The Stratford Evening Post WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED THE EGMONT SETTLER. FRIDAYT, AUGUST 17, 1917. WHY THE ALLIES HOPE TO WIN.

Stratford Evening Post, Volume XXXIV, Issue 20, 17 August 1917, Page 4

The Stratford Evening Post WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED THE EGMONT SETTLER. FRIDAYT, AUGUST 17, 1917. WHY THE ALLIES HOPE TO WIN.

A Gemma newspaper recently asked, in apparent pained surprise, on what tin Knter.Le based its hopes of victory “now that the Central Powers and espeeialls Germany, have given snoh proofs of unbroken si length.“ A writer in the Sydney Telegraph says

' n» * that perhaps it is worth while summing those points up, not that they nro not well enough realised individually, but in order to get them tabulated, and goes on to do so as follows: The Allies hope to win because: (!) Now that America has entered the war the enemy have against them the two .richest nations in the world, richest in resources as well as money. It is true that America is pacifist' and more or less unprepared, but so was Britain when she came in ; yet she is now completely organised for war,' with one of the strongest armies fighting. (2) The Central Powers, strong as they are, are fighting under a very' great disadvantage, to put the thing mildly, on account of the Allied block-' ado. On this point it is worth noting that in spite of the U-boats’ great' achievements, the enemy’s best naval critic (Captain Deisms) admits that after all Britain must’, he recognised, as in command of the. sea. As a result.of this the Central Powers can' neither sell goods nor import food and war supplies, except with narrow] limits, and though it has been impossible to starve them out they certainly have been and are being drained in this way of a considerable proportion of their strength. (3) The weaknesses of the Entente Powers are obvious;' separation from one another in space, j ideals, and aims, with a resulting lack of common understanding, and of coordination of effort. But these weaknesses have become at least far losS| obvious than they were. On the| whole, Germany’s conduct has helped considerably to draw the Allies closer together. (4) If the course of the war up to now can bo taken as any guide to its finish, the signs are had for Germany. She, began all-powerful, attacking and winning everywhere. There followed a stage at which she could no longer attack, except in what are after all only minor theatres. The time has now come when she is admittedly, except as regards Russia, on the defensive. (5) Germany seems to be building all her hopes on Russia and the U boats. But in whatever fix Russia may find herself/ as a, result of internal dissension and Utopian ideals, there is no doubt that the individual Russian hates everything German more than he hates anything else. And though the U-boat danger is still very great indeed, already| Germany lias been compelled to realise that far too much was expected iromj the U boats, and that they cannot by, themselves win the war for hei. 1