The Southland Times. MONDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1939. Unrest in Germany

Southland Times, Issue 23978, 20 November 1939, Page 6

The Southland Times. MONDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1939. Unrest in Germany

RUMOURS of dissension among the Nazis are coming in a rising tide from Germany. Widely different sources are quoted in cable messages received during the week-end, all of which stress the hesitations of the Nazis leaders, their quarrels and rivalries, and the growing truculence of the High Command. Some of these stories are so highly coloured that it would be unwise to treat them seriously. All of them, in the words of a Press Association message from London, must “be accepted with a certain reserve, because it is indisputable that the Nazis command enormous support.” .But when full allowance has been made for the growth of rumour and for the natural tendency towards wishful thinking it must be admitted that the reports are feasible, at least in general outline, if they are related to a single fact. Hitler is a man who in his plans, writings and speeches has shown his reliance on quick action,’ yet now, at the most critical stage of his career, he appears to be unable either to make a final decision, or to have his decision carried into effect. Expensive Delay If the Nazi forces were fully engaged in an offensive the stories of a crumbling regime would seem premature. But apart from minor affrays the Western Front is quiet on every sector, and the German Air Force remains comparatively inactive. In other circumstances this quietness need not be a sign of weakness. If Germany had the economic strength of the Allies, or were receiving large quantities of raw materials from Russia, it would be possible to argue that both sides are simply preparing for largescale • operations to take place at the end of the winter. The Nazis, however, cannot afford to wait for a spring campaign. Every week brings to the Allies an advantage in machines and equipment and allows them to co-ordinate functions of Empire defence which would be immensely harder to safeguard under the strain of continuous fighting. The Empire air training scheme will shortly be established in Canada; American aeroplanes will be sent across the Atlantic to supplement those now pouring from British and French workshops; and in England and the Dominions untrained men are being fitted for active service. Behind all this organization and concerted effort are nations with an undisturbed morale. But in Germany there is a different story. The economic system had already been strained almost to breaking point before the war began. Civilian morale was an unknown quantity, and depended so heavily on repressive measures and the sinister work of the Gestapo that any hint of a reverse or even of hesitancy in the ruling class must increase the danger of a militant discontent. Included in the Reich are new provinces and protectorates that are not likely to co-operate willingly in the war effort. Austria, Czechoslovakia and western Poland are potential centres, of disturbance. Messages from Prague indicate that earlier outbreaks have been repeated, and although the Black Guards are showing their customary brutality the spirit of rebellion will merely remain quiescent until there is a favourable opportunity for action. Economic and social problems become acute in a time of national strain. In a war of nerves, with both sides waiting instead of fighting, a solidarity imposed by discipline and terrorism is quickly revealed as a source of internal weakness and danger. Party Dissension? But it is not only a divided or doubtful people of which Hitler must take account while making his plans. According to the messages coming from Germany and the neutral frontiers the Nazis are quarrelling among themselves. It is said that the Russian alliance has caused dissatisfaction and alarm, that Field-Marshal Goering is out of favour, that Herr von Ribbentrop is being blamed for his diplomacy at Moscow, and that the Army leaders are rejecting all proposals for a great offensive. The Munich explosion begins to look like an attempted mutiny within the party, or at least an excuse for a purge of disaffected elements. There is no need to assume that the present symptoms of unrest will be followed by the rapid downfall of the Nazi regime, although everybody who hopes for an early peace will want to see this happen. Hitler may be able to arrange a compromise along the lines, already suggested, of a limited attack: he may even succeed in over-ruling the Army leaders and forcing them to use the tactics of desperation. But to do this he may have to remove some of the’ leading generals, a measure which would seriously weaken the unity and perhaps the efficiency of the High Command at a time when uncertainty or dissension may well prove fatal. Whatever happens, the Allied statesmen will not be slow to understand that events in Germany are moving noticeably in their favour.