At The Gates Of Shanghai

Southland Times, Issue 23332, 16 October 1937, Page 6

At The Gates Of Shanghai

According to a cable message printed yesterday, the Shanghai correspondent of The Daily Telegraph has stated the objectives of the Japanese Army in China to be complete occupation of all territory north of the Yellow River, the occupation of Hainan Island and a decisive victory at Shanghai. Of these three objectives it is probably safe to say that a “decisive victory” at Shanghai is the most important. It is there that Chinese resistance has been most stubborn. And it is there, in the fabric of a nascent industrial organization, that Japan sees the outward and visible signs of all that she fears most from China. The paradox in this is that Shanghai, which is one of the five original treaty-ports established for foreign trade at the end of the “Opium War” of 1838-42, has outlived the influence of its foreign origins and become the natural heart of the country. Its rapid development has led to a curious mingling of the forms of western and eastern civilization, and industrial expansion has been accompanied by a movement to- j

wards unification. These are the factors which have influenced Japan to push on with her policy of systematic aggression. The militaristic urge has its undercurrents of fear, for the Japanese believe that they can have no real security while China enters into the stream of industrialism, and rouses herself to make use of her vast natural resources. A weak China is believed to be necessary, not only to the militarists and their dreams of empire, but also to the industrial captains and their drive for new markets. As a nation of agriculturists, the Chinese would provide the obvious market for Japanese goods. But if they enter more actively into competition with the industrialists of Nippon they can exploit a lower standard of living and seriously threaten Japanese trade in the east. The attack on Shanghai therefore has a dual importance. In striking at the heart of the new China the Japanese are also driving in a wedge that will open a path across the strongholds of the Central Government. It is generally believed that if a Japanese victory is to bring any lasting gain it must be won within a few months. The Japanese themselves have not hesitated to make it clear that urgency is the essence of the situation. They know that battles won in North China do not necessarily mean the decay of Chinese unity. The country is wide, the Chinese are adept in the arts of guerilla warfare, and Manchuria might yet become a storm centre behind the Japanese lines. Until now it has been possible for Japan to detach provinces from China without having to face anything more than a local or sporadic resistance. But under President Chiang Kai-shek the position has changed. Aggression in the north is now a direct move against the Central Government, and those Chinese soldiers whose furious counter-attack in Shanghai is reported in a message this morning are united in purpose with the troops who have been retreating in the province of Hopei. It is this new solidarity, more than anything else, which Japan is anxious to crush; and it is at Shanghai, where Chinese unity is reflected in the growth of an industrial and financial centre, that the invaders have their best chance of attaining their objective. A victory in North China could be the prelude to a long and indeterminate warfare. But victory in Shanghai would mean immediate and perhaps vital strategic gains.