The Southland Times. MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1940. Axis Policy in the Mediterranean

Southland Times, Issue 24238, 23 September 1940, Page 4

The Southland Times. MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1940. Axis Policy in the Mediterranean

KIBBENTROP’S latest visit to Rome was described in one quarter as a symptom of recurring difficulties between the Axis partners. It was also suggested that the German Foreign Minister would attempt to encourage a more lively Italian war effort. The Berlin and Rome newspapers treated the subject from different angles; but as usual they gave no indication of the real purpose of the visit. Possibly there will be no extraordinary developments, although it must be admitted that the travels of Ribbentrop usually mean trouble for someone. His appearance in Rome inevitably draws attention to the political situation in the Mediterranean area, where the central fact is the Italian invasion of Egypt. Mussolini has entered upon the supreme adventure of his imperialist career. He cannot afford to be half-hearted now that the fateful step has been taken: nothing less than a complete victory can justify the alliance with Germany, or strengthen his regime against the impact of war-weariness. Obviously, therefore, he will be anxious to exploit every political opportunity which might help him to achieve an easy military success. If the situation remains as at present his problems in North Africa must be increasingly formidable. While the Royal Navy is free to patrol the Mediterranean, to shell the coastal road to Alexandria, and to impress the small countries of the Near East with the power of Britain, a successful attack on Egypt seems to be out of the question. But the situation would change if the eastern entry to the Mediterranean were to be sealed effectively. This could be done only through the seizure of Gibraltar.

Spain’s Attitude

It would be interesting to know what Ribbentrop has been able to tell Mussolini of Hitler’s recent conversation with the Spanish Minister of the Interior. Senor Suner is General Franco’s brother-in-law, and most foreign observers describe him as the real political leader of fascist Spain. He is known to be strongly pro-German. After the talk with Hitler Senor Suner declared: “Spain is only momentarily non-belligerent. General Franco will personally decide when to abandon aloofness.” If Spain intends to emulate Italy, this appears to mean that General Franco will abandon neutrality if fortune seems to be strongly favouring the Axis Powers. It is not likely to mean that Spain will give large military commitments: the nation is exhausted after the Civil War, and political unrest still exists under the present repressive system. But Spain wants to recover Gibraltar even more, perhaps, than in the past. If General Franco agrees to attack the Rock, with or without German aid, he must first be convinced that Bi'itain s cause is hopeless, or that it can be made hopeless by his own intervention. Spain already controls Tangier: the next logical step would be to seize the northern support of the ocean gateway. There are, however, certain obstacle.’:. One is the great natural and military strength of the fortress; another is the presence of a powerful British fleet in the Mediterranean. Still another difficulty is the growing unrest of the French North African colonies. There is only one way in which these dangers could be removed at a single stroke: the defeat of the British Mediterranean fleet. It would not be surprising if this point were emphasized by Ribbentrop during the Rome talks. And Mussolini, aware of the difficulties facing Marshal Graziani, will understand the force of the argument. He will also feel the approach of a personal danger. The Italian navy has not made an impressive showing hitherto, whereas the British fleet is eager for battle. A naval defeat would be a shattering blow for a dictator who insists on describing the' Mediterranean as an Italian lake. Even the importance of the issues now at stake may fail to convince Mussolini that so great a risk is inescapable.