Russia and Poland

Southland Times, Issue 25565, 8 January 1945, Page 4

Russia and Poland

THE Soviet Government’s recognition of the Lublin regime was not unexpected. It was obvious that the committee could not have declared itself to be the provisional Government of Poland without Russian approval—or instigation. Russia apparently intends to follow her own policy without the slightest concession to her western allies. The British Government went as far as it could go in supporting Russian claims for the revision of Poland’s frontiers. In doing this it acted independently—thereby placing an untimely strain on its relatioris with Washington. Mr Churchill used the plainest terms in deprecating the failure of the Polish Government to reach a compromise with Russia, and he came very close to expressing a lack of confidence in the newly formed Polish Cabinet. To go beyond that, however, would be to deny the Allied war aims. The Lublin committee is in no way representative, and its members were not elected by the Polish people. Its claims to office rest solely upon Russian support. To put the matter bluntly, it is a puppet Government; and experience has shown that ruling bodies established in this way are effective qnly in promoting internal discord.' It has been pointed out in Washington that Marshal Stalin “could wait no longer in recognizing the 'Lublin regime because of the imminence of a great Russian winter offensive to liberate all Poland.” The Poles, however, are not likely to welcome a liberation which threatens to be merely a transference of control. It is difficult to imagine in what way the setting up of a puppet regime can be expected to have a pacifying influence. Moreover, it seems certain that Marshal Stalin refused to postpone his decision until aftei' the proposed meeting with Mr Churchill and President Roosevelt. British people have come to realize that Russia cannot be stopped from having her own way in eastern Europe. They may begin to feel, however, that Soviet policy should not receive an unqualified approval. If support for Russia means a further weakening of British-American relations, it will prove a doubtful asset in the postwar years. For Russia will follow her own course, with or without British approval. And in the kind of world that now seems to be taking shape the friendship of America is not merely desirable; it is a basic necessity. ‘