The Southland Times SATURDAY, JUNE 13, 1942. The British-Soviet Alliance

Southland Times, Issue 24769, 13 June 1942, Page 4

The Southland Times SATURDAY, JUNE 13, 1942. The British-Soviet Alliance

THE TREATY signed by Britain and Russia is being welcomed, with good reason, as one of the outstanding political events of the war. It is tangible proof that BritishSoviet relations have survived nearly a year of alliance under extraordinary conditions, and that these relations have now been strengthened at the opening of a crucial period. The achievement can be measured only by glancing back to the international “set-up” on the eve of Germany’s invasion last June. Up to that time the two countries had shared a mutual distrust. It is now generally admitted that negotiations with Moscow were weakly and unwillingly conducted by the Chamberlain Government. They were opened only after several Russian proposals for a conference of peace-loving nations had been politely rejected, and they were finally entrusted to a military and diplomatic mission headed by minor officials. There is no need, however, to claim for Soviet policy a pure disinterestedness. It was realistic to the point of ruthlessness. The dominant motive was the desire to avoid participation in a major war, and the threat to Russia’s peace was always known to come from Germany. But if war was unavoidable the Soviet. rulers wanted to make sure that they would not fight alone. When they decided, perhaps mistakenly, that the British Government was half-hearted in its attempts to arrange a rapprochement, they revised their policy in an attempt to turn the first shock of war against France and Britain, thereby gaining time for the strengthening of their own defences. That, at least, was the practical result of the 1939 non-aggression pact with Germany. British opinion was disturbed by the realization that the discussions which preceded the pact must have been conducted, with the utmost secrecy, while the negotiations, with the British mission were still proceeding, or had scarcely begun. And later the partition of Poland and the war against Finland seemed to confirm the belief that Soviet policy was essentially aggressive. The. contrasts in public outlook and sentiment in the two countries, rioted in profound differences of political and racial history, could not be removed by argument or explanation. It remained for the stresses of a shared conflict to sweep away these misunderstandings. Mr Churchill’s historic speech, made with superb timing a few hours after the Germans marched into Russia, gave the situation a new perspective which the British people have steadfastly accepted. Diplomatic tangles ceased to matter. The one fact which captured the imagination of free peoples was the whole-hearted nature of Russia’s resistance. Since then there has been a remarkable growth of pro-Russian sentiment in Allied countries. It is generally recognized that the Soviet Union has made tremendous sacrifices in its battles against the Germans. If it is true (and we believe that it is) that Britain saved the world in 1940, it may be the verdict of history that Russia played a similar role in 1941. The task for the future is to build wisely and quickly upon the foundations of mutual trust and respect established in the first strenuous year of alliance. Promises of material support merely extend the present policy of co-operation. Those features of the treaty most likely to engage public attention are its long-term and post-war emphasis, its reference to a second front, and the endorsement of Soviet neutrality vis-a-vis Japan. Not surprisingly, this last feature has been criticized in China. But the Russian attitude is balanced, or at least made more acceptable', by the growing application of American power in the Pacific. And it must be admitted that the war against Germany will require the fullest concentration of Russian resources on the European front. The existence of a vast Asiatic hinterland, undisturbed by the demands of a second campaign, has played a big part in the reorganization of the Red Army and of the industrial system which feeds it with munitions. M. Stalin’s view of the critical nature of the fighting during the next few months is reflected in the insistence with which his Government has pressed for the opening of a second European front. The Foreign Office statement speaks of a “full understanding . . . with regard to the urgent task of creating a second front in Europe in 1942.” This is sufficiently explicit to stimulate a new flurry of defensive preparations in German occupied territory. The exact time and place are naturally unknown. But there can no longer be any doubt that the supreme effort to encircle Germany will be made before the end of the year. British, American and Russian co-operation in this great military venture will build the framework for the longer, and equally difficult, task of post-war reconstruction.