The Southland Times FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1944. Central Pacific Offensive

Southland Times, Issue 25279, 4 February 1944, Page 4

The Southland Times FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1944. Central Pacific Offensive

THE TYPE of warfare now being waged in the Pacific has never been more clearly illustrated than in reports of the American assault on the Marshall Islands. More than 30,000 troops, the equivalent of two divisions, are said to be in action. This number would scarcely be noticed on the eastern front; and even in Italy, where the forces engaged are relatively small, it would not seem impressive. Undoubtedly, other troops are being held in reserve for further operations. But the total is not likely to be large. These men are being supported by what has been described as “the greatest war fleet in history,” and by hundreds of aircraft. Even allowing for the fact that island fortresses must be heavily bombarded before the landing parties go ashore, this concentration of naval power would seem disproportionately large were it not for the strategic implications. A group of 46 atoll-lagoons, with an aggregate area of about 150 square miles and a native population of barely 10,000, could not by itself deserve the attention of an armada. But the larger atolls are naval stations and seaplane bases, and they are the outer defences of the central sea route to Tokyo. The Americans are descending upon them in such strength that it is obviously their intention to seize the entire group, or at least those larger islands which guarantee a virtual possession of the others. Beyond them, a mere 1250 miles to the west, lies Truk, one of the most powerful naval bases outside Japan. This is the key to the inner defence zone. The fall of Truk would leave the Japanese with a secondary line from Guam to Yap; but without the first protective shield the enemy could not exclude the Americans from the approaches to the Philippines. The Japanese cannot afford to lose the Marshall Islands.

It seems probable that the United States naval leaders expect the Japanese fleet to come into action. They have assembled something much more than a task force, and are ready for anything. Indeed, they would like nothing better' than a full-scale sea and air battle which, once and for all, would establish naval supremacy in the Pacific. Past events have shown that the Japanese Navy will not fight until it has been left with no alternative. This is not a policy of. timidity: it is simply a traditional attitude, based on the view that warships should be used mainly to assist the army. There are no armies in the Marshalls or at Truk, although the larger islands are strongly garrisoned. It is true that the fall of Truk would imperil Japanese armies, in the Philippines and the East Indies, as definitely as if they were being encircled on land. But although the Japanese have large armies which have not yet come into battle, they have only one fleet, and it is already weakened by the attrition of island warfare. It is impossible to judge at what moment the enemy will decide that the navy must fight a defensive battle. From a western point of view, that moment seems to be very near. The Japanese have their own strategic conceptions; but if they decline this latest challenge they may fight in the end under heavy disadvantages. Meanwhile the Americans are striking a blow which seems to leave an ample strength in reserve, ready for a quick follow-through to the limits of the Marshall Islands, and possibly beyond. The offensive arc now stretches from New Britain to the central waters of the Pacific. And this time the Americans are not recapturing islands lost in the bad months of 1942. They are fighting on Japanese possessions, a fact which will cause some loss of face in Tokyo.