THE REVOLUTION IN GREECE.

Southland Times, Issue 19653, 2 October 1922, Page 5

THE REVOLUTION IN GREECE.

PRO-ALLY CABINET. MANIFESTO BA’ THE LEADERS. ATHENS, September 29. Tim Revolutionary Committee is forming a pro-AHy Cabinet, and has ordered ex-King Constantine, Queen Sophia and Princes Nicholas and Andrew to leave Greece immediately. M. Venizelos has been invited to represent Greece at the Allied Council. The revolutionary leaders have Issued a manifesto insisting on the completely national character of the movement. An arruj’ victorious for ten years could not blame itself for the recent misfortunes. Heavy responsibility for the disasters rested upon others. “The national movement,” it states “ic a legitimate explosion due to the desire to repair the nation’.? checks as far as is humanly possible. The settlement of the dynastic question, foreign policy and internal affairs must lx* assured at the legislature elections. Meanwhile we shall work to reinforce the Thracian front.” ARREST OF EX-MINISTERS. LONIX)N, September 29. The Foreign Office has been advised from Athens that five ex-Manisters, Gounaris, Strat-os, Protopadakis, Goudas and Treotokls, have been arrested and charged with being responsible for the defeat in Asia Minor. A TEMPORARY CABINET. REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE WELCOMED AT ATHENS. ATHENS, September 30. (Received October 2, 12.20 a.m.) M. Alexandre Carupanos has established a temporary Cabinet to act until M. Zaimis can be recalled from Vienna to assume office. The members of the Revolutionary Committee arrived and were cheered throughout the streets by crowds who were delirious with excitement. The Governor of the National Bank and the deputy of the Police at Athens have been arrested. M. VENIZELOS INTERVIEWED. NOT RETURNING TO ATHENS AT PRESENT. PARLS, September 29. (Received October 1, 5.5 p.m.) M. Venizelos arrived incognito. In an interview he said: “I shall not return to Greece until the present trouble is over, so that nobody may say that I had a hand in it.” BRITISH LABOUR’S POLICY. DETERMINED OPPOSITION TO WAR. SPEECH BY MR HENDERSON. LONDON, September 30. (Received October 1, 5.5 p.m.) Mr Arthur Henderson, M.P., speaking at the opening of a Trades Hall at Wimbledon, said Labour was emphatically against the Government's mishandling of the Near East situation. The latest demand for the withdrawal of the Kemaliste from the neutral zone on the Asiatic side of the straits was not- calculated to lessen the tension. He feared that the war party within the Cabinet had gained the upper hand. The Government was pursuing a policy quite inconsistent with the spirit of the joint Allied note decided upon at Paris. The Cabinet ever since the defeat of the Greeks at Smyrna 'had maintained a bellicose attitude and threatened war when it should have striven for peace. Il made a capital blunder in constituting itself custodian and defender of the straits. It made a display of force instead of seeking a solution through the League of Nations. Many nations were concerned. The freedom of the straits was a question which should be settled by many nations in conference, not by one by means of war. The organised workers would oppose to the utmost of their power the war now threatening. No war ever had less justification. If necessary a special conference of the trade union and Labour movement would be called to consider how to bring the Government to its senses and enforce a policy aiming at peace. War would not settle anything, but would raise questions more important to the Empire and the world than the freedom of the straits. AN I.L.P. PROTEST. SUMMONING OF PARLIAMENT DEMANDED. LONDON, September 29. The Independent Labour Party has drafted a manifesto protesting against the Government’s Near Eastern policy and rejecting the Prime Minister’s claim that, the policy was dictated by a desire for the freedom of the straits. It declares that the policy was really dictated by British capitalism. The manifesto therefore demands a conference of all Near Eastern peoples and the immediate summoning of Parliament. Lord Denman, formerly Govenor-General of Australia, writing to the Westminster Gazette, demands the immediate summoning of Parliament to deal with the Near Eastern crisis. He is supported by Lord Crewe and the Marquis of Lincolnshire. Parliament will normally meet on November 14. POLAND AND THE BALKANS. WAR MATERIAL FROM FRANCE. PARIS, September 29. At the request of M. Poincare the Finance Commission is hastening the delivery of £8,000.900 worth of war material to Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and Rumania. Further augmentation of credit is being considered. The material is not to be used against the Turks, but is intended to protect the three. States against possible attacks by Russia or Bulgaria. THE INDIAN MOSLEMS. EXCITED BY FALSE NEWS. DELHI, September 29. Immense satisfaction is expressed by Moslems in the Punjab, which is regarded as the danger spot of India, over news published in the Indian papers, said to have emanated from the Afghan Consul at Simla to the. effect that the Kemalists have occupied Constantinople and Thrace. Mustapha Kemal’s photographs are exhibited, and he is hailed as a protector of the faith. Every move is watched with the keenest interest. Sympathisers are most outspoken and are all pro-Turk. BOLSHEVIK AGENTS ON THE FRONTIER. HELSINGFORS, September 29. Soviet newspapers publish a cable purporting to emanate from Allahabad stating that Bolshevist agents have reached the Indian frontier via Turkestan. IN AUSTRALIA. COUNCIL OF ACTION MANIFESTO. FORCIBLE OPPOSITION TO WAR. SYDNEY, October 1. (Received October 1. p.m.) The Council of Action has issued a manifesto in which it states that in consideration of the fact that the promise that the recent European War would be the last war has been dishonoured by the servile acquiescence of the Prime Minister to the veiled commands of the British Imperialiete to plunge Australia into another war in the Near East, the Council has determined to organise the workers in all industries so that the manufacture of army supplies and transport of troops and war equipment will

be prevented at all costs. It is further determined to organise ail effective forms of opposition, including general strikes in key industries and open-air demonstrations. The Council is also determined to secure adequate sanction from the unions to declare such general or sectional strikes or to take other measures for quick summary action in case of imminent or actual war projected bj’ anj f Australian Government.

The manifesto concludes with a warning that those individuals who precipitate the people into such a war will be jiersonally responsible for the death or mutilation of any member of the working class resulting therefrom.

GENERAL HARINGTON. "A SAFE MAN.” A brief sketch of General Sir Charles Harington, whose name figures largely in the cables concerning the Near East situation, will no doubt be welcomed by our readers (says the Dunedin Star). A Dunedin officer who served in France with the N.Z.E.F. describes him as a splendid type of man, with wonderful organising ability. At the time of the battle of Mcssines General Harington was chief of staff of the Second British Army, under General Plumer, and, as the New Zealanders were attached to (hat army and took a prominent part, in the battle, many New Zealand officers came in contact with him. Many, indeed, consider that his powers of organisation were chief!j’ responsible for the great success of the battle of Mcssines. General Harington was a great friend of the regimental officer, and insisted that staff officers, instead of receiving written reports on the situation from the officer in the line, should visit the front and see the position at firsthand. The regimental officer, he argued, had enough to do in the front line without writing lengthy reports, to staff officers. The oflicer, who met General Harington in France, says he is of small stature, after the tyy>e of Lord Roberts, a hustler, but a thoroughly safe man. General Harington has a splendid record of service. He was educated at Cheltenham College and Sandhurst, and entered the army in 1892. He served with distinction on the staff’ in South Africa and in the Great War from 1914 till 1918. For his latter services he received the K.C.B. He has been the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief the army of the Black Sea since 1920. He was twice mentioned in despatches in the South African War, and also in the Great War. THE NATIONAL PACT. TURKEY'S TERRITORIAL AND OTHER DEMANDS. PROBLEM OF MINORITIES. The conditions of peace demanded by Mustapha Kemal Pasha and the Nationalist Party in Turkey are based upon the National Pact—a broad statement of territorial and other claims. The following article, written last year by the special correspondent of the Manchester Guardian in the Near East, contains the translated text of the Pact and interestingly analyses its details. The principal change in the situation since the article was written is, of course, that the Greeks have been driven out. of Asia Minor by the Nationalist forces. The Pact was drafted in the early days of the movement and adopted by the Grand National Assembly not long after its convocation in the interior of Anatolia. A diplomatist with this document before him might breathe curses on the Scotsman who first invented the formula of a “solemn league and covenant,” and no doubt covenanters are awkward parties to meet in negotiation, the correspondent wrote. The effect of swearing to a pact is like nailing one’s colours to the mast or chaining oneself to one’s fellow-warriors in a line of battle. It is very hard for the covenanter to adapt his tactics to changes in the situation or ro avoid fighting to the death for positions which have lost their strategic importance. Does this Turkish “National Pact” make it impossible for the covenanters of Angora to come to terms with Great Britain? I will first recite the clauses of the Pact, as they have been translated for me by a Turkish friend and will then discuss them in the light of a conversation 1 have had with a Turkish diplomatist who is cognisant (and perhaps partly author) of the Angora Government’s present policy. THE TERMS OF THE PACT. 1. “The Ottoman Empire abandons claim to territories inhabited by Arab majorities, but considers the other parts of the Ottoman Empire inhabited by a population united by religion, race, and aspirations as an inseparable whole.” (1.e., Angora claims to retain all territories inhabited bj r non-Arab Ottoman Moslem majorities; e.g., not only Turks, but Kurds.) 2. “The Ottoman Empire leaves the status of Western Thrace to be decided by its inhabitants.” (Western Thrace was ceded in 1913 by Turkey to Bulgaria, and in 1919 by Bulgaria to the Allies, who afterwards assigned it to Greece. The majority of the population consists of Turkish and Bulgarian Moslems. ) 3. “The Ottoman Empire accepts and supports the rights of minorities in accordance with the principles decided by the Power's (in the case of the defeated or newly-created iStates in Europe), hoping that Moslems living in neighbouring countries will benefit by the same rights.” 4. “The Ottoman Empire demands the security of Constantinople and the Sea of Marmora, and respects the decision of the interested Powers that the Bosporus and the Dardanelles shall be opened for commerce and communication.” 5. “The Ottoman Empire accepts a plebiscite in Kars, Ardahan and Batum.” (Districts ceded by Turkey to Russia in 1878 and retroceded by Russia to Turkey in the peace of Brest-Litovsk. The Turkish authorities took a plebiscite there, under Turkish military occupation, and after the flight of the Christian element, in 1918. I am not clear whether the National Pact ‘accepts’ this plebiscite, or one to be taken in the future under fairer conditions). 6. “The Ottoman Empire insists that national and economic development and (he administration of the country on modern principles are impossbik* without a recognition of the Empire's complete independence and freedom, anti considers this a fundamental necessity for its existence.” (1.e., the ‘Capitulations' must be abolished.; AN ANALYSIS. These articles are worth analysis. Articles 1,2 and 5 are territorial, while 3, 4 and 6 deal with the powers of the Ottoman Government in the territories it hopes to retain. The most important territorial article is obviously 1. Under it the Turkish Nationalists reclaim the Smyrna zone and Eastern Thrace, in both of which they maintained (at the London Conference last March) that an impartial investigation would reveal the existence of an Ottoman Moslem majority. The territorial issue between Turkey and Greece, in which the Powers will have to intervene, is expressed in this formula. But the question of the frontier between Turkey and Mesopotamia is implicit in it too, and the destinies of Eastern Thrace affect the freedom of the Straits, so that we shall have to discuss it in exploring the issue between Turkey and Great Britain.

The other two territorial articles are of minor importance to us, and can probably be settled directly between the parties concerned. As regards Western Thrace, which lies between Bulgaria and the Aegean, I understand that the Angora Government would prefer to see it in the hands of Bulgaria rather than Greece, but that they will put forward no claim to it themselves. Being anxious to secure their European frontiers by. a permanent good understanding with Bulgaria, they do not wish to stand between her and her access to the open sea. As regards Kars, Ardahan and Batum, it appears that under the auspices of the Soviet Government of Russia, the Soviet Government of Armenia have consented to cede Kars and Ardahan to Turkey, but that

Turkey has abandoned her claim to Batum, which is the only Black Sea port for the three Republics of Trans-Caucasia. I also have the impression that Angora would not refuse to consider slight cessions of Ottoman territory further eastward to the Armenian Republic if it were proved by impartial investigation on the spot that the actual population of the Republic, includ ing the Armenian refugees from the Ottoman Empire, is too great for the present exlent of Armenian territory.

There remain the three articles dealing with sovereign Powers of which (4) “Free dom of the Straits” and (6) “Capitulations" concern British interests directly, while Ij) “Rights of minorities” does not. But article 3 is at least as important as the others, since it involves questions of human life on a large scale, and the honour, if not the interest, of all the Allies is concerned in it, because we have accepted the assistance of the Christian minorities in Turkey while we have been at war with her, have allowed them to look to us as their protectors, and have exposed them to reprisals if we now disinterest ourselves in their fate. I am told that Angora is prepared to eon cede them the rights secured to minorities in the treaties imposed on the defeated and newly-created States in Europe, plus the traditional privileges of the non Moslem communities or “millets” in the Ottoman Empire, except on points where the latter exceed the former. This is a fair offer, but paper privileges for minorities in the Near and Middle East have again and again been proved valueless without practical guarantees, and the discovery of sanctions accept able to all parties is going to be the crux of the problem. The national “amour propre” of the preesnt generation in Turkey makes them intransigent about consenting to any limitations on their sovereignty which are not at the same time imposed on their Christian neighbours. They will not hear of any local automony. or even of a special local gendarmerie, for those districts where non-Moslems form a considerable element in the population. The only local sanction they seem willing to tolerate is the presence of foreign consuls with ordinary consular powers, though I suppose that, under the terms of the Pact, they accept the supervision of the Minorities Commission of the League of Nations. Certainly I do not believe that minority rights unsecured by practical sanctions on the spot will be less respected in Turkey than they will be, for example, in Greece or Rumania. I do not question the Angora Government’s good will. But national hatred ami distrust have reached an intensity to-day which thej r have seldom attained before, and the Powers cannot save their faces by nominal safeguards and then abandon the minorities to the possible consequences of their situation either in Turkey or elsewhere. RECIPROCAL GUARANTEES FOR MINORITIES. The proper salve to Turkish pride would be to institute identical guarantees of a practical kind for minorities in several Near Eastern countries and this might not prove such a formidable undertaking as it looks at first sight. If reciprocity of minority rights and guarantees could overcome the obstacles created by national pride it would also be recommended by the national interest in cases in which two nations held hostages, in the shape of minorities, in each other’s territories. For instance, an agreement between Turkey and Greece or Turkey and Armenia to grant reciprocal rights, secured by identical sanctions, to Christians in Turkish territory and Moslems in the territory of Turkey’s Christian neighbours, ought not to be impossible, if it were negotiated as part of a general settlement, with the good offices of the Powers. We have a strong obligation to do everything we can for the solution of this problem of minorities, which has caused such immense suffering among both Christian and Moslem populations, and has been rendered more acute than it need have been by the Oriental policy of Western Europe. But here again we cannot act as an impartial intermediary while we have controversies of our own outstanding with one of the parties. Thus a settlement of the direct issues between Great Britain and Turkey is an essential preliminary to successful intervention on our part in any of the other issues raised by the Turkish “National Pact.”