THE FRENCH ARMY IN 1877.

Samoa Times and South Sea Gazette, Issue 7, 17 November 1877, Page 4

THE FRENCH ARMY IN 1877.

[From "Blackwood's Magazine.") (CoMfamed from our last issue.) Tin: unceesaful bidding of fonkications di iiends. -however in these days, almost a< mueh mi tin- power of the artillery on the ramparts as on tie vigor and tenacity of the garrison ; ami in the organization of their " artillerie ile forteresse " the French have still a great ileal to Jo. Each of their nineteen brigades of gunners includes three dismounted batteries, making fifty-seven batteries in all it is, then, with the men of these fifty-seven batteries that, thus far, the French army is supposed to be able to serve the immense defensive works which have been constructed at so much cost' There is hen one of those strange negligences which puzzle foreigners. . , ha: :. . esser.l ial point been so [.eglected >. Why, aitei sis \cuis of organization, is Frame still unable to completely man her ramparts ? The mixing up of garrison and held batteries in the same brigades is an inexuusab<e t! ey ought to be separated at he ; ai:d the titty-sever, batteries of in .-•■ 3 guns i ught to I e carried as rapidly le to two or three times as many. Until this is done, "the question of the practical defensibility of the new forts will remain somewhat in doubt; for though, of couise, it may be said that sailors can be called up to woik the batteries, yet still, iron; a military point ci view, that solution settle;' nothing. It is now time to go on to the territorial army and its reserves, of neither of whl hj has anything been said yet. The territorial army includes, theoretically, all Frenchmen between the ages of hirty and thirty-four, and its reserve takes ,'!1 those between thirty-five and forty. tasnoattempt whatever has been made, ■ u on paper, to organize the reserve of

the "territoriale," it may be left out of the account, for the present at ali events, ps a non-e - isting force. The territorial

I'll- . jutuiy, a progressing reality. It is (■■ mposed, nominally, like the active a»my, of five annual contingents. As *.! ere- are scarcely any exemptions, each : those contingents may be roughly . -etl at two hundred thousand men ; . neral total would seem therefore to . :"'ne million. But that figure is ili istry : it allows nothing for mortalit)-

or for :! er causes of diminution ; and furthermore, the one hundred and fortyfive regiments of infantry into which the •' territoriale " is divided, are composed, by law, of three battalions of one thousand men eaeh, and can only absorb, therefore, 435,000 men; so that, allowing the additional propottion of 120,000 more for cavalry, artillery, engineers, and auxiliary services, the utilizable total of ■this force would not exceed —or. peihaps, not even attain—sss,ooo men. Practically, indeed, it would be wiser not to count on the mobilization of more than 500,000 —the surplus men, if any, remaining disposable for ulterior needs. Of that number it may be calculated that, at the ptesent moment, about "iJO.OOO are old soldiers of the active ... ;:.y, that 120,000 served in the last war as " mobiles," and that the remaining hundred thousand have had no military training. The ratio of old soldiers is, however, increasing now each year with the regular application of the : universal service law, and from and after iSSIi every man in the territorial regi ments will have passed through the active army. Meanwhile those regiments contain a large proportion of men who have been non-commissioned officers, and who would, for that reason, contribute to the rapid instruction of the thers.

As regard the officers of the " territori- ," the situation is not very satisfactory. out two-thirds of them (8000 out of ,000) are appointed. They have been eeted after a personal examination, .1 such of them as happen to be retired icers ui the active army will of course their work well. But it is notorious it political and social considerations ve teen largely consulted in choosing

t':.e,->e officers, and that most of them have been named, not because they were soldiers, but because they were gentlemen in position or Conservatives in opinion. Certain applicants who were professionally capable have been excluded because they were too Republican. Furthermore, it is becoming more and i., re difficult tc Hr.d candidates for com- . .. I l the territorial regiments ...... ... the res r of :;.c :..;.;ve army. It

is ibs&luttly forbidden to officers oi those two services to wear uniform off duty; consequently the applicants who thought it would be agreeable to tliero to swagger about in red trousers rind their dream unrealizable, and no longer pursue it. Then, again, though there is no pay except under arms), officers have to proi Mi.' their own clothes and equipment. Finally, almost all the great financial and industrial institutions of the country, with the Bank of France at their head, haw very practically, but not very patriotically, announced to their " employe's " that if any of them accept a grade in either the reserve or the territorial army, they will instantly be dismissed from their places. The result Is, that by refusing the permission to wear uniform when not convoked for service, all the vain-glorious aspirant* havo been discouraged ; by obliging officers to pay for their dress and arms, all tho fortuneless are drivon away (and the fortuneless are numerous); and by proclaiming incompatibility between clerkship and soldering, a great part of the lower " bourgeoisie " is shut out.

The result of all this has been, that the ' enthusiasm of [B73—when crowds of 1 men of all ranks petitioned to be made j officers of the " territoriale " —began to ! die out in t>74. In 1575 it became : necessary to reduce the difficulties of [admission; non-commissioned officers of ' the " mobile " were admitted to the examinations for the reserve artillery ; toon afterwards the same measure was extended to all other arms. It was Constantly declared that each examina- ; tion would be the last, and that the list was on the point of being closed ; but I more examinations followed all the same. I Their level was lowered ; and only last month the " Journal Official" of the army published another new programme, ! still less developed than its predecessors, , for another scries of examinations in ! April. I These insufficiencies are, however, of no very seri us importance; tbeysupply i si me iurlhcr eviueuce ct the !• ilil t'v idi frii itrativt power which is so strangely evident to the present generation of Frenchmen, but they will not do much real damage. If war broke : out, it would at once bo seen that the I" armee territoriale " is not a mere imaginary corps ; officers would then be forthcoming in any numbers, for everybody would have to serve. The resources of Fiance would not be limited to the j active army and its reserves ; the | territorial troops would rapidly acquire ! value, and would present a very different I character from the "mobiles" of H7O. ; It is true that they are not yet in a state of cohesion which would permit them to render immediate service as a separate army ; but they may certainly be relied on as auxiliary forces, the more so as they would not, in all probability, be needed so mueh for campaign work as for guarding "etapes,"for keeping open communications, and for aiding to supplygarrisons for the entrenched camps, and for Paris and Lyons. And it should be particularly remarked that the engineering element of the •' Territoriale " will be most useful, for it will include the mest effective part of the corps of

The organisation of the " Territoriale " is now quite complete on paper, but the men have only been called together once, for one day, to receive their registerhooks, At least a month would be required (supposing that their arms and uniform are really ready, which does not appear to be quite certain) before the battalions could be formed into regiments and brigades. Still, notwithstanding, it must be repeated that the " Territoriale " presents sufficient elements of number, of so.idity, and of reality, to justify its admission henceforth into the list of the disposable forces of France.

Recapitulating the figures at which we have now successively arrived for ti.e various elements of those- forces, it

appears that the entire combatant strength of which France could now dispose (one-half of it within three weeks, and the rest successively), would lie made up as follows :

Field armies, ... ... ... 455,000 Camps and garrisons 210,000 Unconcentrated troops, ... 325,000; Unincorporated men at depots, 310,000 Forest and coast guards, ... 25,000 Territorial army 500,000 General total, 1,825,000 In IS7O only 250,000 men could be concentrated in a month, while the reserves and garrisons did not, at first. reach 300,000. The position is therefore, completely changed , money, work, and time have, in spite of obstacles and incapacities, converted the French army into a machine of power. For what purpose can this machine Le used ?

Can it possibly be employed for attacking Germany ? Or is it, by the force of things, utilizable solely and Exclusively for defence ? To obtain answers to these questions it is essential to look at them from three 'iiierent standpoints—to measure the strategical, the material, and the political considerations which seem likely to influence the action of France. When the Germans took the AlsaceLorraine fortresses, and surrounded them with additional fortifications, which have rendered them impregnable without a I long siege, they thereby rendered it virtually impossible for France to undertake an offensive campaign. The annexation of those fortresses has turned out to mean something more than territorial conquest, something else than homage to a German sentiment; it is now proved to be an act of the profoundest military wisdom. They close the road to Germany. The experience of recent campaigns, and especially of 1870, has clearly shown, that though an army can advance into hostile territory without immediately investing the fortresses on its way (unless, indeed, they contain a numerous garrison, in which case that garrison must of course be watched by a more than equal force), it is scarcely possible to advance at all—with the masses of men which modern war puts in motion—unless the invader has a railway at his complete disposal for the carriage of his supplies. It happens, however, that the new German strongholds between France and the Rhino would, in consequence of the space covered by their fortifications, be, of nocessity, heavily garrisoned in the event of a French attack, and that it would therefore be indispensable to invest them ut oneo. Such an investment would mean the inn-mobilization, for an undetermined period, of a force which can scarcely be estimated at less than 400,000 men. Hut the ton of the

Alsace-Lorraine fortresses means much more than this; it means, also, the total stoppage of all traffic on the railways which pass through and are commanded by those fortresses. Consequently, mppoting even that France wen able to devote 400,000 men to the merely

- sondary task of reducing the lateral obata les in her pith -supposingthat she bad enough men to besiege several firstclass fortresses, and to simultaneously j conquer nil the German armies in the field—she would not, even then, have the command of a single railway until one or more of the fortresses were taken, and would have to contend, meanwhile, against difficulties of transport, which it is impossible to suppose that she could overcome. The holding out for a few weeks of a little place like Toul caused the very gravest difficulties to the Germans in lts"0, because it deprived them of the use of the line to Paris, •■! under the guns of that fortress. What would happen then to the French, with their inferior organization, if such an obstacle arose in every direction at the very origin of the campaign, if they had to try to fight their way ahead without a railway ! Turn and twist this difficulty as you like, you cannot get over it. There it is, absolute and unchangeable. If then, we follow up the idea of an attack by France on Germany, we arc- bound to suppose, first, that all, or nearly all, the 1,300,000 men of the French active army can be brought on to German soil at the very commencement of the campaign; secondly, that the supplies for, say, 800.000 men (no weaker army could be supposed to force a road against united Germany), could be carried regularly to constantly increasing distances " in carts." It is surely needless to pursue such an hypothesis as this. Yet, all the same, let us go one step further, in order to exhaust the wildest possibilities of the case. Let us conceive (if we are capable of so mad an imagining) that the armies are forthcoming, that all the fortresses are invested, that the Germans are defeated and are driven across the Rhine, and that the French follow them and advance into pure German ground. An offensive war under such conditions, with the prodigious quantities of men which would be eraployed on both sides—with all the Fatherland in arms in front, and with all the men of France surging onwards from behind, — would necessitate a vigor of command, a unity of action, a perfection of administration, which would imply not mere ordinary capacity, but the very highest genius, in the chiefs. But are we justified in presuming, from what the world has seen of the French army since Waterloo, that the neodraJ genius would be there ? Can the fhost earnest, the most enthusiastic, the least reasoning i'rier.d of France pretend that

the experience of the last fifty years justifies the hope that there is one single soldier in the French army who is capable of discharging so tremendous a task \ No. It may, however, he urged—it has, indeed, been urged occasionally in private talks—that though, in scientific war, Germany is, for the moment, iueontestalily superior to Fntoce ; though, in this generation, the thinking power of battle appears to lean most heavily to her side ; yet that France has sometimes shown a might of an altogether special kind, a might peculiar to herself alone, a might

which rides down obstacles, and which extorts success from impossibility. Twice, in recent centuries, has that outbreaking potency revealed itself ; it was awakened for the first time by Joan of Arc, for the second time by the French Revolution. It was the potency of an idea, of glowing ardors, of hot passions ; it was resistless then ; but would it conquer now ? Are fevers capable of overthrowing science ? The contrary result is probable. The conditions of war are so radically changed that emotions would only be in the way, and the more fervid they were the more cumbersome would they be. If some totally fresh sentiment, some unknown and uninvented quantity, some new " French fury," were to unveil itself tomorrow, it would simply break its heated head against the cold wall of science.

Neither strategically nor materially, nor even emotionally, can France expect, then, to fight her way into Germany in our time.

And the political obstacles in the way of an offensive war are not less important or less real. By the constitutional law of Kith July KS7o, it is enacted that war can only be declared with the consent of the two Chambers. Under what conceivable circumstances is it to be imagined that the two Chambers would vote a voluntary attack on Germany ? Where is the minister of war who will dare to proclaim once more that " France is ready " ? Where is the president of the council who, " with a. light heart," will mount into the tribune and call on France to fight again ?

No conditions are reasonably supposable under which all this could happen : and certainly, so long as the republic lasts, the world will sec nothing of the kind. The republic has no dynastic interests to serve—no personal or special reasons for desiring a " revanche.' On the contrary, it has everything to lose by war; for if war produced victory, a successful general might make himself dictator; while, if it produced defeat, a Bonapartist " quartrc Scptembro " would immediately become possible. And then, again, France longs earnestly for peace ; she shrinks instinctively from nil i ' I*of conquest, Of course she would

take back Alsaev and Lorraine if she could get them ; hut would she provoke a w»r (even if die believed herself to be quite reedy] fof the sole purpose of regaining them I Solferino, Mexico, M.-iiuiiia, would not be voted now by the Parliament ut Versailles—nor " Berlin " either.

One more point should be looked at, France has vainly sought for an allay since IH7I. She" has not found one in Europe; and perhaps it is lucky for her that she has failed; for we may rest assured that, if she had succeeded, the very instant the news got out that she had signed an offensive and defensive alliance —no matter with wdiom—the German armies would instantaneously have been mobilized and F'rance have been invaded. She has, though, one unprovoking ally at her disposal —an ally who is waiting for her at home, and whose precious aid she would lose the very instant she crossed the frontier. That ally is not a nation or a monarch, it is simply—distance.

France at home has every man at hand; France in Germany would be forced to leave a constantly increasing proportion of her soldiers behind her to guard the road she has followed. And, as the argument applies equally to both sides, it follows that just as France would lose by distance if she attacked Germany, so would she profit by it if she were herself attacked. It cannot be argued that the transfer of the German frontier to this side of the Vosges in any way diminishes the difficulty of distance for Germany; if she were to enter France again, she would have at once to contend with it—and it is in that fact that Franco would find her only probable ally.

These reasons are evident, simple, and real. Nobody will deny their truth. France cannot attack Germany. But if she is attacked, she can, most certainly defend herself. After six years of loitering, hesitating, and bungling, she has at last—almost in spite of herself—manufactured an enormous army. She may be incapable of using it to the best efl'e :t, or of extracting from it all that it is susceptible of producing; but, however weak may be her management of it, the material force is there. She still needs two years to finish up the details ; she has still to finally terminate her " materiel " and her fortresses, to remodel her garrison artillery, to reorganize her Intendancc and her staff' corps. But all the really heavy work is ilone. She is ready now to fight upon her own ground if needful. At home, one half of her difficulties would disappear. Her fortresses and her entrenched camps would supply her armies with magazines and solid " points d'appui." Her railways would furnish ample means of transport from the rear. Of course she will grow stronger with each year ; of course with time her army will steadily improve; of course its faults will gradually diminish,—at least it may be hoped so. But it is an army " now " ; and it is useful not only to declare that fact, but to add to it the distinct statement that if Germany were to once more raise the menace of two years ago, France would no longer depend for her existence on the intervention of Europe. She would, most assuredly, accept that intervention gratefully and heartily, in order to avoid war ; tut she no longer imperiously needs it, as she did in 1875, to save her from destruction. If another " scare " burst out to-morrow, it would find her, at last, in a situation to efficaciously protect herself. She would no longer talk of withdrawing her useless soldiers behind the Loire, and of leaving the invader to overrun an undefended country. If Germany again proclaimed the wish to crush up France for good, before she is fit to fight, France would, this time, look her calmly in the face, and would say to her, in the consciousness of sufficient strength,— It is too late.