NEW NAVAL BASE

Southland Times, Issue 18972, 20 June 1923, Page 5

NEW NAVAL BASE

“QUESTION OF INSURANCE” VALUE OF SINGAPORE WEAKENING OF WESTERN PRESTIGE (By arrangement with Morning Post). (By Telegraph—Press Assn. —Copyright). (Australian and N.Z. Cable Association.) LONDON, June 18. Without any desire to appear unduly alarmist, it is impossible to resist the impression anywhere in the Far East that a clash of colour is imminent, since Western education is having its effect, and the Oriental no longer regards the American or the European as a miraculous being. Every concession by European Governments to a native race is looked upon in the bazaars from Bagdad to Tokio as a sign of weakening, with the result that strikes against Western administration or supervision of industry are of rapidly increasing frequency. With the signal instance of the Hong Kong strike as an example of what combined native action can achieve, any loss of prestige at this juncture will be even more than usually serious, while it must never be forgotten that the Oriental goes almost entirely by what he secs at close quarters, and not by what he may be asked to believe at a distance of ten thousand miles. A good instance of this is the enforced economy in connection with naval affairs, which latterly made it impossible for Britain to keep up the China Seas fleet to the same proportion as before 1914. At the same time similar cuts in the army, combined with the critical situation at Constantinople, have weakened the British military powers, in so far as maintaining white battalions in the China command is concerned. We who live in our. own country know that neither of these visible signs of retrenchment really indicates a loss of power, but the native mind sees in them inability to keep up Britain’s might on the old lines, and therefore envisages an actual loss of grip. An adequate fleet with an adequate base and all the pomp and circumstance of a prosperous, dignified Power would do far more to secure Western interests in Asia than all the diplomatic notes in Christendom, and from this viewpoint alone the desire to make Singapore a great naval centre is therefore a great Imperial conception. Singapore is only 1440 miles from Hong Kong, and lies geographically in such a position that a proper nav.al base there could not only receive reinforcements from Europe without danger or difficulty, but could also protect the vast British trade interests from Borneo to the Australian coast. An intelligent study of the map combined with the atmospheric education of Joseph Conrad’s novels, will speedily convince those who have not seen Singapore of its immeasurable importance to Far Eastern trade. Welded by this port, through the narrow waters that lies between Sumatra and the Malayan Peninsula, come all the ocean carriers of European commerce. Radiating from Singapore to the north-east and south-east, spring the vast ramifications of the island trade, that stretch right down to Australia and the South Seas. Dutch and British flags predominate in these waters, and it is worthy of note that the former, fully alive to possible developments in the Pacific, are rapidly putting themselves in a state of approximate security. Since they can have no fear of English or American interference, it may be surmised that they anticipate much the same development as these articles are meant to foreshadow.

At Hong Kong, on the other hand, is focussed all the European trade to China and Japan. She is a large western owner in the China coasting trade, Australian trade, and trans-Pacific trade with Canada and America ; but Hong Kong without the backing of Singapore is so isolated that her tenure or possession against an aggressor from the north would be merely a matter of hours. Before the Great War she might have defended herself successfully against an ordinary enemy, but she is now precluded by the status quo agreement from enlarging her defences to meet the contingencies of modern warfare. Nor is Hong Kong as certain now as in the past of a favourable, or at the worst a neutral atmosphere on the Chinese mainland. From what has been heard of Australian opinion since the Singapore policy was made known, there is nothing but a welcome for a movement containing such a definite index of intimate co-operation in case of need. With her naval forces freed from the disturbing menace of a possible onslaught from the north, Australia will be able to devote her maritime interests to the immediate pro. tection of her own coasts.

Another aspect of the Singapore scheme is that it will add renewed strength to the British position in India, since whatever untoward events might occur in the big Indian ports as the result of mutiny or revolution, a strong naval force could quickly be thrown northwards, irrespective of what reinforcements were sent via the Suez Canal to India. As to the other Asiatics, this very tangible reminder of our strength would not be without its effect. It would be useless for Russian agents to boast of Britain’s declining power when no ship friendly to Russia dared to show its keel in any portion of the Indian Ocean. Similarly, without alliances or even a semi-official understanding, those responsible for American rule in the Philippines, would feel half their burden lightened if they knew that their greatest friends were in a strong enough position to stem the Asiatic tide on the spot. No such protection to the Philippines is possible by America herself, and she is more likely to work in harmony with British trade interests if she is sure of their mutual protection. To sum up, the proper development of Singapore as a genuine British headquarters in the Western Pacific and on the fringe of the Far East, will be an ever-present indication to Asiatics generally that Britain intends to protect her interests and nationals, whatever policy may be proposed out there by other nations. It would serve as a check to Bolshevist propaganda, which loudly proclaims the weakening of European power. It would be a very genuine gauge of friendship with America for their mutual defence and would stand as one of the most important Imperial links with China that binds Australia and New Zealand to the Motherland. There is no question of aggression in the Singapore proposition. It is entirely a question of insurance on behalf of the Western world against war risks, and it is merely a fortuitous circumstance that England alone of the Western nations is at the moment able to take out an insurance policy for the protection of her Far Eastern trade, and as a standing pledge of Occidental prestige in the Orient.