The Stratford Evening Post WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED THE EGMONT SETTLER. SATURDAY, DECEMBER 29, 1917. BRITISH NAVAL POLICY.

Stratford Evening Post, Volume XXXV, Issue 28, 29 December 1917, Page 4

The Stratford Evening Post WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED THE EGMONT SETTLER. SATURDAY, DECEMBER 29, 1917. BRITISH NAVAL POLICY.

The school of naval criticism in England which strongly advocates a) greater offensive being taken even if some risks of losses have to be faced, is apparently gaining in strength; and it is probable that the replacing; of Admiral Jellicoe may be an outcome of the agitation. It is certain! that the earlier steps taken in, British Naval re-organisation and the appointment of Sir Eric Geddes* as* First Lord, mark a certain degree of concession to the critics. The Wel J lington, Post points out that one of the chief contentions of the greater offensive criticism is that material should lie separated from military direction, and that from the former the fighting staff should be cut free, and considers that, to a large extent this has been done by the appoint-, ment of Sir Eric Geddes as a civilian' ivijth a special commission to supervise material supply. If the cut between material and military policy has not been made so decisively and clear-i ly as some of the critics would desire, the demarcation is yet substantial enough to have a very marked effect. It frees the military staff from the main burden of what is principally a civilian duty, and leaves the First Sea Lord and his fighting colleagues with no hindrance in the carrying out of offensive plans in an offensive warfare is found to be advisable. The Wellington evening journal goes on to say: The critics' further point—that Admiral Jellicoe is not fitted by training to originate and carry out a determined naval • offensive—could hardly be expected to he conceded hi the initial stage of the, Whitehall evolution. For, after all,' it'is still an open question who is right—the First Sea Lord or his critics. Certainly their case has not been proved to demonstration. If they v liave proved failure to sufficiently check the submarine, they havi- yet to show conclusively that the failure was avoidable and to demonstrate n more excellent method. If ii is possible to completely defeat the submarine, every mom' aid material consideration calls lor early consummation of that purpose, even at considerable cost. But if the submarine can be defeated only in degree—checked, but not. killed—the "whole-hog" policy

may iu the long run cost more' than it.-is worth. ..Such an issue only experience own finally decide. And it must he !>nni«\.it> tmnd that partial failure is not •the-", .'privilege ± oif ■.. the Navy aloix*. As i\fr Pollen has him--nlf pointed out. "Tt is pnri ol the lopayturveydoui hi which we live thai

the greatest land force and the greatest sea force in the world have achieved everything expected of tliom — except victory. The failure to achieve victory has given time to each side. Time, in which we have been able to produce a new kind of army that Germany will not be able to resist; time for Germany to produce a new kind of navy which we do not seem yet Able to fight." The partial failI lire 'of the German Army is viewed ' l)y Mr. Pollen with' less composure than'the qualified success of the British Navy. He is convinced that the Nary should do more; it is even becoming a question "whether the j Army will be able to win the war before the Navy loses it." To phrase the situation that way is to put the case too high. Not all the depreda-

tions of the German submarines, as so far recorded, can so weigh against the efforts of the British Navy, the \ ship-yards, and the Food Controller, as to lose the war. But it may be that a more intense phase of the submarine attrition is ahead when the longer days of spring-summer return. Tn that case 1918 may brmg events that will tip the balance, :t*.id commit the British Admiralty to a definite attempt to close the German coast and to seal up the wasp-nests on the still unrecovered coast of Belgium. It seems to be postulated by Mr Pollen that offensive operations against the German coast would re--1 quire a specially constructed fleet with new engines of destruction. If no such fleet is ready or under construction, his reply is that the Admiralty has neglected constructional opportunity. Although the Admiralty has "from the very first days of the war" been conceded a very high proportion of the supply of raw material and of the resources of the country in shipbuilding, engineering, and manufacture, "it has for a long time been very questionable whether the Admiralty has put this monopoly to good use. It has indeed been almost' unquestionable that it has not donei so." One of the most difficult matters to decide is how much ship-build-ing effort should be devoted to mer- 1 cantile replacement and how much to anti-submarine craft. As the sub-

marine losses increase, Mi- Pollen leans more and more to the latter,: "If you are losing between four and five million tons of merchant shipping a year, and can only, build one million, the question immediately arises whether the labour and mater-i ial expressed by these million tons of merchant shipping could not be more profitably invested in an equivalent amount of submarine-hunting craft. Could not, in other words, a million tons of slow destroyers or fast patrols save a great deal more than a million tons of shipping before the! year was out " The mathematical basis on which the above quotation/ is founded has no application at the) moment. But the anti-submarine plans must necessarily take into consideration not only the short casualty, lists of winter, but the comparatively, long ones of the summer months. In his last Admiralty statement in the House of Commons, Sir Eric Geddes emphasised the anti-submarine as well as the replacement- pliase of the question, pointing out that a weapon offensive against submarines was in-* creasingly needed, and that defen-sively-armed merchant vessels did not provide it. Though the enemy is still buildi»g"*submarines faster than; we sink them, and is still sinking ships faster than we replace them, the anti-submarine measures are developing and are "proving steadily more efficacious."