Peace Diplomacy In Spain

Southland Times, Issue 23741, 13 February 1939, Page 6

Peace Diplomacy In Spain

Events in Spain will now be watched, everywhere with the closest interest. General Franco appears to have triumphed in the field, and if General Miaja decides to abandon the defence of Madrid the rebels will have gained a complete victory. This can scarcely fail to open a critical phase in European politics, for it is unfortunately true that the quarrels and troubles of the Spanish people have been made factors of the utmost importance in the policies of the fascist States. In considering the new situation there is a constant danger of oversimplification. It is dangerously easy to assume, for instance, that because Britain and France are ready to aid the reconstruction of Spain the difficulties caused by fascist intervention will quietly disappear. It is equally easy to believe that victory for General Franco means a victory for Signor Mussolini and that Italy has gained a new and important “zone of influence” in the Mediterranean. Both these possibilities can be accepted; but they must be related to other and complex conditions before they can be given their proper significance. It is probably true that Signor Mussolini expected the rebels to gain a rapid victory with the aid of Italian troops, and that by establishing himself in Spain he hoped to counteract British and French influence in the Western Mediterranean. If the war had been won as quickly as the rebels expected in the early stages there can be little doubt that Italy would have made considerable gains in prestige, as well as in

strategic and economic positions. But the Government resistance was surprisingly stubborn: an equal strength in artillery, aircraft and food resources on both sides might have led to a different result. In any case the struggle was sufficiently protracted to commit Italy to effort and expenditure far beyond her original plans. Among other things the delay led to increased intervention by Germany, which may or may not have been welcome to Italy. The position now seems to be that unless Signor Mussolini can show something more than rnilitary victories he will find it difficult to convince the Italian people that their sacrifices have not been made in J vain. According to the terms of the Anglo-Italian Agreel- - he has undertaken not to annex any territory and not to establish any permanent bases in Spain. But it will be remembered that he also promised to withdraw his troops before the agreement was implemented, and that this condition was not fulfilled. Britain’s action in arranging a Spanish settlement at Minorca suggests that the Government is fully alive to the possibility that Signor Mussolini’s designs will allow him to ignore the limitations of the treaty. The next few weeks should bring some interesting developments, and possibly some international dangers. Unless Italy can dominate the peace negotiations her efforts of the past two and a-half years will have been thrown away. She is certain to be supported strongly by Germany, whose own intervention has been less spectacular but in some ways more substantial. In the meantime General Franco seems to have shown a preference for British support in the preliminary negotiations. But will he be permitted to side-step the secret obligations that must have conditioned military aid from Italy and Germany? It seems too much to expect that the dictators will be ready to cut their losses and leave the Spanish position much as it was before the war while Britain and France take the rewards of non-inter-vention.