The Southland Times PUBLISHED EVERY MORNING “LUCEO NON URO” FRIDAY, OCTOBER 15, 1937. Another Scrap Of Paper?

Southland Times, Issue 23331, 15 October 1937, Page 6

The Southland Times PUBLISHED EVERY MORNING “LUCEO NON URO” FRIDAY, OCTOBER 15, 1937. Another Scrap Of Paper?

Germany’s guarantee to Belgium, reported in a cable message this morning, is a further stage in Belgium’s progress towards independence. First steps were taken in October of last year, when King Leopold announced a policy of neutrality. Belgium was then a party to the provisional Anglo-Franco-Belgian agreement, signed on March 19, 1936 —12 days after Germany had reoccupied the Rhineland. The purpose of the agreement was to provide undertakings by the three parties to aid one another in case of aggression, and this amounted simply to a reaffirmation of the purposes of the Locarno Treaty. It differed from Locarno, of course, in that Germany was no longer a party to the agreement. Since then Belgian policy has been aimed at a status of privilege, and its object was partly attained when Britain and France, in the declaration of April 24 of this year, released Belgium from her guarantee under the Locarno Treaty and at the same time renewed their own guarantees to protect her against aggression. As a positive contribution to this agreement Belgium undertook to defend her frontiers against invaders, and to resist any attempt by an aggressor nation to use Belgian territory as a means of access to another State, or as a base of operations by land, sea or in the air. She also gave assurances to Britain and France of her loyalty to the Covenant of the League of Nations. This was important, for under Article 16 of the Covenant Belgium could be called upon to provide the right of passage in the event of a combined movement by League members against an aggressor nation. Under present conditions this seems an unlikely contingency. It was obvious at the time that the Anglo-French agreement must remain an inadequate guarantee for security in Western Europe unless Germany would make a similar contribution. German opinion was generally favourable to King Leopold’s neutrality announcement last year. From a strategic point of view Germany’s position seemed to have been strengthened. According to the diplomatic correspondent of The Daily Telegraph—writing in October 1936—it was believed that “should Germany attempt expansion it would be eastwards; her concern in the west would be to hold off an attack from France going to help Poland or Czechoslovakia.” An independent Belgium means a shorter line of trenches if war comes again to Western Europe. It may seem strange, then, that Herr Hitler should have waited six months before taking a step which promised advantages to Germany. One reason for caution was probably the uncertainty which existed over Belgium’s obligations under Article 16 of the League Covenant. It is significant that when the Anglo-French agreement was announced Germany was already pointing out that partial exemptions from Articles 15 and 16 were obtained by Switzerland in 1920 and by Germany herself in 1925. British observers did not hesitate to speculate as to whether Germany would ask for undertakings in this direction in return for a guarantee to Belgium. But it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Germany now feels certain that there is nothing to fear from League solidarity. Accordingly the long-awaited guarantee has been announced by Germany, and, as The Times puts it, “Belgium gets all King Leopold asked for last year.”

The Times also states that the prospects for a western pact “seem distant, but the German declaration is a step in the right direction.” What has happened is that an unsigned pact has been created in relation to a small but important area of European territory. Germany’s assurance is unilateral; but although there has been no collective agreement among the western Powers the essential result is the same as if there had been one. There is little reason to justify any hope that the area could be extended. A blind spot among the western frontiers can be of great strategic value to Germany on one side or to Britain and France on the other. But it has been easier to create because Belgian interests are confined there; they do not extend amid a complexity of political relationships across the debatable lands of the west, or to the troubled waters of the Mediterranean. And even then it is easy to wonder how far this Belgian independence could survive the outbreak of war. Modern warfare is hard to localize, and although Belgium has undertaken to develop her army to a strength which will allow her to resist invasion it is difficult to believe that neutrality could be possible for any length of time in a country whose frontiers receive no aid from mountain range or wide waters. If the position is studied

from a strictly political viewpoint, the gains are merely theoretical. The “great error of 1914” may not be repeated in literal terms; but there has been nothing in the attitudes of Germany to. suggest that “scraps of paper” have a new inviolability. Is there not a certain irony in the fact that these latest guarantees have had to be granted as the direct result of Germany’s disregard of a former treaty?