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Hitler and Turkey

THE REPORT that Hitler has sent a courier with a special message to the President of Turkey raises a number of interesting questions. It seems to imply fairly plainly that Turkish interests will be involved in the German offensive. This may not mean that Hitler is planning to force the issue with Turkey, although the possibility must be kept in mind. A frontal attack on Turkey would be ill-timed and risky. Fortified by the consultations with Mr Eden and Sir John Dill, the Turks are in the mood to resist aggression. National feelings are running high; the country is mobilized and expectant. Moreover, if the Turks stood firm the Yugoslavs, who are already in a state of great excitement, might be tempted to throw in their lot with the Allies. Hitler’s diplomatic and propaganda campaign against Yugoslavia is obviously intended to wring subservience from the fear of encirclement and isolation. It has always been his policy to deal with one victim at a time: he is therefore unlikely to make a move that would expose his elaborate smoke screen to a sudden and spreading flame. Possible clues to Hitler’s motive in approaching the Turkish President can be found in some of the latest messages from the disturbed region. It is reported, for instance, that strong forces of Germans are concentrated on the Turkish frontier. Earlier moves, especially the massing of Bulgarian troops in this area, gave the impression that the Nazis intended to keep well away from Turkey. Hitler may now believe that the negotiations with Yugoslavia cannot be made to serve his strategic requirements quickly enough, and is planning to send his troops through the Maritza Valley into Thrace. This would bring the fighting dangerously close to Turkish territory. Hitler’s message could therefore have been an assurance that Turkey’s territorial- integrity will be scrupulously respected. Everybody knows, of course, that Nazi promises are worthless. But the Turks, in spite of war-like hints in their semi-official newspapers have shown that they have no wish to enter the struggle unless their own frontiers are attacked. And this attitude appears to have been strengthened by the talks with Mr Eden. According to one influential newspaper, the talks established that “Turkey alone shall decide if, when and how aggression is directed against her, and what action shall thereafter be necessary.” The Nazis might succeed in exploiting this lati-

tude. And the advantage of a march through the Maritza Pass, especially if it were made in the knowledge that Turkey would not intervene, would be the cutting off of Greece from all Turkish aid in the unpredictable future.

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/ST19410305.2.26

Bibliographic details

Southland Times, Issue 24376, 5 March 1941, Page 6

Word Count
437

Hitler and Turkey Southland Times, Issue 24376, 5 March 1941, Page 6

Hitler and Turkey Southland Times, Issue 24376, 5 March 1941, Page 6

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