The Southland Times. MONDAY, APRIL 9, 1945. Russia in the Far East

Southland Times, Issue 25642, 9 April 1945, Page 4

The Southland Times. MONDAY, APRIL 9, 1945. Russia in the Far East

THE reasons advanced by M. Molotov for the denunciation of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact were as valid three years ago as they are today. It was true then that Germany had attacked the Soviet Union, that Japan was helping Germany, and that Japan had attacked Russia’s allies. But it was equally true that neither Russia nor Japan wanted to be reminded of these awkward facts while they retained correct relations in the Far East. The treaty was a convenient diplomatic instrument. Russia was fighting foi - her life at the end of 1941, and no one blamed her for avoiding a further entanglement. Similarly, the Japanese knew that they would need all their strength for the war against the United States and Britain. They attacked at the moment which seemed to promise them an immunity on their Asiatic frontiers, though a year later the great counter-offensive from Stalingrad may have caused some of their war lords to wonder if, after all, they had misjudged the situation. Nevertheless, it suited both sides to respect the non-aggres-sion pact. Russia was free to concentrate on a single front, and the Japanese spread down the Pacific with-

out any real fear of a flare-up on the borders of Manchuria. Today, however, the whole position has changed. Germans>- is defeated. It seems probable that one strong push from the Oder will complete the Red Army’s major task in the west. Thereafter, fairly large forces will be needed for the occupation of the Soviet zone; but the main forces will be released for operations elsewhere. In trying to decide whether or not Russia will take action against Japan, it is necessary to remember that the Russians will be guided solely by practical and realistic considerations. If they fight Japan, it will not be because Japan has attacked their

allies, it will be because Russia has the chance, possibly unique in her history, to obtain complete security in her Far Eastern areas. This search for security can be noticed as the dominant motive for Russian policy in the west. There are times when it seems to be carried too far. It is not always easy to understand why a nation which occupies one-sixth of the earth’s surface, in a continuous land mass, should be so anxious to set up buffer states beyond its frontiers. The war has shown that Russia still has the world’s best gift of space for strategic manoeuvres. It may be true, of course, that the Russians want to make sure that future withdrawals, if they become necessary, will occur in outside territories, and that the soil of the European homeland will be preserved from ravages similar to those committed by the Germans.

Further, no conception of Soviet policy can approach the truth if it ignores the fact of Russia’s movement towards a nationalism that could easily become an open imperialism. It is a movement which can be traced in the history of all great nations in the years of their military and political ascendancy. Dangerous Frontiers

If it is thought that Russian policy is a little too expansionist in Europe, it must at once be admitted that there is justification for security measures in the Far East. More than three-fourths of the Soviet Union is in Asia. It may be said that in this case population, rather than territory, is the surer guide to future policy. The inhabitants of Soviet Asia number only 35,000,000 compared with 135,000,000 in European Russia. But the eastern regions are rich in raw materials. Strenuous efforts have been made to make them self-supporting, and to create reservoirs of economic wealth for the union as a whole. Since the beginning of 1941 coal and iron mines have been opened up in the Amur valley. Heavy industries have been established at Kharbarovsk. Oil refineries at Nikolayevsk, Komsomolsk and Kharbarovsk are handling crude oil brought from the island of Sakhalin. And the great forests which extend across the whole of Russia have their continuation to the Asiatic coast. The Far Eastern provinces occupy an essential place in the Soviet economy. But they have strategic weaknesses. The industrial regions of the Amur valley—and, indeed, the entire area now being developed—are close to the northern frontier of Manchuria. If the Japanese cut the Trans-Siberian Railway, which runs for about 800 miles near the edge of Manchuria, the richest and most productive areas of the Far East would be lost. Further, the Japanese are in Inner Mongolia; and more than once they have threatened to press into Outer Mongolia, the strategic key to eastern Siberia. Japan’s seizure of Manchuria occurred in 1931. It is doubtful if, in normal circumstances, the Russians would have permitted the Japanese to establish a military colony which implied a direct threat to their flank in the east, and to the puppet states nearby. In 1931, however, the Soviet Government was facing internal embarrassments. The Five-Year Plan was in its most critical phase; the collectivization of the south, especially in the Ukraine, had caused something close to a civil war; and the Far Eastern army existed chiefly on paper. That was the beginning of strained-relations with Japan which led frequently to frontier skirmishes and minor wars. Russia has never lost sight of her strategic interests in the east. A self-contained army, built up before the war, and improved after its opening, was kept at full strength during the worst phase of the war against Germany. The end of hostilities in the west will release more forces than are needed for a campaign at the other end of the continent. And the general circumstances are supremely favourable. The Japanese have large armies on the Asiatic mainland; but the war is drawing nearer to their own islands, and powerful Allied forces will soon be available for landings in China. If Russia wants to protect her frontiers in the east, in the way that she is protecting them in the west, her opportunity seems to await her in the near future.