The Southland Times. PUBLISHED EVERY MORNING. Luceo Non Uro. THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 1917. RUSSIA.

Southland Times, Issue 17756, 6 September 1917, Page 4

The Southland Times. PUBLISHED EVERY MORNING. Luceo Non Uro. THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 1917. RUSSIA.

The most obvious fact about the condition of affairs in Russia is that no one is able to express any opinion about it. This statement is certainly true of all who are as remote as we are from the troubled country, but we suspect that it is also true of Russia itself. Anything may happen in Russia. The whole country is still heaving and seething, and no one can say what to-morrow will produce. Even Kerensky and Korniloff, the two men who seemed to have a grip of the situation, are meeting forces which baffle them. The Government has not yet attained stability, and the armies are still not to be depended upon. Both Kerensky and Korniloff have spoken from time to time in terms of firmness and confidence which inspired the highest hope. Neither of them could have anticipated such serious political and military developments as have since occurred, and neither of them is yet really in control of his department. In the political world there are elements which are hostile to Kerensky. Their influence is powerful and it is opposed to the policy of the "iron hand” which alone can save Russia and which Kerensky would adopt if he could. The political influences which thwart Kerensky’s efforts to restore order and industry in the country make it impossible for Korniloff to employ the drastic measures necessary to eradicate the weaknesses and defects of the army. Regiments and divisions are still running away from the enemy. In the communiques it is stated that they “voluntarily retire,” but the meaning is that when the enemy attacks they take to flight, disgracing themselves as soldiers. That a large part of the Russian army is still staunch and capable of fighting against odds with the stubborn courage for which the Slav soldier is famous is a fair inference from the slowness of the enemy’s advance. If the Russian army was completely demoralised Austrians and Germans would be sweeping forward on the whole front. That is not happening. On most sectors the enemy is held up, and despite the weight of his attacks he cannot do better than make very slow progress. The great bulk of the array is evidently prepared to fight, and with the troops upon which he can depend Korniloff would soon restore the organisation and efficiency of the whole army if he

had a free hand. Ste has not a free hand. Kerensky is not prepared to give him absolute control of the army, and even if he were would probably not be allowed to do so. Instead of authorising Komiloff to take such measures as a General would ordinarily employ to stamp out disaffection in his forces in the face of the enemy the Moscow Congress talks of sending “military' commissioners” to the front “in order to raise the lighting spirit and secure democratic organisation,” no doubt by holding meetings and addressing the men, appealing to them and arguing with them. The democratic re-organisation of the Russian army' is a fearful thing to contemplate. It began by setting up a “committee” in each regiment to maintain discipline and arbitrate between officers and men. The rot in (he Russian army set in when these committees, instead of obeying orders when the Russian army appeared to be closing in on Lemberg, held meetings to decide whether the orders should be carried into effect or not, and while they were talking the enemy broke through and the stampede out of Galicia began. The condition of Russia may be judged from the fact that the Moscow Congress thinks that the army can be made efficient by military commissioners, either superior in authority to the Commander-in-Chief or at least with consultative powers that seriously embarrass him. The Moscow Congress also suggests the appointment of a Military Council “for the purpose of enlightening and interesting the whole army’s front and rear organisation”—more meetings, more addresses, more appeals, and more arguments. Kerensky and Korniloff want to act, but the parties that want to talk seem to b.e too strong for them. As we have said the situation is such that no opinion of any value can be expressed upon it, but it is so bad that Riga has been lost. Without cither exaggeration or pessimism the loss of Riga can be described as a disaster. To recount the story of the defence of Riga would serve no purpose at this time, but it may be recalled that the Germans have fought for Riga on sea and land with immense energy. They knew its value and Hindenburg time and again sent all the forces he could spare to the Dvina front in order to reduce Riga. The Russians beat down every attempt. Not only did they check the enemy in their attempt to advance, but they threw him back and advanced themselves. How many lives the defence of Riga has cost we cannot estimate, but many thousands of heroic Russians have fallen to keep the enemy out of it. Now all the sacrifice has been thrown away, the enemy holds Riga and with it control of the Gulf. With Riga as a base, with communications open on sea and land, the enemy is in a better position than ever before to essay an attack upon Petrograd. Naturally the Russians apprehend that the loss of Riga may be followed by the development of operations on a large scale against the Russian capital, and unfortunately it is to be feared that at the present time the right wing of the Russian army is in no condition to reply to such operations. Perhaps if German guns were once heard in Petrograd Russians of all parties and classes would unite on one platform for the defence of their country and the situation is not without hope. The brightest gleam of hope is the unfailing candour of the communiques from Petrograd. The Russian military authorities resolutely refuse to conceal anything and frankly tell the world the worst.