing up the supply of foodstuffs and raw / material, on which Great Britain is s dependent. ' : : - The. issue accordingly arises: Can.this • best be done by taxing ourselves and j subsidising .the : British Navy, or is it better to rely, on ourselves/and establish some naval »force s in Australasian, waters, which; will be available for the protection of 'our mercantile marine in the' event of war freaking' out?'* *' ' The naval proposals of the present Government are, clearly based, "on the assumption' that the latter is the right course; ' " "" ' • THE AUSTRALASIAN SQUADRON. The question . is being . debatedfrom fiercely pai'tisaia, standpoints, with the usual wealth of invective that is invariably • the • refuge of uniformed' and incompetent critics.' We are treated to an appalling aftiount of rubbish about'' toy navies,'' " mosquito fleets," etc., from Opposition newspaper writers, and the misrepresentation that goes on almost daily is a disgrace to journalism. Prior to 1909 New Zealand subsidised the British Nary. Starting with £20,000 a year in 1887, the amount had risen to £IOO,OOO, when Sir Joseph Ward •electrified the Empire by presenting Britain with a. Dreadnought. The annual subsidy represented a tribute of 2s per head paid by. the people of New Zealand towards naval defence. At the same time the people -of. Great Britain .were paying 19s per head. Our contribution, therefore, was negligible. Regardless, however, of the insignificance of the assistance given by both Australia and New Zealand during the past 25 years or more, Britain maintained an Australasian' Squadron . iu these waters. . j v I ■- ••■■■ . ■! ' | SHOWING THE |*LAG. Y.,.J?6.]r all practical purposes the Squadron was oneooff f these despised ' f local'' navies. ;^';l j.,.... Stationed ijjbOO miles away from Home, and composed of ships of small fighting value, the Australasian Squadron could only liaVe been used to convoy merchantmen, had war broken out between England and France during the latter part . of the 19th century, or with Germany in the first .decade of the 20th. Still, the Australasian Squadron performed useful services. It is always necessary to "show the flag," and on several occasions its presence in the Pacific maintained British prestige. People seeing a warship lying in port day after day are apt to take it as a matter of cours.e, and attach no importance or value to its presence. But if, in pursuance of the notion that there is no necessity to, 'maintain warships except in the North Sea, the white ensign disappeared from these waters, j the most friendly visit of a foreign inan-o '-war would produce a mighty un- < comfortable feeling. The people : of ; Jamaica thought so, at any late, when j trouble came and' there was no British warship within a thousand, miles. Nor is it flattering to British pride when ( armed parties from warships land to maintain the King's peace in the absence of British bluiejackets. Yet ! it what happened at Kingston, and ' the Governor resigned as a result of. • the. censure he incurred for . insisting ] on the observance of the King 'sregula- 1 tions, and in refusing to accept the pro- 1 tection of an armed force landed by the ' captain of an American vessel, purely J in a spirit of friendliness. . • ' FUTILITY OF NAVAL SUBSIDIES. Even if we could get along well enough with a big fleet of Dread- , noughts in the North Sea to fight the ] Germans, and never a cruiser t<N re- , mind us that the seas are one, the faet remains thsit it is' no solution of the" ] problem to pay a lump sum .annually J to the Mother Country and leave the ! rest to her. ; If the cost :>of the navy is shared J equally by the Mother Country and ' the Dominions, it would mean an . allround payment of about 15/- per' head. New Zealand's share would come to . £750,000. Nov Government, however, £ would dream of paying away any such sum without a voice in its expenditure. , The only authority tjjat could levy . on this scale for the purposes of naval } defence would be an Imperial Govern- 1 ment of a type which has yet to be s created, adequately representing the a peoples and Dominions to be taxed for r the purpose. Nor could any purely c British Cabinet place itself in the position of being dependent for the main- a tenance of the navy on the voluntary contributions, however large, of Dominions that might, owing to internal political changes, decide to suspend s< those contributions. This was the atti- s tude taken up by Mr Asquith at the t Naval Conference of 1909, and must e always be the attitude of any British I Administration responsible for the 1< foreign policy and security of the 1: Empire. In short, the policy of subsidy a or tribute is incompatible with the e principle of representative government p and that is why British statesmen who c are sounder on matters of principle t than their colouial brothers refuse to o entertain the idea seriously. c THE 1909 NAVAL PANIC. "V Moreover, its futility is amply demonstrated by effects of our gift of t. a Dreadnought. n That vessel was given at a period n of. panic-which subsequently i>roved to C be quite, unjustified. It was a time p when even statesmen like Mr Balfour s lost their heads and talked wildly, t Speaking in the historic debate on the t Naval Estimates of 1909, Mr Balfour v anticipated that Germany would have n 21 Dreadnoughts by April of 1912, as c compared to Britain's 20. She has not '

got them .«she. has ottly l-9> .-while Britain has 32. The effect of Sir Joseph Ward's gift was merely that Britain built one less; than- she- otherwise would. • cost.-New-Zealand- ■•£l,700yO0(> J , and did not, as was giva the Mother, Country", an,, extra...ship :at'a time when the alarmists 'were- expecting Germany Would W ready for a; trial of, strength. Sir Joseph Ward's pletion was considered 1 " immensely 'patriotic; at' f- the time:' in the cold' light q£ sbbseg quent events it was immensely foolish. . Why, therefore, repeat • -the foily) for r that is what it would, amount -to, of a attempting to strengthen the navy with r annual -gifts of money and occasional s gifts of ships, when the Dominion lias Q no Voice in deciding British, foreign and no say in determining what is adequate in the matter of naval d - a fence? Clearly, it is necessary to. proceed along different lines. >1 At the. Naval Conference/"of 1009, s, the Admiralty recognised this; by s s approving of , the Commonwealth's der* j cision to establish the . Royal p lian'Navy; and, .subsequently' made "arrangements for the withdrawal of the " Australasian squadron.. 1 7 g A LOST OPPORTUNITY, . New Zealand was strongly urged, as g the .official correspondence shows, to, j join Australia .at the time, but j.- Sir Joseph Ward was the, stumbling block, and- the upshot oi the. negotiations was -that the. Admiralty uriderl-; .took to Weate an Eastern. Pacific unit' i .of the: navy, ; the flagship of which, was, { to be the~ New Zealaiiid Dreadnought. " The scheme looked well enough on i paper, but it soon became obvious that ■ the - strategical disposition of .the I ;world's 'flaval. force? did not warrant : the maintenance" of any such fleet in-: the China ■ and the Admiralty secured New Zealand 's concurrence- to the transfer of . our Dreadnought to ' L Home waters. The result,' therefore, ; of "the Naval Conference, the protracted ' negotiations, and the "gift Dreadnought,; is practically nil as far as New Zealand is concerned. The Dominion was" I thrown back on its own resources; and when the present .Government came ' into power it was faced with the alter-' ■ native of approaching Australia with- ' a scheme of naval co-operation, %v p£1 taking independent action. It decided, ■ upon tlxe latter. . (To be Continued.) , [Previous articles appeared on February, 6, 9; 13, and 18.] ;

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/SUNCH19140226.2.44

Bibliographic details

Sun (Christchurch), Volume I, Issue 18, 26 February 1914, Page 6

Word Count
1,439

A NATIONAL POLICY. Sun (Christchurch), Volume I, Issue 18, 26 February 1914, Page 6

A NATIONAL POLICY. Sun (Christchurch), Volume I, Issue 18, 26 February 1914, Page 6

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