The Southland Times WEDNESDAY, APRIL 30, 1941. American Patrols in the Atlantic

Southland Times, Issue 24422, 30 April 1941, Page 4

The Southland Times WEDNESDAY, APRIL 30, 1941. American Patrols in the Atlantic

ANE OF THE most interesting parts of Mr Churchill’s speech was the disclosure that the “extended use of patrol vessels” as an alternative to American convoys means much more than was indicated in the brief announcement reported on Monday from Washington. At his Press conference President- Roosevelt defined a patrol as “a reconnaissance of certain areas of the ocean to find out whether’ there are any possible aggressor ships that might be coming into the western hemisphere.” Mr Churchill amplified this statement by explaining that planes would be used as well as warships, and that their function would be, not merely to note the position of German raiders, but also to broadcast the information to all shipping in the neighbourhood. Noris that the full scope oi the plan. According to statements by officials in Washington, printed yesterday, American vessels will be detailed to follow Axis surface raiders of superior fire power and speed, reporting their movements and enabling British warships to converge upon the enemy. When the system is operating all merchant ships will have “a safe channel several hundred miles wide.” Although a certain number of British warships will be required in the patrol zone, it will now be possible to concentrate most of the Atlantic squadrons nearer home, where enemy interference is more sustained and dangerous.

. The scheme is obviously intended to be elastic. Mi - Roosevelt told a Press conference that vessels , of the neutrality patrol have been ’ operating 1000 miles into the Atlan- • tic during the past 18 months, al- ■ though not under the conditions visualized for the future, and he added that “the patrol would not necessarily be confined to the Atlan- : tic.” The risks are clearly realized; ; it has even been said in Washing- . ton that “the issue of peace or war with the United States rests on any decision by Germany and Italy to ‘make something of it.’ ” Germany can scarcely ignore the challenge. Apart from a successful invasion there is only one way of crushing

Britain—by cutting the Atlantic lifeline. The issue is so vitally important that Hitler might be prepared to risk America’s entry into the war. Experts on both sides of the Atlantic have pointed out that the flow of war equipment to Britain would probably slacken temporarily if the United States became fully engaged in the struggle. But this does not appear to be the opinion of Mr Churchill, whose speech showed that he is waiting hopefully for the American people to emerge from their “travail and stress of soul” into the calmness of decision. One possibility is that

pressure will be applied to Japan to create a diversion in the Far East. The need to maintain a two-ocean navy has caused some anxiety in Washington, where it is realized that a crisis in the Pacific would mean a reduction in the strength of the Atlantic squadrons. Under the terms of the Tripartite Pact Japan is pledged to attack any third Power which declares war on Germany or Italy. But if the initiative is left to the Axis, and the war spreads without an open declaration, the Japanese may be glad to escape through

a legal technicality. Germany and the United States might both find it convenient to avoid an open clash while doing what they can to defeat each other’s naval policy in the Atlantic. Public opinion, however, will react sharply to a first hint of enemy action against American warships. The danger of such action may not be as great for patrols as it would be for convoys; but it is real enough to prepare the people of the United States for a development which now seems to be inevitable.