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THE WAR IN THE AIR

Need For Pressure On • Western Front

One of the most interesting and important aspects of the present hostilities has been the part played by the air arm. In so far as the West is concerned, most of us are wondering why devastating air attacks have not occurred, for they were expected concurrently with the declaration of war, if not actually preceding it, wrote the military correspondent of The Sydney Morning' Herald soon after the outbreak of hostilities. In Poland the tactics of the German Air Force are clear. Neutral observers now say that most of the German success were due to their use of mastery in the air.

One might have expected preliminary aerial bombardments, paving the way for the progress of the land troops; but the unexpected feature has been the great role assigned to the aeroplanes in the actual advance itself. Some writers even say that the Germans, once they drove the Poles from the air, worked out a new form a strategy based on collaboration between the air force and the mechanized units below. They smashed strongposts of the enemy, shattered the forces of the defenders, and prevented aggregations of troops collecting with a view to counter-attack-ing. In short, the air force became an intrinsic part of the land armies, in a way that would have been impossible if they had been compelled to face strong opposition in the air itself. They obtained the same results as so many tanks, working from the air. The land and air forces blended their efforts, and became one organism instead of complementary but distinct units; CLOSE CO-OPERATION This combination was summed up by Major Bartz, of the German Air Ministry, when he wrote a short time ago, that “technical possibilities exist today of shattering the resistance of the enemy country both physically and morally at the earliest possible stage of the war by persistent, sudden, and unexpected bombing attacks.”' The difference between German and French strategy before the present war was that the Germans looked upon the air arm as an integral part of the entire military effort, working in with land warfare, whereas the Fernch tended to look upon the two as distinct. One wellinformed French military writer even went so far as to say that the air force “will not often be"called upon to cooperate with the land forces.” The first fortnight of air warfare in Poland belies this prediction, just as did the German manoeuvres of 1937.

In those manoeuvres, the upshot of the land battles was decided by the intervention of air forces, and this was the principle upon which first General Wever (killed in an aeroplane accident in 1936), and later General Milch, built up German aerial strategy. Indeed, this was why Germany insisted upon a far higher proportion of bombers in her air force than did other nations.

The German military force, in short, was described as one of “concealed effectives,” with the air force in a major position, capable of being switched from one front to another, and of providing the unexpected element in any offensive. The air force is Germany’s “inner line” in any attack, equivalent to the production of an unsuspected body of reserves, sufficient in striking power to decide any military issue. DIFFERENCE IN THE WEST But there is one important qualification to this. The German aerial tactics may succeed in a country like Poland where there is no effective resistance; but it is not to be assumed that similar results will follow on the Western front, where the aerial forces are more evenly matched. The total bomb load of the entire Polish Air Force was said to be no more than 70 tons—an insignificant quantity compared with those available to the British and French Air Forces on the Western front. In other words, the parity of German and Allied air forces in the West must mean the growing dissociation of aerial warfare from land warfare; and thus the decisive power of aerial combat in the West becomes one of the great intangibles of the present situation.

This raises the question of indiscriminate air warfare. It may well be that neither the Allies nor the Germans have felt disposed to begin unconfined air raids, because of their intrinsic horror and because of the effect on neutral, and especially American, opinion; but, at this stage, purely military considerations must be raised. If, as the Poles claim, the great majority of the German Air Force is being employed to terrorise civilians in the East, does not this afford an opportunity

to the French and British to harry the Rhineland by air? Certainly no side wishes to begin the unrestricted bombing of open towns, but it is fairly clear that the Germans, for some time now, have been employing this method of terrorism in Poland; and it seems unduly squeamish to hold our own forces back in the West, especially if the diversion _of German planes to the East minimises the opposition that is likely to be offered to them. This is obvious from Lord Halifax’s speech yesterday, when he said that the very force of circumstances in these days of “total war” may soon mean “the end of the policy of restraint” which we have so far followed in this matter of open bombing. The time has arrived when purely military considerations cannot be overriden by humanitarian arguments, for the facts of. the strategical position are clear. Either we have “guerre a I’outrance” or not; there is, there can be, no other alternative. ON THE POLISH FRONT As far as the actual fighting in the last few days is concerned, the Poles are still holding a swaying line. Warsaw is so certain of itself that wireless and telephone services are again normal, in itself an indication of the purely military situation. The fort of Modlin, at the Vistula-Narew confluence, is still holding out; the Poles vigorously deny German claims that it has fallen. The Western Polish army has escaped the encircling pincers of the Germans, and, indeed, claims to have defeated four German divisions in the Kutno sector, directly west of Warsaw. Against this, the Poles admit that the Germans have crossed the Vistula near Sandomierz in the south-west, and that the Germans have brought their motorized dash on the east of the capital to within 40 miles of Warsaw. But this is all part of the outer encircling movement, which has left the inner defences of Warsaw intact. The Germans are methodically bombing open towns everywhere in Poland since their declaration of unrestrained warfare two days ago; but it is unlikely that the terroristic effects of this will counteract the gallant stand of Gdynia or the resistance of the isolated regiments in the Corridor. It is such fights as the latter that maintain civilian morale; they often obtain a significance out of all proportion to their purely military importance, as in the case of the Alcazar in Spain. ANALOGY WITH SPAIN

Indeed, the present position of the Poles is very like that of the Spanish republicans after Franco’s initial advance in the Civil War. Within a month he had over-run more than half of Spain, but after that he made practically no advance for over a year; and this may yet be the position in Poland, from a military point of view. What Madrid was to Spain, Warsaw is to Poland; what the Navarrese front was so the Narew-Bug-Vistula sector is becoming; and what Barcelona was to Spain, so the Inner Triangle is to Poland, the heart of the country’s resistance. Whether the military analogy is to be carried to its bitter end, nobody can say, for the upshot depends on the v.eather, on Poland’s supplies of military materials, and on the number of forces which Germany can bring to bear.

From a purely military point of view, Spain may be described as the triumph of the mechanized battering-ram over old-fashioned infantry; from the wider viewpoint of “total warfare,” Spain must remain, whatever the immediate upshot of the war, the triumph of morale over armament. Today the commander-in-chief of the German forces (General Walther von Brauschitsch) seems to be in the position that General Franco was in when he came to the outskirts of Madrid and the Aragonese plateau; but there is this tremendous difference —that, whereas external interference decided the military day in favour of Franco, it is likely to take the opposite form in the case of Poland, for land and aerial pressure on tire Western Front can, and must, detract from the German thrust towards the inland of Poland.

The pressure on the Saar and the Palatinate is not local warfare, but it the solution, for good or for evil, of the Polish military situation. In effect, the time has come for some decision in military matters, and it is very likely that the visit of the British Prime Minister to France had this very aim in view. For it is in the West, one might almost say in the air in the West, that Poland will be won or lost. POSTPONED ELECTIONS LIKELY FINANCING BRITAIN’S WAR EFFORT (Received September 25, 10.10 p.m.) LONDON, September 24. According to the newspapers, discussions have taken place in -party i circles which are likely to obviate any contested elections, either local or parliamentary, for some time. The question is given actuality by the death yesterday of Mr F. B. Simpson, a former Lord Mayor of Leeds and Labour member for Ashton-Under-Lyne, and the fact that the municipal elections are due on November 1. Parliament will reassemble on Tuesday and on Wednesday, the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Sir tJohn Simon) will announce his proposals for financing Britain’s gigantic war effort. It is recognized that it will be exceedingly unpleasant but that it will contain no surprises, for everyone, including business circles is prepared for the severe measures which are required and the only concern manifest is that the methods adopted for passing the huge sums which must be raised shall be such as will cause the least dislocation of industry, as even temporary unemployment would result in a waste of resources, which must be avoided when every ounce of the country’s strength should be available for the struggle. N.Z. WAR VETERANS AT SYDNEY CHURCH SYDNEY, September 25. Former members of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force, who served in the Great War and who npw live in Sydney, attended the annual New Zealand service at St Columba’s Presbyterian Church last night. Two tattered banners hung in the church on each side of a wooden cross from Pozieres. * , N.Z. GERMAN CONSULAR PARTY AT SYDNEY SYDNEY, September 25. The New Zealand German Consular party arrived at Sydney yesterday. A strong military guard was placed round the wharves when the vgssel berthed and communications between the Consular party and land was forbidden. -

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/ST19390926.2.68

Bibliographic details

Southland Times, Issue 23932, 26 September 1939, Page 8

Word Count
1,811

THE WAR IN THE AIR Southland Times, Issue 23932, 26 September 1939, Page 8

THE WAR IN THE AIR Southland Times, Issue 23932, 26 September 1939, Page 8

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