The Stratford Evening Post. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED THE EGMONT SETTLER FRIDAY, JULY 12, 1918. BRITAIN’S GREAT NAVY.

Stratford Evening Post, Volume XXXVI, Issue 88, 12 July 1918, Page 4

The Stratford Evening Post. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED THE EGMONT SETTLER FRIDAY, JULY 12, 1918. BRITAIN’S GREAT NAVY.

?‘ft is certainly true,” says Mr John ■Loylaud in his book “The Achievement of the British Navy in the World War;” “that the work of the Sea Service during this unparalleled 'war has never been properly appreciated by many of those who have benefited by it most. The silent Navy ■does-its work unobserved. The record of its heroism and the services it renders pass unobserved by the multitude.” At intervals it emerges to engage in a brush with the enemy or even, perhaps, to fight ( a set battle, and after its job is done it retired again into obscurity. These operations are forgotten by the majority, of people, who, however, remember the case of. every bombardment of a British coast town and every torpedoing of a big ship which,the navy fail-* ed to frustrate. The experience lias been similar in all naval campaigns in the past, and on this matter, British statesmen when they speak of the navy’s work in the war, almost invariably fail to enlighten the public. Seeing that British people fail to understand the full significance of Britain’s command of the sea it is no wonder that the peoples of our European Allies are unable to recognisethat behind all the fighting power of their armies lies the influence of seapower exercised by the British navy and by the navies co-operating with it, and ill at without this command of the sea it is useless to expect success in military operations. In the words of King George, the British navy defends the British shores and commerce, and secures for Britain and her Allies the ocean highways of the world. On the first day of hostilities the British navy established a hold on the road which leads to victory, and it is no exaggeration to say that the navy; from the very beginning, influenced the military situation throughout the world, and made possible many military operations which otherwise could not have been initiated or continued. When the war broke out the situation a s regards tin* British navy was critical—operations had to lie performed swiftly and unhesitatingly in case the enemy intended to strike a sudden unforseen blow with his fleet. But, owing to; the high state of efficiency in the service and tlu? unerring instinct and sagacity of the commanders, tin* right measures wore decided on and were executed quickly and decisively. The need of exerting sea power was, never more urgent than when the war broke out—the food that the British people ate and the things by which the industries and commerce of Britain existed demanded control at sea, which was also necessary if British armies were to he kept in supplies in various parts of the world, and help rendered to her Allies at widely-separated points. Therefore, it is as true to-day as it was in 1038,; when John Holland wrote in his “Discourse of the Navy” regarding; the wars of his own lime that “the naval part is the thread that runs* through the whole wooft, the burden of the song, the scope of the text.” Thus it might he imagined that the war started with the initiative in the hands of. t.he Germans, because the German military forces were the first military forces to take the field

and invade foreign. wliereas

the real initiative was in the hands

I of the Allies, as a result of the disposition of the British fleet wliich had previously been made. The navy had been mobilised as a test operation on July 20th, 1914, and though the various units afterwards returned to their home ports demobilisation was delayed, and when Austria declared war on July 28th, the .British fleet, in full war strength, was able to proceed to its war stations the 1 next morning. Therefore, when Britain entered the war on August 4th, she was already exercising control of the sea and the safe, transport of her troops to France was guaranteed. In the first months of the war the navy had a particularly strenuous time. Operations had to be carried out at sea by the fighting forces, and in ad- 1 '

ditiou innumerable supplementary services had to be organised and put in working order. Alter the brush

( in the Heligoland Bight on August* 28th. the navy was once more lost to view, but gradually people began to realise that the navy was an efficient) force, for there was no German raid on England and no anxiety about food. But at the same time there was a good deal of unreasonable disquietude regarding minor mishaps—the escape of the Goeben and Breslau, tlie sinking of the Aboukir, Crossy, Hogue and Formidable, the depredations of German raiders on the more distant sea routes, the bombardment) of English coast towns, and similar small operations, annoying, but having no direct influence on the major strategy of the naval war. The real truth of the situation was not • com prehended. The British people looked for victories on a large scale, while the strategy of the enemy mado such impossible. Even so, with the enemy carrying out small operations with comparative impunity and the British navy unable to gain a largo scale victory over the German fleet, the British navy was all in all to Great Britain, to the British Empire and to Britain’s Continental Allies. There arc a great many things which the navy should not be expected to do (though they may ho demanded by those ignorant of the navy’s work and power), but there are tiling* which it is expected to do: it is expected to safeguard the incoming of supplies, to deny all activity to the enemy on the sea, to shut off the enemy’s sea-borne supplies, to support the armies in the field, to exert in flucuco wherever the enemy can be reached by sen. and to safeguard the Empire from injuryor disruption; a n d he would he an unwise person who! endeavored to argue that the British navy has not. with triumphal success, executed each and every of these important functions. i