Second Edition. THE MOROCCAN SQUABBLE

Stratford Evening Post, Volume XXXI, Issue 90, 29 November 1911, Page 6

Second Edition. THE MOROCCAN SQUABBLE

SIR EDWARD GREY MAKES A GREAT SPEECH.

SOME MORE LIGHT ON THE NEGOTIATIONS. BRILLIANT SCENE IN THE COMMONS. (By Electric Telegraph.—Copyright.) (United Press Association.) London, November 28. The House of Commons presented a striking spectacle. The galleries were crowded with peers, ambassadors, attaches, and a number of Eastern visitors and foreigners. The House was restless until Sir Edward Grey rose. Then the tensity was only broken by cheers. The speech evoked occasional illuminative and patriotic phrases, the greatest applause being when he justified Mr Lloyd-George whole-heartedly. He spoke for an hour and twenty minutes with deliberation and groat clearness, reading important passages. Sir Edward Grey declared the Moroccan negotiations were still important, serious and delicate, and ho intended to confine his speech to that subject. It was impossible for the Government to postpone full settlement longer, despite the risk of disturbing the discussion which had not yet taken place between France and Germany. Her von Kiderlin-Wachter’s disclosures were published contrary to diplomatic custom, without notifying Britain. Sir Edward Grey said he knew nothing until he read the statement in the newspapers. It was understood that the exigencies of the situation rendered it impossible for Britain to be cqnsulted. Herr von Kiderlin-Wachter had already denied that France insisted on going to Feu in defiance of Germany. Finally information was received leading him to apprehend that Germany contemplated a settlement, including* the partition of Morocco, after negotiations whereto it was not intended that Britain should he a party, though it was true Britain was not interested herself in Morocco politically. By the Anglo-French agreement of 1904,. however, Britain expressly reserved the possibility of a disturbance of her economic and strategical conditions . Seen after Sir W. Goschen’s interview bn the 12th, German newspapers reported that Germany had made demands in the French Congo to an extent to which it was obvious neither the French Government nor the Chamber of Deputies could agree. Sir Edward Grey therefore saw Count Metternich on the 21st, and said that Britain’s silence must not be interpreted to mean that she was not interested in Morocco. The Government, he said, would he glad if a settlement were arranged on a basis of the rectification of the Congo frontier, but was anxious because it appeared that Germany’s demand was not a rectification of the frontier hut a-cession of . the Congo, which it was impossible for France to concede. If negotiations were unsuccessful a very embarrassing situation might arise. He pointed out to Count Metternich that it was rumoured that Germans were landing at Agadir and negotiating with the natives, suggesting it might be for the purpose of acquiring concessions, and that the German flag might even he hoisted at the port, which was the most suitable on the coast for .a naval base.

On July Ist, when Count Mstternioh came to tlie Foreign Office notifying the despatch of the Panther on the ground that German firms required protection, he explained that the Panther would bp withdrawn when the positioli in Morocco resumed a quiet aspect. This communication was accompanied by an .explanation making it clear that Germany regarded a return to the status quo doubtful, if not impossible, and that she contemplated a definite solution of Morocco between Germany, France and Spain. Sir Edward Grey, realising that the. whole Moroccan question was being reopened, consulted Mr Asquith, and then invited Count Metternieh to an interview on the 3rd, and informed him that the situation was so important that it must be discussed by Cabinet. Accordingly, after Cabinet had desired Count Motter”''' l to : f—m Germany, be saw the letter "*» the 4th. and said it was impossible for Britain not to be interested in Morocco. and that she must t-I:?. v' 1 ' r -a-

siderqtion her treaty obligations with France. Many days of filer r'llowed, Count Metternieh not being instructed to make any comment on the Cabinet’s communcation. The longer the Panther remained at Agadir the greater the risk of developing a situation which would make it difficult to withdraw, and render it necessary for Britain to take steps to protect British interests.

Count Metternieh replied that lie was unable to give information, but was sure Germany did no intend to acquire commercial monopolies. The same day Mr Llovd-Gserge’s speech was delivered, ho, Mr Asquith and Sir E. Grey had a feeling Hot public opinion would be misled if the subject was much longer ignored.

Mr Lloyd-George claimed no preeminence or predominance in Britain’s international affairs, and no menace such as saying “Hands off!” to anyone anywhere. The purport of his speech was, “Where Britain’s intercs x o are affected we must not ho treated as of no account.” Count Metternieh on the 2-!th informed Sir E. Grey that not a man had landed in Agadir.

Count Metternieh then made the communication contained in Herr von Kiderlin-Wachter’s speech. The stiffness of the communication caused Sir E. Grey to say the surprise created in Germany alone seemed to he a

justification for Mr Lloyd-George’s speech.

Sir E. Grey added that since it was inconsistent with German dignity to give an explanation of the Agadir incident, the tone of Germany’s communication made it inconsistent with British dignity to give a public explanation of Mr Lloyd-George’s speed). (Cheers.)

He told Count Metternieh it was not intended to do or say anything to embroil negotiations between Germany and France, hut it would evidently ho a difficult situation if they failed.

Count Metternieh on the 27th made a communication, saying he trusted that Sir E. Grey had gathered the conviction that Germany’s pourparlers with France did not touch British interests. He asked Sir E. Grey to inform Parliament accordingly, without giving details of the confidential communication.

Sir E. Grey said the House would observe that the tone of this was exceedingly friendly. He expressed appreciation to Count Metternieh, who replied regretting British public opinion had been misled. Sir E. Grey answered: “What enubl be expected when ships were suddenly sent to tbc most suitable port for a naval base?’" Sir E. Grey added that Herr Kid-

erlia-Wachter stated that Germany never intended taking the port. ii Britain had been told this at the first much misunderstanding would have been avoided.

'1 iio French Government consulted Britain at every point where it was likely that British interests would be affected.

It was understood that Captain Faber’s speech had somewhat intensified the bitterness. Captain Faber’s speech was not official. 'there were speeches made in Germany equally open to objection. Ha suggested the possibility of a most deliberate diplomatic situation, but that there was no prospect o! war. He hoped Ins statement would act as a sedative regarding the general foreign policy. He thought it wisest for Britain to expand further as little as possible, especially in Africa. A/ldressi ’g the Radicals, ho declared it would 1)0 disastrous if Britain proclaimed that under no circumstances would she give a friendly Power assistance.

Herr von Kidcrlin-Wachter had spoken of a “clean slate.” &ir E. Grey endorsed that sentiment, and hoped that Britain would take part in removing the Moroccan trouble. Mr Bonar Law, leader of the Lnionists, declared the Premier should have spoken in, the House of Commons instead of delegating the duty to Mr Lloyd-George. Britain did not want more territory. She had sufficient rcalready.