East African Strategy

Southland Times, Issue 24352, 5 February 1941, Page 4

East African Strategy

fTHE STRATEGIC pattern of the attack on Italian East Africa is not yet clear. British forces have moved into Italian territory from four directions. The northernmost drive, through Eritrea, has resulted in the capture of Agordat and the hasty retreat of the Italians towards the belt of mountainous country that runs parallel to the Red Sea. Further south, British forces from the Sudan have recaptured Gallabat and are moving on to Gondar, which lies slightly north of Lake Tsana. From Kenya mechanized units have crossed the borders of Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland. In addition, an Abyssinian patriot army, under British officers, is reported to be harassing the enemy in tire west of Ethiopia. The most significant of these movements at present is the advance through Eritrea, which threatens to cut the Italian colony in half. The capture of Agordat and Barentu suggests that this is in fact the British objective. Agordat is the head of the railway which reaches the Red Sea at the port of Massawa, the main base for Italian naval and air operations in this region. According to a British Official Wireless message military circles in London are not inclined to regard the capture of Agordat as an “immediate” threat to Massawa, since the intervening country is difficult and the Italians may be expected to make good use of its natural advantages. There seems little doubt, however, that the Red Sea port is the ultimate objective. Its capture would rob the Italians of an important base and would close one of the few remaining leakages in the British blockade of the eastern colonies. Although Eritrea, Abyssinia and Somaliland have been cut off from their mother country ever since Italy’s entry into the war, a limited quantity of supplies has been trickling across the Red Sea to the Eritrean coast from the Arabian mainland. But there is an even stronger motive for Britain to gain command of Italian East Africa, and particularly of its Red Sea coast, as soon as possible. Although Hitler’s intervention in the Mediterranean has

had no very 'Serious effects so far, he may ultimately succeed' in closing the western outlet to British shipping. At present this seems a remote possibility, but if the Germans were able to launch an attack on Gibraltar and to establish bases for their dive-bombers in French North Africa as well as in Sicily and Pantellaria, sea communication between Egypt and Britain through the western Mediterranean might become too hazardous. Even under present conditions this route is used only for the shipment of urgent supplies to the forces in the Middle East. Control of Italian East Africa and possession of the Red Sea ports would ensure the safety of Britain’s principal supply route to Egypt. The great bulk of the troops and supplies now being used in the African campaigns have been sent round the Cape of Good Hope, up the east coast of Africa and through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. The British convoys have been able to pass through the narrow waters of the Red Sea in spite of Italy’s efforts to stop them, by air and by sea. If Germany could bar the western passage through the Mediterranean and establish her air squadrons in Italian East Africa she might succeed in defeating the whole British strategy in North Africa. The defeat of the Italians in Eritrea, Abyssinia and Somaliland will protect Britain against this contingency.