The Southland Times THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1941. British Offensive Strategy

Southland Times, Issue 24603, 27 November 1941, Page 4

The Southland Times THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1941. British Offensive Strategy

ONE OF THE most dramatic speeches of the Commons debate which preceded the fall of the Chamberlain Government in May 1940 was made by Admiral Sir Roger Keyes. He strongly criticized the direction of the Norwegian campaign and revealed that he had “importuned” the Cabinet to let him organize and lead a naval attack on Trondheim Fiord. “If our sea power had been used vigorously and courageously,” he said, “the Germans would have been in a most dangerous position and would eventually have been defeated.” In the light of later information it seems doubtful if a bolder naval policy could have prevented the failure in Norway. The British expeditionary force was badly equipped, and 'it could make no headway without air protection. In the months which followed the evacuation from Norway the defensive nature of British strategy,was revealed in a series of rearguard actions, stubbornly fought, but ending always with new extensions of the enemy’s continental power. The situation was dominated by a single fact—Germany’s large advantage over Britain in arms, motorized equipment and trained man power. It was impossible to make a sudden change from defence to offence. Before that could be done it was necessary to fight the two great defensive battles of the war—in the Atlantic and in the skies over England. Arms production had to be expanded while the enemy was halted at the Channel or advancing into new corners of Europe. Today, with a British offensive occurring in Libya, it can be said that the tide is at least on the turn. But there are many persons in Britain, including military experts, who continue to argue that a more dynamic policy could be undertaken, and that enough is not being done to relieve the pressure on Russia. Mr Churchill has already answered them effectively. But there are other critics who, while admitting that an invasion of Europe is beyond Britain’s present military strength, believe that a great deal could be done to harass the Germans in occupied territory and to clear the ground for massive operations in the future. These critics may use the latest speech of Sir Roger .Keyes as the text for a new and louder campaign against the Government. Once again the speech was made in the House of Commons, and again the speaker accused the Service committees of clinging to negative methods. Explaining that he had been removed from the leadership of the Commandos (groups of highly-trained specialists in amphibious warfare, of | whom something has been heard ; lately), he alleged that he “was frus- j trated in every worth-while offensive action,” and that the service committees, by “concentrating on the difficulties and dangers of every enterprise suggested, . . . succeeded in thwarting or delaying execution until we were either forestalled or were over-late.”

Maritime Assault

Until the Government makes a statement the case cannot be judged fairly, and a disappointed man is seldom an objective critic. But one statement stands out: “We were eager and ready to act a year ago.” If this is true it may be hard for the Government to explain why the Lofoten and Spitzbergen raids (and one or two coastal reconnaissance landings) have been the only attempts to undertake amphibious warfare. Students of military strategy have frequently pointed to the special opportunities which exist for a maritime power. Troops can be moved rapidly by sea, and an enemy who has to defend a long coastline can be forced to transfer i large forces to threatened areas, or can be kept in a state of suspense until the real objective is revealed. A series of raids may not bring substantial results in losses inflicted on the enemy, or in the occupation of strategic points. But it could force the Germans to throw additional strains upon their vast transport system. It could lead to an expenditure in fuel which would be particularly unwelcome while reserves arc being used so heavily in the east. It could weaken German morale through suspense and anxiety, especially if the raids became progressively heavier. And it would increase the problems of policing the occupied areas while encouraging the subject populations to more active forms of sabotage and resistance. History has shown many times that the effects of maritime assaults can be out of all proportion to the number of troops involved. The Germans are thinly guarding their thousands of miles of vulnerable coastline. By next spring they may be able to provide larger garrisons: it is doubtful if there can ever be better opportunities than at present for aggressive tactics. Plans may already have been made for amphibious enterprises on a larger scale. According to a statement from the Ministry of Information, the Germans suspect that raids are being prepared, and it may be significant that Mr Arthur Greenwood explained his refusal to reply to Sir Roger Keyes by saying that “to do so would be to disclose information of great strategic importance.” But the Government will need early and substantial results if it is to escape the criticism that is brewing against it in parliamentary and Press circles. Although Mr Churchill retains his place as a great war leader, there is a growing belief that changes are needed in some of the more important administrative positions. The present Parliament has been in existence for six years, and its record is not impressive. Few of the younger men have shown themselves fit for- high’ responsibilities, and the British public is tired of the reshuffling of portfolios among the older statesmen. Mr Churchill may yet have to make a revolutionary departure from precedent if he is to avoid a political crisis. Public opinion is growing restive as evidence accumulates that hesitancy and bureaucratic interference are clogging the wheels of the war machine.