The Southland Times. FRIDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1938. France In A Period Of Readjustment

Southland Times, Issue 23651, 28 October 1938, Page 6

The Southland Times. FRIDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1938. France In A Period Of Readjustment

A significant statement by the French Minister of Commerce is reported this morning in a cable message from Marseilles. “I am convinced that the country has reached a turning point in her history,” said M. Gentin in a speech before the opening of . the Radical Congress. “I consider that a regime of directed economy, possibly under which capital and labour will remain under private control, will be possible. But if private initiative is insufficient, or too many private undertakings threaten productive anarchy, the State must step in.” Something of the same kind in relation to Britain was hinted a day or two ago by The Daily Telegraph. “We may have to consent to a new ordering of our social structure,” said this paper, commenting on a speech by Lord Halifax. “The test of our fitness to face the new world will be our capacity to accept obligations hitherto spared us.” In Britain, however, the democratic tradition is so deeply rooted that changes are unlikely to come suddenly; and if they come it will be mainly in response to an inner compulsion, expressing the will of the people. France is placed somewhat differently. The democratic instinct in that country has always shown a tendency towards extreme action; there is a revolutionary tradition that seems to be innate in the Gallic temperament. And where this tendency exists it is usually accompanied by an equally strong impulse towards reaction, so that periods of an extreme radicalism are followed by a pronounced swing towards the Right. Until a few months ago it seemed fairly safe to suggest that France was now in the mood for dynamic political experiment. The socialist policy which was implemented vigorously uhder the leadership of M. Blum seemed to indicate a long process of social adjustment, although opposition from the Right was never altogether quiescent, and more than once there was rumour of conspiracy and incipient fascism. In normal circumstances French politics might have attained a comparative stability, with no more than the usual number of alternations from socialism to conservatism. But the crisis and the Munich Agreement have completely changed the situation. The French nation realizes its danger, and is ready to accept a more rigid system and to abandon, for the time being, what may now seem to be utopian benefits under the labour code. Defence is the first consideration; and if the country is to bear the expense of an expanded programme it must organize its resources on the basis of what is practicable rather than what is socially desirable. The process is certain to create anxieties and discontents; it may even lead to a sharp struggle for power and an attempt by the Chamber of Deputies to abridge the widening scope of plenary government. But the French worker is essentially a realist; whatever his position may be in domestic politics he will not be slow to understand that the policy favoured by the Popular Front has suddenly become ineffectual against the forces now lined up against it in Europe. Democracy on the Continent is practically extinct outside France, and any attempt to persevere with the former system of European alliances with the smaller States would clearly be futile against the strength, military and propagandist, of Greater Germany. , It also seems likely that the Franco-Soviet Pact, which has had the enthusiastic support of the majority of France’s workers —many of whom liked to read into it an ideological significance that was probably imaginary—will now be abandoned, perhaps without much protest from Russia. Already there have been signs that France will seek a better understanding with Italy; if the Anglo-Italian Agreement is implemented and better relations exist between Paris and Rome a settlement with General Franco may be the next inevitable step. Left-wing policy in France has insisted from the beginning on the need for a strong stand against the dictators. But the sudden collapse of French influence in Central and Eastern Europe makes this attitude impossible. It also throws the left-wing groups into a state of uncertainty, perhaps of confusion; and while they are struggling to find new positions the mass of the people, united temporarily by the nearness of danger, may support M. Daladier in a policy that might have sent the workers into the streets if it had been put forward only a few months ago. In the meantime there will be serious economic difficulties. Valuable markets have been lost; others may go in the near future; and production has been declining ominously for some time past. These are facts that will influence French politics in the coming months of readjustment. The interesting and disquieting truth that emerges from a survey of present conditions is that if France changes her social system

it will be in response, not to theory or to political ferment within the State, but to the policy and methods of Nazi Germany. Totalitarian government may not be an exportable commodity; but it- has a way of seeping across the frontiers. The lesson for Frenchmen is that in a world dominated by nations organized for aggression the only chance of survival seems to lie in an equal vigour of preparation and discipline. If democracy is to suffer in the process it must remain for history to assess the loss and apportion the blame.