The Southland Times MONDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 1941. “Dazzling Climax” in Cyrenaica

Southland Times, Issue 24356, 10 February 1941, Page 4

The Southland Times MONDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 1941. “Dazzling Climax” in Cyrenaica

riIHE FALL of Benghazi, announced with almost startling suddenness on Saturday, brings to a close one of the most successful campaigns in the history of British arms. Cyrenaica, the large eastern province of Libya, is now entirely occupied by the Army of the Nile. Great distances have been covered since, two months ago. the first attack was set in motion against Sidi Barrani. Although the forces under the command of General Sir Archibald Wavell were inferior in numbers, and possibly in field equipment, to those of Marshal Graziani, they were able to seize and hold the initiative in a series of lightning thrusts which exploited the full possibilities of mechanized weapons. Throughout the campaign the land army was aided, perhaps to a unique extent in modern warfare, by an air force which had gained a local ascendancy, and by a navy which had to face no serious opposition. These factors do not detract from the achievements of General Wavell and his staff. Where such large and complex forces are thrown into an offensive the secret of success is to be found, not merely in the training, the courage and discipline of military units, but also —perhaps decisively—in a co-ordination which must be planned and effected with a hairtrigger precision. Military genius is fundamentally a gift for recognizing and utilizing opportunities. Without this gift General Wavell could not have proceeded with such swiftness and certainty to the “dazzling climax” of the East Libyan campaign.

African Bases

The conquest of Cyrenaica is in itself an important event; but it does not bring a final clarification to the strategic pattern in North Africa. It can be recognized as a preparation for larger developments, either in Libya or in the Balkans. A new offensive against Tripolitania might seem at the moment to be unnecessary, since the western province can be isolated by sea power. Recent developments, however, have provided good reasons why the long march to Tripoli should be undertaken. German air intervention from Sicily, and the renewal of political intrigue against the Vichy Government, are warnings that the enemy has no intention of abandoning the Mediterranean zone. Hitler's agents are working feverishly to circumvent Marshal Petain's rigid adherence to the terms of the armistice. The Nazis want to secure control of Bizerta, the important Tunisian naval base. With this base in their hands, and with their dive bombers already established in Sicily, they would be able to dominate the narrow straits between Sicily and Tunisia. The occupation of Benghazi allows Britain to utilize an air field reasonably close to the Germans; but the capture of Tripoli would be an immense advantage in the scramble for bases in the Mediterranean. Further, a British advance to the western gates of Libya would surely stimulate the French peoples of Tunisia and Algeria to an irresistible mood of revolt against German influence. So far they have been satisfied to wait passively, although they cannot have been indifferent to the part played by General de Gaulle's supporters in the march through Cyrenaica. But General Weygand, who is still in North Africa, might not be able to restrain the nationalist spirit if the Vichy regime were displaced. Indeed, it is by no means certain that the General himself could transfer his loyalty from Marshal Petain to the unspeakable Laval.

While Hitler Waits

Events in Libya are therefore closely connected with the political situation in France. Until now they may have influenced this situation much more than they have been affected by it; but the next few days may bring changes which will have a direct bearing on North African strategy. There is another and perhaps more urgent possibility to be found in the Balkan theatre. A German advance through Bulgaria would inevitably check the British offensive in Libya: in a few hours the direction of Mediterranean strategy could be abruptly changed. It is not to be expected, however, that Hitler would risk a Balkan campaign simply to relieve his harassed ally. If he fights at all in the Middle East, it will be to serve his own military and political requirements. And at the moment, with warnings of an impending invasion of Britain coming thick and fast, it is hard to believe that the Germans can afford to disperse their energies among new and large commitments. There can be no certainty, of course, that the invasion will be attempted. Semi-official observers in London have stressed the possibility that Hitler is planning strategic alternatives, and that he is not yet certain which one to select as the final challenge to Britain. While he is making up his mind, or waiting for favourable weather, General Wavell is free to consolidate his gains and to prepare for new successes in North Africa. The fall of Benghazi is one more reminder that it is to the Allies, and not to Germany, that victory has come in the winter campaigns of 1940-41. These achievements will make it easier, in a material as well as a moral sense, to face the ordeals of spring.