The Southland Times. PUBLISHED EVERY MORNING. Luceo Non Uro. SATURDAY, JUNE 9, 1923. ELECTORAL REFORM.

Southland Times, Issue 18963, 9 June 1923, Page 4

The Southland Times. PUBLISHED EVERY MORNING. Luceo Non Uro. SATURDAY, JUNE 9, 1923. ELECTORAL REFORM.

A correspondent writes in search of information concerning the operation of proportional representation, and incidentally mentions two arguments on which the opponents of the system usually rely in their arguments against its introduction. The first point he mentions is the effect of the reform on party government. It is a peculiar fact that those who rail against P.R., claim on different occasions that it will destroy the party system and that it will play into the hands of the big party organisations. So far the experience has been that the system in vogue before the introduction of P.R., has been maintained, suggesting that it does not have any influence on the grouping of the representatives, but it is hoped that, in 1 the long run, the effect of electing the popular chamber by proportional representation will be to make the individual members rather more independent and less amenable to the cracking of the party whips. On the Continent the group system prevails as distinct from the big parties which characterise popular government under the British flag and in the United States, but it is noticeable that new issues, causing re-shufflings in the political field, have broken up the old parties in the Old Country and in Australia, thus increasing the number of leaders and sectional groupings. Efforts have been made in Britain and in Australia to decrease the number of separate organisms, and doubtless there will be a return to the two-party system in both places before very long. The destruction of parties is almost impossible, but it is hoped that the evils of party government may be removed by the development of independence among individual members. Proportional representation should be an aid in this direction, but it cannot be soundly argued that it will confirm or destroy the party system com-

pletely. When the advocates of P.R., state that the single electorate for the entire country is the ideal for the proper working of the reform, they know that they are referring to conditions which are impossible of realisation at this juncture, and we doubt very much if the country would accept this method of securing representation if it were based on one large electorate in each island. But if we assume that the South Island set about electing fifteen members by means of proportional representation, we do not create conditions which are as difficult as our correspondent suggests.. Recently in Invercargill the burgesses elected twelve councillors and had before them twenty-three candidates. Every elector had to mark his paper with crosses, and he could vote for twelve or fewer as he wished. If he had been faced with a voting paper containing forty-five names and was asked to vote for the return of fifteen members for the whole of the South Island, his task would be less difficult than was that which faced the people of Invercargill a few months ago. Under P.R., he would look down his voting paper and select the names of three or four candidates he wanted to see returned to the House, and he would show his preference for them. Naturally he would vote first for the men he knew best, and it is probable that his first choice would go to candidates from his own district. One of the mistakes most frequently made by those who discuss proportional representation is that they impose on the elector the task of voting for as many candidates as there are seats to be filled. This is quite wrong, and springs from a misunderstanding of the working of the system. It has been found that, even in elections where there are fifteen or sixteen seats to be filled, the preferences beyond the sixth are of infinitesimal value, because the vote is usually exhausted before it reaches that point. The elector does not vote for fifteen candidates, but actually his vote is of practical value to only one. If his entire vote is required for the election of one candidate it is not used again, but if the man for whom he voted cannot be elected, it is transferred to someone else and becomes effective there. If it is originally cast for a candidate who is returned with a surplus, then that portion of it which is not required goes elsewhere. The actual effect of this system is that the House elected approximately reproduces the divisions of political opinion in the country. With a single electorate the approximation would bte so close that it might be called an actual reproduction of the distribution of opinion among the electors, but as the electorates are multiplied the approximation widens. At no time, however, does it throw open the door to such extravagances of representation as the haphazard system now in vogue in this country, and in Britain inflict upon the electors, when the majorities in the House have no relationship to the party strength in the country. That is the weakness ’ and the danger of the present system, which the advocates of P.R. want to see removed.