NAZIS’ SECRET WEAPON

Southland Times, Issue 24154, 17 June 1940, Page 9

NAZIS’ SECRET WEAPON

Existence Doubted By Experts

[By

JOHN MacCORMAC,

in The New York Times]

Rumours and boasts which have circulated, from time to time, about the employment of new weapons by Germany received an impetus when Eben Emael, a strong Liege fort, was captured with little fighting. The following article discusses the reaction of military experts to the suggestion of a secre weapon.

WASHINGTON, May 13. A canvass today of American army and navy experts and military attaches of the warring Powers revealed the existence of considerable doubt whether Germany really had a “new weapon” bf general efficacy by means of which her airmen subdued Eben Emael, one of the forts protecting Liege. As to the nature of the weapon there have been three suggestions:— 1. The mysterious bomb which the Germans are credited with having used in Barcelona during tile Spanish civil war, one projectile exploding square blocks. 2. An unchallengeable flame thrower. 3. A secret device which magnetically, or otherwise, renders guns or ammunition impotent.

The High Command and other official sources declined comment.

It is known, however, that the fortress is a high-walled block of masonry at the juncture of the Meuse river and the Albert Canal, on the Dutch-Bel-gian border near Maastricht. It bristles with light, heavy, and anti-aircraft guns. It is about a mile in circumference, with an open court perhaps 600 to 800 yards in diameter. NO PARTIAL USE The official account of Eben Emael’s capture was: “Lieutenant Witzig steered his machine into the centre of the fort area. After immeasurable surprise and despite heavy defence measures, 1000 Belgians were taken prisoner.” Although it is admitted to be possible that the Germans used against the fort a new gas that would penetrate ordinary gas masks, a potent argument was advanced by War Department experts against Germany’s possession of any new weapon capable in itself of winning the war or even overcoming the Maginot Line, as German broadcasts were hinting. The argument was that, if the Nazis had anything of the sort, they would not employ it piecemeal—as the German army did mustard gas in the World War—and thus give the Allies time to counter it before making''full use of its surprise value. Why, it was asked, should the Germans use a “new weapon” with complete success against one fort, and lose hundreds of men unsuccessfully attacking others by ordinary means? Another reason why army experts doubted that Germany possessed any new war-winning device was that, if she did, she would not be advertising it as she is doing. The fact that Germany disseminated the first reports about the new weapon and that the

first suggestion that it was a “nerve gas” seems to have come from Switzerland, led army opinion here to the conclusion that the whole thing might be propaganda. The Germans claimed some time ago that they had worked out methods whereby one fort at a time, even in the Maginot Line, might be isolated and subjected to concentrated fire. They may have employed a surprise landing of parachute troops in the achievement of such a result at Eben Emael. They might also have employed a new gas. But if it were so effective as intimated, it is asked by army experts, why has nothing been heard aboui Rs use in the fighting elsewhere? United States Army chemical warfare service experts said they believed it was quite possible that a gas corresponding roughly to the description of “nerve gas” might be produced under special conditions, but they had not heard that it could be successfully used in warfare. Belgian, French and British military experts attached to their embassies in Washington all said they had had no reports from their Governments about the new weapon and all they 'Tmew about it was what they had read in the newspapers. “WAR OF NERVES” TACTICS They said they were inclined to believe the whole matter was part of the German “war of nerves,” a propaganda device employed after Eben Emael had been taken, perhaps by lucky use of surprise tactics. It was intended, to impress on civilian populations the idea of German invincibility and to harry the nerves of soldiers by leading them to expect new forms of attack that they could not guard against, these experts suggested. Military experts of all categories in Washington were willing to admit that in their mass employment of parachute troops the Germans had a method of attack that put a question mark to many hitherto accepted theories of warfare. It revises, for instance, the lesson that the British expert, Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, thought the last war had taught that the power of the defence was three times the power of attack. It was admitted that it seemed an excellent way of circumventing the Low Countries’ water defences. But doubt was expressed whether it could be successfully used against thickly populated Britain, especially now that such tactics had lost their surprise value.