The Southland Times. MONDAY, JUNE 17. 1940. Russia's Uneasy Situation

Southland Times, Issue 24154, 17 June 1940, Page 4

The Southland Times. MONDAY, JUNE 17. 1940. Russia's Uneasy Situation

RUSSIA’S latest act of aggression has been carried out in circumstances which reveal two significant facts—the opportunism of Soviet policy, and the precarious nature of,the alliance with Germany. The tragic events in France have claimed so much of the world’s attention that the subjugation of Lithuania may seem too small an incident to justify more than passing notice. After a period of “total” warfare the average mind loses the edge of its receptivity to dark impressions, so that events which a few months ago would have been the cause of an intense indignation are now regarded as minor phases of a larger tragedy. This does not mean that any moral justification can be found for Russia’s ultimatum to Lithuania. It was plain enough, after the first encroachment on the Baltic States last year, that the Soviet would strengthen their hold on these small countries whenever such action was required by their new imperialist policy. The supporters of Russia argued at the time that the seizure of air and naval bases On the Baltic, and later the shameful attack on Finland, could be explained as the necessities of a purely defensive strategy. Unfortunately it is not easy to make a clear distinction between defence and aggression where territorial changes are involved. Other imperialists have found in the past that there is a continuing need to strengthen new positions by advancing further than was originally intended. . Balkan Interests

No one is likely to pay serious attention to the pretext for intervention put forward by the Moscow Government. The important facts in the new situation are that Lithuania has a frontier with East Prussia, and that by sending troops to this region the Soviet are strengthening their position vis-a-vis Germany. There have been other reports, in the past few days, which suggested that Russia is becoming active in ways which are hard to reconcile with the Nazi-Soviet alliance. Rumania is believed to have moved towards the Russian orbit. Stern warnings to Germany’s ally, Italy, have been made in the Moscow Press. Mussolini, it will be remembered, was careful to indicate in his declaration of war on the Allies that he had no wish to drag other nations into the struggle—a hint obviously intended for Yugoslavia. But there can be little doubt that the price for Italy’s aid is to be a free hand in the Balkans. Stalin and his advisers know this, and will not be deceived by pledges or smooth speeches: they know too much about totalitarian morality to trust the promises of a dictator. They understand, too, that there could be no more propitious moment for preventing any disturbance of the balance of power in the- Balkans, although prevention in this case may mean a disturbance in their own favour. The Russians must therefore view with alarm the evidence of a Nazi-Fascist understanding which will almost certainly "imply the extension of Italian interests across the Adriatic. If they are to remain true to their political realism, they cannot afford to wait until Italy is free to restrain the growth of Soviet influence in the Balkans. Disappointed Hopes

There are other and wider considerations. Stalin cannot be pleased with the rapidity of the German advance. The communists have openly declared their belief that a period of world wars would be followed by the world revolution in which they hope to play a leading part. But they have been like a great many other persons in visualizing the war in terms of a long and exhausting struggle. There must have been occasions at the Kremlin when hands were rubbed over the thought that the so-called imperialist Powers had exposed themselves to the draining of blood and wealth in a war which would end in stalemate. The only victors (according to communist theory) would be the agents of revolution, receiving the allegiance of a war-weary proletariat. But Hitler has upset these calculations. Stalin would be pleased to watch Germany and the Allies exhaust themselves in an inconclusive struggle. He would be anything-but pleased to see Hitler gain a rapid decision. For he must realize that, if the mechanized columns can drive back the armies of France so far in so short a time, the conquest of Russia would no longer seem an impossible, or even a very formidable, task for the German High Command. The Soviet role is essentially that of a mischief-maker who hopes to profit from the quarrels of other people. But the Nazi exploitation of modern weapons is gradually forcing Stalin towards a realization that international relations in a troubled world depend, in the final analysis, on the simple facts of geography.