The Southland Times MONDAY, MAY 22, 1939. Britain’s Negotiations With Russia

Southland Times, Issue 23823, 22 May 1939, Page 6

The Southland Times MONDAY, MAY 22, 1939. Britain’s Negotiations With Russia

qpHE Anglo-Soviet negotiations appear to have reached a critical stage. Mr Chamberlain’s summary of the position during his speech in the House of Commons, as reported this morning in cable messages from London, indicates that strenuous attempts have been made, and are still being made, to find a solution. It is becoming clear, however, that the Soviet Government has taken its stand on the need for a threePower alliance, with military staff talks and “the fullest possible cooperation.” Britain is obviously opposed to this and has been working to build up a peace front with a system of guarantees. The Prime Minister reminded the House that what they were seeking was “not an alliance between a group of States, but a means of resisting aggression.” But it is now possible that nothing less than an alliance on the widest possible basis will be an effective means of checking German expansion in Eastern Europe. The Guarantee System

There is an obscurity in some of Mr Chamberlain’s statements that is hard to understand, even if allowance is made for the fact that he had to make his speech while the negotiations were still proceeding. He said, for instance, that the British suggestion to the Soviet Government was substantially that “Russia should make a declaration regarding Poland and Rumania similar to the one made by Britain and France,” apparently in a form which leaves Russia free to withhold help from a threatened country until Britain and France have taken action. Yet a little earlier he complained that his critics made insufficient 'allowance for the possibility that “the direct participation of the Soviet in the security guarantees might not be altogether in accordance with the wishes of some countries for whose benefits or on whose behalf the arrangements contemplated were being made.” The countries mainly concerned are Poland and Rumania. As far as can be judged from the rather subtle distinctions in this speech the key to the dilemma lies in the words “direct participation.” Britain appears to be striving to arrange a diplomatic machinery whereby Russia can be kept in the background, presumably to avoid alarming the States that are to be protected from attack. It is difficult not to believe that the real reason for this involved method of “encirclement” is a reluctance on Britain’s part to enter into a complete alliance with the Soviet Union. Poland and Rumania are certainly not in a position to dictate the terms under which they are to receive assistance; their prejudice against Russia is not likely to be strong enough to make them reject British support if it involves a back-door agreement with their eastern neighbour. It could be argued, perhaps, that the reluctance to make commitments is on Russia’s side rather than Britain’s. But the evidence points another way. Mr Chamberlain expressed disappointment because M. Molotov and M. Potemkin were not allowed to go to Geneva to confer with Lord Halifax, in spite of the fact that the League Council had postponed its meeting entirely for this reason. “.This is one of the cases,” he said, “in which I cannot help feeling that there is a sort of veil or wall between the two Governments which it is extremely difficult to

penetrate. . . .” What seems to have happened is that the Soviet leaders have informed Britain that anything less than a threePower alliance will not be acceptable to them and that once this decision was made they saw no point in sending diplomats to hear the patient arguments of the British Foreign Secretary. The “veil or wall” between the two Governments would therefore be the fixed attitude of the Soviet. The Final Dilemma

In the circumstances Britain may have to decide whether to enter into a three-Power alliance or to dispense with Russian aid in her difficult European commitments. The choice is not an easy one for British statesmen. They know that an alliance with Russia will be received in Germany as a final and unmistakable act of encirclement, and it is clear from the tone of Mr Chamberlain’s references to the satisfaction of “reasonable aspirations,” that they wish to leave the door open for negotiations with the Nazis. But they must know, also, that without Russian support their position will be dangerously weakened. Although Mr Lloyd George may have spoken extravagantly against the Government he came close to the truth when he said that it “is impossible to redeem our pledge to Poland without Russia.” Britain’s decision may have to be made within the next few days; if the Government fails at this stage to accept the underlying realities the outlook for peace will not be encouraging.