The Southland Times. TUESDAY, MARCH 21, 1939. Ominous Events In Europe

Southland Times, Issue 23772, 21 March 1939, Page 6

The Southland Times. TUESDAY, MARCH 21, 1939. Ominous Events In Europe

ALTHOUGH a new world crisis might not be the immediate sequel to Germany s annexation of Czechoslovakia it would be misleading to deny that the situation is full of ominous possibilities. World reactions to Heir Hitler’s latest coup have been generally clear cut and definite. Mr Chamberlain’s Birmingham speech expressed the dismay ana unqualified disapproval of British people who had accepted Munich as the guarantee of “peace in our time.” In France M. Daladier, who claims that the violation of the Munich Agreement has given Britain and France “an incomparable moral force,” gained an almost unanimous vote from the Senate Finance Committee in favour of the granting of full powers to the Government. The United States Government struck the heaviest blow of all by imposing new tariffs that will exclude German imports from their largest overseas market. Meanwhile the Soviet Union, whose spokesmen have had far more to say than during the anxious days of September, has addressed a forthright Note to Germany and is moving troops to her western frontiers. Troop movements are also taking place in Rumania, where the position has been complicated by rumours of an economic ultimatum. This, action has been denied by the German News Agency in London, and a British Official Wireless message says that the situation “awaits clarification.” The Rome-Berlin Axis

The general attitude of those countries which may be classed roughly as the non-aggressive group has been one of indignation and distrust, accompanied by signs of a stiffening resistance. It can be assumed with certainty that if war comes the initiative in aggression will not be taken by these nations, and that if they are compelled to act it will be only because they have been pressed beyond the limits of forbearance and safety. The key to the position must be found, therefore, in the intentions of Germany and the Rome-Berlin axis. There is only too much evidence to support the belief that Herr Hitler is adhering, with a magalomaniac intensity, to a plan of conquest that must bring him ultimately into conflict with the major Powers. Even if this is not the case, his partnership with Signor Mussolini may make it difficult for him to draw back. The RomeBerlin axis hitherto has been regarded as a more or less equal partnership, in theory if not altogether in fact. But the seizure of Czechoslovakia, both in. the preliminary phase at Munich and in the stage-managed march to Prague, has given Herr Hitler a tremendous advantage in acquisition and in prestige. Signor Mussolini is by no means the man to submit passively to a minor, and possibly unprofitable role in the fascist campaign. The agitation against France a month or two ago was generally believed to indicate that the Mediterranean would be the next setting for a crisis and that an attempt would be made to repeat in Tunisia the successful tactics of Sudetenland. In the meantime, however, Herr Hitler has once again made a panther-spring to the east, and according to a message from Paris Signor Mussolini has been advised “not to press his claims on France at present.” Signor Gayda is reported to have praised Germany’s coup in terms which suggest that Italy may remain passive in the meantime. “History does not end today,” he wrote. “Obviously it is right to reserve for tomorrow the valuation of Italy’s advantages from the axis.” Dangerous Possibilities

Just how far Signor Mussolini is in agreement with Herr Hitler is of course a tantalizing question. Apparently M. Daladier believes that the axis partners can be separated, an opinion for which there may be some justification in the new trend of events. Il Duce has missed his turn in the scramble for spoils, and he lives too much in the public gaze to be able to risk the imputation of a growing subservience to Herr Hitler. The danger lurks in two possibilities. It may become necessary for Herr Hitler to act against his own instinct in supporting Italy’s claims in the Mediterranean, chiefly as the means of preserving the axis. (To lose Italian support at this stage would be to sacrifice a great part of German immunity from attack in the west, for Italy showed in the last war that she can change sides quickly, and a disappointed friend is always a potential enemy.) The second possibility is that Herr Hitler will be forced further than he intended to go by the pressure of events in the east, and by the impatience of the satellite nations —especially of Hungary. If the next few days can pass without a major disturbance there may be a breathing space before the next occasion for alarm. But it is increasingly difficult to believe that the present disturbances can be settled on the basis of a permanent security.