Russia's Strong Position

Southland Times, Issue 25549, 18 December 1944, Page 4

Russia's Strong Position

Those who study it, not from the viewpoint of expediency, but as a human experience, may accept its logic reluctantly. For mass migrations, even when they are arranged without the grimness of Hitler’s expulsions and transfers, are tragic episodes in the lives of nations and individuals. They will have to be organized very skilfully if human suffering and economic disturbance are to be deprived of lasting effects. Although Mr Churchill cited the migrations from Greece and Turkey after the last war as examples of a successful disentanglement of population, it seems unlikely that the British Government came easily or quickly to its decision to support the Russian proposals. Nevertheless, it is difficult to see what other decision could have been made. The fact which cannot be disregarded is Russia’s dominant position in the east, and indeed in the whole of Europe. If the Russians want the eastern provinces of Poland, they are strong enough to take them, and the western Powers could do very little about it. Britain’s policy is based on the recognition of these facts, and on the desire to preserve a framework of legality for future co-opera-tion. There is also the question of immediate military necessity. Unless the Polish dispute is settled quickly, the war in the east may be gravely impeded. “Russian armies will probably in the next few months traverse large areas of Poland, driving the Germans before them,” said Mr Churchill. “If fierce fighting breaks out between large sections of the Polish population and Russian troops, very great suffering, which can still be avoided, will inevitably occur, and new and poisonous wounds inflicted on those who must dwell side by side in peace, confidence and good neighbourliness.” Britain has reached the view that a Polish settlement can and should be arranged on the lines proposed by Russia. It can be taken for granted that Mr Churchill obtained in Moscow an accurate outline of Marshal Stalin’s intentions. He knows the realities of the situation, and he knows that they cannot be changed by any policy which ignores them. Mr Churchill must also have been strongly influenced by the reconstruction of the Polish Government in London. The eclipse of M. Mikolajczyk meant a defeat for the liberal elements and the disappearance of any hopes for a compromise with Russia. In its present form, the Polish Government seems likely to follow an anti-Soviet policy, a policy which can thrive only on BritishAmerican disagreement. Mr Churchill’s statement was apparently made with the conviction that further delays in reaching a settlement would be dangerous to Poland, and inimical to the unity of the western Powers. Whatever the result, it must be admitted that the outlook for international co-operation after the war has not improved.