PECULIAR LIBEL APPEAL

Southland Times, Issue 20834, 24 July 1929, Page 14

PECULIAR LIBEL APPEAL

CAPTION- TO A PHOTOGRAPH. JUDGES DISAGREE. Judgment was given by the Court, of Appeal, consisting of Lords Justices Scrutton, Greer, add Russell, in the appeal by the Daily Mirror Newspapers, Ltd., from a judgment of Mr Justice McCardie, in the King’s Bench Division, awarding £5OO damages against them for what was held to be libel by a photograph. The judgment was given at the suit of Mrs Mildred Anna Cassidy, of Luton road, Baswater, wife of Mr Kettering Edward Cassidy, the rasehorse owner, who is known as Mr M. Corrigan. She had complained of the publication of a photograph of her husband and a lady at Hurst Park races, “Mr Corrigan, the racehorse owner, and Miss Muriel Harrold, whose engagement has been announced.” The case for the appellants was that the words were not capable of bearing a defamatory meaning, and that in the circumstances in which the words were published there was neither malice, in fact nor in law. By a majority the court dismissed the appeal, with costs, Lord Justice Greer dissenting. x. Lord Justice Scrutton said that Cassidy or Corrigan had achieved some notoriety in racing circles and in connection with women. When the photograph was taken he told the photographer that he was engaged to marry the lady with whom he was photographed, and gave permission that it might be announced. . Without further inquiry the Daily Mirror published it, and Mrs Cassidy brought an action against the newspaper, as the words in her view, bore the innuendo .that she was an immoral woman and was not married to Cassidy. Mrs Cassidy's Point of View. “In my view,” added the Lord Justice, “the words published are capable of the meaning that Corrigan was a single man, and they were published to people who knew that the plaintiff professed to be married to Corrigan. Therefore, the inference could be drawn that she was living in immoral relations with. Corrigan.” Lord Justice Russell concurred. Lord Justice Greer, in his dissenting judgment, said there was no evidence on which it was reasonable to conclude that it was known or ought to be known to the defendants that Corrigan was married. He said he was, engaged to marry the lady, and they could not be expected to know lhat he was already married. He thought that the defendants were entitled to succeed because, in fact, they had not used language which reasonable persons would have interpreted as being defamatory to the plaintiff. Conditions upon which stay of execution, [lending appeal to the House of Lords, should be granted were left over for further argument.