The War of Lost Chances

Southland Times, Issue 24685, 5 March 1942, Page 4

The War of Lost Chances

IT WAS unfortunate that General Wavell’s return to India, which probably became inevitable after the fall of Singapore, could not have been announced a little earlier. The statement issued from Number 10 Downing Street was accompanied by assurances that the Dutch were not being left unaided to defend Java. But the announcement came at the height of the Japanese invasion, just when things seemed to be hanging in the balance; and it could not fail to create a bad 'impression. In Washington it has been generally interpreted as “a prelude to the collapse of organized resistance in Java”—a view which, in the circumstances, could scarcely be avoided. There is evidence, however, that the higher direction of strategy in the ABDA area has suffered from the beginning from a lack of unanimity. General Wavell’s arrival in Batavia was followed shortly by the resignation of his second-in-command, Admiral Hart of the United States Navy, ostensibly on the grounds of ill-health. His replacement by ViceAdmiral Helfrich was welcomed in Dutch circles as the promise- of a more aggressive naval policy. And it seems probable that a fundamental difference of opinion led to the change of command. In an exclusive interview with a correspondent of The New York Post, printed yesterday, the Lieutenant Governor of the Netherlands East Indies revealed something of what has been happening. “The only place where the Japanese can be effectively checked is at sea, by naval forces,” said Dr van Mook. “When in the United States recently I tried to explain the consequences of failing to act promptly against Japan’s only vulnerable point, extended sea lines of communication, before bases of occupation were established. But, speaking frankly, the situation has been allowed to deteriorate . . .

through failure to adopt offensive tactics where they were most needed.”

It is clear, from General Wavell’s return to India, and from American comment, that the Allies intend to make their major counter-thrusts against the Japanese from Indian bases. The advantage of this policy is that it provides an Asiatic front, from which advances can later be made through Burma and Thailand. At the same time it allows the Allies to set up a central supply depot for the Chinese and Indian forces. This is a long-term policy; and apparently it is regarded in London and Washington as the only way of meeting the needs of the Asiatic and Russian campaigns without risking heavy naval losses while America’s two-ocean navy is still in construc-

tion. To a certain extent it has been forced on the Allies by Japanese strategy, which is believed to be aimed at a junction with the Germans in the Middle East. But it is difficult not to agree with Dr van Mook that the war in the Pacific has been “a war of lost chances.” If American cruisers and destroyers had been sent, in sufficient numbers, to co-operate with the gallant little Dutch navy it should have been possible to smash the Japanese armada—especially since it appears that the enemy had no strong air superiority. Japan depends heavily on sea communications, even for her campaigns on the Asiatic mainland. A blow struck at this stage would surely have been more effective, and less expensive, than the hard and protracted fighting that may be necessary before the Japanese can be dislodged from Burma and Malaya. The Dutch have not thrown reproaches against their Allies. But it is impossible not to feel, while they fight with merely a token support against heavy odds, that they have just cause for bitterness. The root difficulty is the unpreparedness which has impeded Britain on every front. It is making the war longer, harder and more costly than would have been necessary if there had been vigour and realism in high places. Every new failure reveals the same weaknesses and points the moral that changes of outlook and method must come quickly if' they are not to come too late.