The United States and Japan

Southland Times, Issue 24448, 30 May 1941, Page 4

The United States and Japan

JAPANESE comment on President Roosevelt’s speech was curiously mild compared with the splenetic outburst of Dr Gayda and the plain threats of a German official spokesman. It has been pointed out in Tokyo that the speech, “while more truculent, contained little that was new.” Actually, of course, there was something very new and important. When a state of unlimited national emergency is proclaimed in the United States the country enters automatically upon a war footing; its great energies are brought under a central direction, and the Government assumes an authoritarian status. The Americans are quick to resent an extension of authority, and in normal times they would resist it tenaciously. But the present emergency has been foreseen. The general reaction may include a tinge of relief that the preliminary phase is ending, accompanied by a growing desire to finish the main task as quickly as possible. In the words of The New York Times, the speech was “a call to action.” It was also an intimation that the Government is ready to implement a more positive defence programme. Japanese observers found a significance in the fact that Mr Roosevelt said nothing about convoys. But he gave an assurance that Hitler will be actively resisted in “every attempt to gain control of the seas,” and he reaffirmed his Government’s purpose

to facilitate the safe passage of war materials across the Atlantic. The Japanese view that Mr Roosevelt is “still hesitating to lead his country to war” may not be altogether sincere, for the trend of the speech was unmistakable. • It is true that the President wants to avoid military participation in the struggle, and he has framed his policy in such a way that the initiative remains with Germany. If the Nazis attempt to seize, or to control, French territories in the western hemisphere, the Americans are pledged to take preventive action. Similarly, a submarine attack on United States warships will be resisted. It therefore remains for the Germans to decide whether or not they wish to precipitate a clash with a new and powerful enemy. Hitler may be convinced that American intervention cannot seriously embarrass him during the present critical period of the war; and so much depends on the battle of the Atlantic that he may not hesitate to order an extension of submarine warfare, even though its victims include American warships. There is likely to be more anxiety in Tokyo than in Berlin. Under the terms of the Tripartite Pact, Japan has agreed to declare ’war on any nation which enters the struggle against the Axis. Hitler would like to see a conflict between the United States and Japan. But the Japanese, in spite of their official policy statements, have no desire to sacrifice themselves to Hitler’s war plans. They know that the greater part of the United States Navy is concentrated in the Pacific. The” war in China has weakened their economy, while America is only beginning to draw upon her vast resources. After the signing of the Tripartite Pact Japan was used by the Axis as a restraining influence upon the United StatesThe Americans retaliated by increasing their aid to China and by announcing their decision to fortify their naval and air bases in the Pacific, including Guam, which lies on the fringe of Japanese waters. Tokyo must have realized then that political bluff had ceased to be effective. The semi-official comment on President Roosevelt’s speech shows that there is a tendency to ignore the implications of American policy. If the United States drifted imperceptibly into the struggle the Japanese Government might be glad to point out that there had been no formal declaration of war.