TOKIO MURDER

Southland Times, Issue 25363, 15 August 1935, Page 7

TOKIO MURDER

NAGATA’S ASSASSIN A DISRATED ARMY OFFICER WAR MINISTER’S POLICY (United Press Assn.—Telegraph Copyright.) Tokio, August 13. The War Office revealed that MajorGeneral Nagata’s assassin was Lieuten-ant-Colonel Aizawa, aged 46, who on August 1 received an “Irishman’s rise” when he was relegated from the fortyfirst regiment to a military instructorship at Formosa. General Hayashi, Minister for War, visited the Emperor and received his sanction to remain in office and uphold the policy of strict army discipline. He has appointed Lieut.-General Imai, director of the War Office personnel, to succeed Major-General Nagata in the joint offices of Director of Military Affairs and Secretary-General, being superior to the War Council. DISUNITY IN THE ARMY MOTIVE FOR CRIME NOT CLEAR. (Uniled Press Assn.—Telegraph Copyright.) London, August 13. The Tokio correspondent of The Times says that though the motive for the murder of Major-General Nagata is unknown, it seems that the assailant believed misleading rumours concerning Major-General Nagata. This cryptic remark is interpreted to mean that he thought officers who had sympathized with the political faction in the army would suffer in their careers, and everyone would like to believe the crime originated from personal feeling. Uneasiness is still discernible in wellinformed circles lest the trial will bring further disclosures of disunity. Aizawa prepared himself for the deed by patriotic and religious exercises. THE ARMY DISPUTE MINISTER’S ATTEMPT TO REGAIN CONTROL. FIGHT AGAINST POLITICAL FACTION. New York, July 16. General Jinzaburo Mazaki, Director General of Military Education and popularly known as one of the army’s “big three,” has been ordered relieved of his post, to which General Jotaro Watanabe has been appointed. This change follows a disagreement between General Senjuro Havashi; the War Minister, and General Mazaki about further extensive changes in personnel which the Minister proposes to make when the annual transfers and promotions are announced on August 1, says Hugh Bejas, in a message from Tokio to the New York Times. These changes were intended, according to the newspapers, to carry further General Hayashi’s policy of “strengthening control of the army” by removing officers who have been “disturbing its unity.” In other words, General Hayashi, with the support of the army as a whole, is removing from key positions the so-called progressive faction, who desired that the army play a political role and whose tendency toward independent action had been noticeable since the Manchurian affair in 1931.

General Mazaki's post is one of the three most important in the army, and, like those of chief of staff and War Minister, confers on its holder the right to direct access to the Emperor. Realizing that General Mazaki’s opposition endangered his policy _ of “placing the right men in the right positions,” General Hayashi, after twice requesting General Mazaki’s resignation, dismissed him, with, it is reported, the support of the majority of the highest officers. Press Applauds Firmness.

His action is a victory for the moderate elements, with which General Hayashi has become increasingly identified. The Press applauds his firmness, which is regarded as proof that the dangerous movement revealed by the political assassinations in 1931 and 1932 has subsided.

General Hayashi’s courage in dismissing his powerful colleague and striking a blow at the influences that have dominated the army in the last four years impresses the public imagination, but the newspaper Hochi fears his action may fail to restore unity. The Nichi Nichi declares that General Hayashi is determined to carry out his policy even if he becomes “a human sacrifice.” Tracing the history of the affair, it states that the mission assigned to General Hayashi when he succeeded General Sadao Araki was restoration of internal control of the army.

He invariably found himself opposed by a strong faction led by General Mazaki, comprising two generals who had once held high office, one being a lieutenant-general commanding a division. This group not only opposed personnel changes that would have weakened their influence, but to force General Hayashi’s resignation, which would have been followed by a return to the “progressive” faction with its forward policy. Growth of Movement. The latest incursions of the military into Japanese politics began in 1931, when, because of many alleged antiJapanese incidents in Manchuria, a strong movement grew up for direct army action. Greatly stimulated by the Japanese conquest of Manchuria which followed, the younger military men took an increasing part in political affairs, even forming societies where they hotly debated the nation’s course. This fervour culminated in the assassination on May 15, 1932, of the Premier, Mr Tsuyoshi Inukai by cadets and in attacks on various institutions in and around Tokio. Soon after this the Ministers for War and the Navy promised in the Imperial Diet that they would seek to restrain the young officers and cadets from further political activities. But the realization of this pledge, if it is now achieved, has required nearly three years. There intervened a long period in which the domestic as well as the foreign affairs of Japan were strongly under the influence of General Sadao Araki, who, as War Minister, was known as an extreme nationalist. Even after General Araki was replaced last year by General Hayashi, groups of army officers repeatedly issued volumes of pamphlets dealing with the social welfare of Japan, particularly of the farmers and fishermen, and implying that only the army leaders really had the interests of the masses at heart.

However, the most recent of these brochures, circulated only a few months ago, brought forth severe criticism from much of the Press and from the civil authorities.