DARDANELLES EXPEDITION

Southland Times, Issue 17970, 10 March 1917, Page 5

DARDANELLES EXPEDITION

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION Unwieldy Control MACHINERY CLUMSY AND INEFFICIENT Kitchener’s Centralisation of Authority CHURCHILL’S FATAL OPTIMISM Experts Not Sufficiently Consulted LONDON. March 8. The Dardanelles report covers from the commencement of the war until November 25, 1914. No change was made in the machinery for the superior conduct of the naval and military operations. This machinery consisted of the Cabinet, assisted b£ the Committee of Imperial Defence, with the War Office and Admiralty acting as executive agents. It must have been obvious from the first that this body was far too numerous to control effectively the conduct of the war, and it is regrettable that this rudimentary fact was not recognised immediately after the outbreak of war. The result was that for four months, when events of the utmost importance were occurring, the machinery for their higher operation was both clumsy and inefficient. Eventually an improvement was effected. The Cabinet appears generally to have been Informed of any Important decisions taken by the War Council, but not until the executive met were steps taken to give either whole or partial effect to the Council’s decisions. This was what happened over the naval and military operations at the Dardanelles. Some members of the Cabinet did not wish to be informed of what was going on. Mr Churchill, during his examinatlcn, said : “I often heard those in the Cabinet say they did not wish to hear of this secret matter, as the fewer knowing about it the better.” The report adds : “These members very rightly were content to delegate the full powers of the Cabinet to their colleagues on the War Council." Mr McKenna, in his evidence, confirmed this allegation. —Division of Responsibility.—

A distinction has to be made between the real responsibility developing on several Ministers who are members of the War Council. Mr Lloyd George, Sir E. (now Viscount) Grey, and Earl Carew exercised an undoubted and very legitimate influence, but the main responsibility rested on Mr Asquith, Lord Kitchener, and Mr Churchill. Later in his evidence Mr McKenna said : “In its early stages the war was carried on by Mr Asquith, Lord Kitchener, and myself, but I was on rather a different plane. I had not the same authority as Mr Asquith or Lord Kitchener. If they said this or that should be done, that settled it.”

The Commission find this description of the working machine substantially correct, save that Mr Churchill probably assigned himself a more unobtrusive part than he actually played. There was a distinction between the War Office and the Admiralty. Lieutenant-colonel Wolfe-Murray stated, that Lord Kitchener acted very much as his own Chief of Staff. Witness was never asked to express any opinion. The Admiralty was different. Mr Churchill was not an expert. Lord Fisher and Admiral Wilson acted as the experts. —Exports not consulted.— Lord Fisher explained that neither he, nor Lieutenant-colonel Wolfe-Murray, nor Admiral Wilson were members of the War Council. "We were experts, who only opened our mouths when told.” They were never asked anything about the Dardanelles. TH.E EVIDENCE, LONDON, March 8. Received March 9, 2.16 p.m. Sir A. K. Wilson confirmed Lord Fisher’s statement. Mr Churchill, in his evidence, declared that his naval colleagues had the right and power to correct him or dissent from his views, and were fully cognisant of their rights. Viscount Grey stated that the War Council went entirely in naval and military matters by the opinions expressed by two members. Mr Balfour gave his opinion, and if the experts did not express theirs he would infer that they assented. The Commission did not think they should have remained silent if they did not agree to the propositions. The military experts stood on a different footing, because Lord Kitchener was an expert. He, however, thought that the member of the Cabinet presiding should have facilitated the experts’ assent or dissent by asking them. Mr Haldane said he would expect Lord Fisher, if he had objections, to have stated them. He did not concur with Ijord Fisher's view of the War Council. Earl Crewe thought that the political members of the Council did too much talking, and the experts too little. Mr Lloyd George also disagreed with Lord Fisher’s view. None of the Junior Se.a Lords were consulted about the Dardanelles. Commodore Lambert expressed the opinion that the Dardanelles was a proper subject for Admiralty Board discussion. On 22nd November, 1915, the Junior Sea Lords submitted a minute to Mr Balfour that the principle that the supremacy of the First Sea Lord was complete and unassailable had been pushed too far, and tended against Imperial and national safety. WAR OFFICE ADMXHTSTBATTON. Regarding the War Office administration the Commission thinks it regrettable that the devolution of authority and responsibility on which the War Office was based was ignored by Lord Kitchener. All the evidence points to the fact that Lord Kitchener did not consult his subordinates. He gave orders over the heads of the Chiefs of Departments, and centralised the whole

administration in his own hands. When an Order in Council at a later stage of the war restored the power of the Chief of the General Staff, Sir Reginald Brade, Secretary to the War Office, expressed the opinion that this was due to Lord Kitchener's not asking, or disregarding, the advice of the General Staff. Lord Kitchener pushed centralisation to extremes. Though it proved eminently successful in the Soudan, it was unsuitable for large scale operations, and threw work on the shoulders of one man with which no individual could successfully cope. SEA Z.OBDS HOT SUFFICIENTLY CONSULTED. STZI.iI BOOM FOB IMFBOFEMEHT. LONDON, March 8. Received March 9, 2.30 p.m. The Commission considered that had the naval members of the Admiralty Board been regularly and collectively consulted on the large questions of the warand the policy during the present nav. al campaign, some, at least of the events which the Empire is bitterly deploring would not have happened, and that until the authority and responsibility of the Sea Lords is enlarged and defined there will be no adequate assurance that similar disasters will not recur. Mr Churchill agreed that the four Sea Lords should be fully consulted, but Prince Louis of Battenburg (formerly First Sea Lord) and Lord Fisher did not favour this. The Commission found that Mr Asquith was ill-informed as to the way Admiralty business was conducted when he told the Commission that the War Council was entitled to assurance that any view submitted by the First Lord was the considered opinion of the Admiralty Board. EABLY BOMBABDKBHT A MISTAKE. wab council hot consulted. MB CHUBCBILL SUGGESTS THE EXPEDITION. BUSSXA ASKS FOB DEMONSTRATION LONDON,' March S. Received March 9, 2.45 p.m. The Commission concurs with Admiral Jackson that the bombardment on 3rd November was a mistake, and calculated to place the Turks on the alert. ,The order for the bombardment emanated solely from the Admiralty, and the War Council was not consulted. On the 25th Mr Churchill suggested an attack on Gallipoli, which would give control of the Dardanelles and enable the Allies to dictate terms at Constantinople. He admitted that the operation- was difficult, and would require a large force. Lord Kitchener agreed that it might be necessary to make a diversion by attacking the Turkish communications, but the moment had not arrived. On 2nd January, 1916, the Russians were somewhat hard pressed in the Caucasus, and Russia asked for a demonstration against the Turks in order to relieve the pressure. WAB OFFICE PROMISES DEMONSTRATION. CHURCHILL TOO OPTIMISTIC. RELIANCE ON THE QUEEN ELIZABETH. BZS MEASURE OF BLAME. LONDON, March 8. Received March 9, 2.50 p.m. The Foreign Office sent a telegram drafted by the War Office stating that demonstrations would be made, though It was feared that any action would not seriously affect the withdrawal of enemy troops from the Caucasus. Mr Asquith and Mr Churchill did not see the telegram, though the latter thought that Lord Kitchener sent the reply as the outcome of a conversation with him. Lord Kitchener, writing to Mr Churchill, said he hadn't troops to land anywhere. The only {dace for a demonstration was the Dardanelles, but he would not be ready for anything big for some months.

The Commission copsiders that although Lord Kitchener pressed for demonstrations, it didn’t necessarily in-.-'ve an attempt to force the passage proper, and the conclusion seems to be that when a demonstration appeared necessary Mr Churchill thought It possible to convert it into an attempt to force the passage. As a new army was ready, and he had to provide for home defence, he was unwilling to withdraw a single man from France.

Mr Churchill’s views as to the success of a purely naval operation were more optimistic than was warranted by experts’ opinions. Therefore Lord Kitchener grasped too eagerly at the proposal to use the fleet alone, but the responsibility rested rather on Mr Churchill. The latter alleged that there were marvellous potentialities in the Queen Elizabeth, whose astounding effectiveness would revolutionise naval warfare.

A 3PATAX. BELAY. DUE TO KITCHENER'S INSTRUCTIONS. LORE FISHER'S UNWISE SILENCE. LONDON, March 8. Received March 9, 5.15 p.m. The decision on 16th February, 1915, to mass troops in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles marked a critical stage of the whole operations. The Commission considers that inasmuch as time was all important, no compromise was then possible between making an immediate vigorous effort to ensure success by joint naval and military occupation, or falling back on the original intention of desisting from- the naval attack if the experiences gained during the bombardment were unsatisfactory. Lord Kitchener decided on 20th February that the Twenty-ninth Division, part of the troops which by the decision of the 16th were to have been sent eastward should not then be sent, and Colonel Fitzgerald, by Lord Kitchener's orders, instructed the Director of Naval Transports that the transports for that Division and the rest of the expeditionary force would not be required. This was done without informing Mr Churchill. # The consequent delay of three weeks in the despatch of the troops gravely compromised the probability of the success of the original attack by land forces, and materially Increased the difficulties of the Anal attack. The Commissioners consider that in view of the opinions of the naval and military authorities on the spot the decision to abandon the naval attack after the bombardment of 18th March was inevitable..

They point out that there was no meeting of the War Council between 19th March and 14th May, while important land operations were being undertaken. They think that before such operations were commenced the War Council should certainly hhve reconsidered the whole position, and express the opinion that the Premier ought summoned a meeting of the War Council for that purpose, and if it were not summoned the other members of the War Council should have pressed for such a meeting. They think this was a serious omission, and express the opinion that Lord Kitchener did not sufficiently avail himself of the services of his General Staff, with the result that he undertook more w r ork than it was possible for one man to do, causing confusion and want of efficiency. They are unable to concur in Lord Fisher’s view that it was his duty, if he differed from Mr Churchill, to maintain silence at the Council or resign. They think that the adoption of any such principle generally would impair the efficiency of the public services. Although the main object was not attained certain important political advantages were secured by the expedition, but whether those advantages were worth the loss of life and treasure involved must remain a matter of opinion. The report is signed by all members of the Commission, except Mr W. F. Roch, M.P.

LOBD PISHEB’S BELUCTANT ACQUIESCENCE. CAUSE OP HIS RESIGNATION. LONDON, March 8. Received March 9, 5.5 p.m. The Commission states that the evidence confirms the accuracy of Mr Asquith's statement that Lord Fisher reluctantly acquiesced in the Dardanelles operation as long as be thought it would not seriously interfere with his plans elsewhere. It may be that he was convinced that the demands made on the fleet for the Dardanelles prejudiced his alternative schemes, and he resigned. Although Lord Fisher in evidence said he was dead against the naval operations alone he did not at the time express any such decided opinions. The actual decision was arrived at by the War Council on 13th January, after hearing Lord Kitcliener and Mr Churchill, while Admirals Fisher and Wilson and Lieut.-Colonel Wolfe-Murray remained silent. The decision was couched as follows :—“Naval expedition In February to take Gallipoli, with Constantinople as the objective.” ABMIBALTY STAPP VIEW. EXPEDITION LOOSELY UNDERTAKEN LONDON, March 9. Received March 9. 11.50 p.m. Admiral Oliver thought that by the time the fleet overcame the initial difficulties the military force w’ould have been ready. Generally speaking, the Admiralty staff preferred a joint operation. The Commission thinks that the War Council in its action was probably governed excessively by the fact that the entry of the Dardanelles would have a profound effect on the course of the war, and therefore neglected to make sure whether it was advisable for the undertaking to be a purely naval enterprise. It is highly probable that if Lord Kitchener and Admiral Fisher had objected upon technical grounds the project would have been abandoned. Mr Asquith stated that Lord Fisher’s main objection was not based on the naval merits or demerits of the Dardanelles operation, but upon the fact that he preferred another objective. STB lAN HAMILTON’S EVIDENCE. NO DEPINXTEf PHANS. Received March 9, 9.35, p.m. Even when Sir lan Hamilton, on the eve of his departure from London, conversed with Lord Kitchener, it was abundantly clear that the scope of the operations had not been fully decided. Sir lan Hamilton, in his evidence, dwelt strongly on the absence of information by the War Office staff. No scheme was drawn up, and no water supply arrangements had been made. There was a great want of staff preparation. Lord Kitchener still clung to getting through without military aid. Sir lan Hamilton went out that impression. He took Lord Kitchener’s telegram that the passage of the Dardanelles must be forced as. peremptory. Admiral de Roebeck, in evidence, said he realised that it was only possible for the fleet to stay in the Sea of Marmora if a revolution broke out in Constantinople, otherwise It would have to come out again. It would have been difficult anyway for the transports to follow up the straits. The Commission thought it clear that Admiral de Roebeck’s opinion was greatly influenced by political considerations .and the loss of prestige if the attack was abandoned. Sir lan Hamilton, on 19th March, telegraphed to Lord Kitchener that he was reluctantly convinced that the battleships were not likely to force the passage, and if the army was to participate the operations could not assume the subsidiary form anticipated. Owing to Sir lan Hamilton’s and Admiral de Roebeck’s presentations on 23rd March operations were postponed until adequate military forces had been assembled. The Commission find that although the attempt to force the Dardanelles was a failure, it was fairly successful in relieving pressure on Russia while/ it de -layed the earlier entry of Bulgaria into the war, and kept a large force of Turks for a long while immobilised.

ATMOSFHERE 07 VAGUENESS. KB CHURCaXLX, TOO SANGUINE. ACTUALITIES 07 SITUATION NOT REALISES. HESITATION AND VACILLATION. The Commission adds: — It is impossible to read all the evidence and papers without being struck by fhe atmosphere of vagueness and want of precision which characterised the War Council’s proceedings. It is almost inconceivable that anyone, whether military, naval, or civilian, could have imagined that Constantinople could be taken without military help on a somewhat large scale.

In the case of the Dardanelles the reduction of the forts presented difficulties more hazardous than the taking of Port Arthur or Wei-Hai-Wei, while the narrow waters lent themselves to defence by mines and torpedoes, interfering with Mr Churchill’s presentment of v the enterprise to the War Council. Without impugning his good faith, it seems clear that he was carried away by his sanguine temperament and a firm belief in the undertaking.

The evidence shows that he obtained experts’ support to a less extent than he imagined. It is also clear that the Turks’ opposition was greatly under-estimated. Lord Kitchener held the opinion that once the ships were through the position on Gallipoli would cease to be important. Moreover, he and others, including Viscount Grey, confidently anticipated a revolution at Constantinople when the fleet entered the Sea of Marmora.

Then the idea of a purely naval operation was gradually dropped, and the argument grew that we had drifted into a big military attack. Lord Kitchener, on May 14th, said he realised that if the fleet failed the array would need to help the Navy through. On 16th February he informed a meeting of Ministers that he had decided to despatch the Twentyninth Division. An acute discussion took place in the War Council between the 16th and 26th. Lord Kitchener’s views underwent a change. There was now no chance of breaking off the Dardanelles attack.

There was a sharp difference on the 20th between Lord Kitchener and Mr Churchill owing to the decision not to send the Twenty-ninth Division. Lord Kitchener held that the Naval Division, with the Australians and New Zealanders from Egypt, would be adequate. Lord Kitchener still thought that the fleet would get through.

General Birdwood, on sth March, telegraphed to Lord Kitchener that he was very doubtful if the Navy could force the passage unassisted. In any case it would take a considerable time. The Admirals’ forecast had been too sanguine. Then Lord Kitchener decided to despatch the Twenty-ninth Division, but three weeks’ valuable time was then lost.

Lord Kitchener was mainly responsible for the decisions, although if alive he might throw new light upon them. It is strange that the actualities of the situation should not have been more fully realised by Lord Kitchener and his colleagues. There were only two alternatives, either to face the loss of pres-

tige by abandoning the Dardanelles, or to boldly face the risk which would have been Involved elsewhere by a determined effort to force the Dardanelles by a rapid combined attack in great strength. Unfortunately the Government adopted neither. For three weeks the Government vacillated, and the right moment for action lapsed. The Turks were enabled to formidably strengthen their position. Mr Churchill is justified in attaching importance to the delays in despatching the Twenty-ninth Division.

THE FINDINGS SUMMARISED. responsibility welx. divided. LONDON, March 8. Received March ft, 2.10 p.m. The majority of the Commission finds that Mr Churchill initiated the attack on the Dardanelles at the War Council on 24th November, 1914, as an ideal method of defending Kgypt and Russia. Lord Kitchener declared that the troops required were not available. The War Council’s acceptance of this view was unfortunate, because investigation would have revealed that the position was otherwise. Admirals Fisher and Wilson did not express dissent to the ’ proposed naval action alone. They should have expressed their view if they thought the project was navally impracticable. They did not object, however, because they regarded the operations as experimental only. The Commission thinks that there was an obligation, first on Mr Churchill, next on Mr Asquith, and next on the other members of the War Council, to insist upon a clear expression of expert opinion on naval action alone, because the chances of a surprise land and water attack offered such great military and political advantages that it was mistaken and ill-advised to sacrifice it by a hasty and purely naval attack which could not by itself secure the desired objects. A MINORITY REPORT. SIGNED BY ONE MEMBER. LORD PISHEB’S SIBONO OPPOSITION WAB COUNCIL CENSURED. SCHEME EEL-CONSIDERED AND BADLY ADVISED. LONDON, March 8. Received March 9, 6.40 p.m. • In a lengthy minority report, Mr Roch states that the forcing of the Dardanelles had been considered when Lord Fisher commanded in the Mediterranean, again later when Lord Fisher was First Sea Lord, and still later in 1916 by the General Staff. Lord Fisher decided that it would be mightily hazardous, and the General Staff decided against naval or military action.

On 28th December, 1914, Lieut.-Col. Hankey (Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence) circulated a memorandum to the War Council suggesting that Germany could be struck effectively through Turkey. In January, 1915, Mr Lloyd George, in a memorandum, outlined a far-reaching policy against Austria in co-operation with the Greeks, Roumanians, and Serbians, also the withdrawal of substantial forces from Prance.

Admiral Jackson presented Mr Churchill with a memorandum against the possibility of rushing the Dardanelles, showing that losses would be involved in even reaching the straits. Lord Fisher, Sir A. K. Wilson, and Admiral Oliver expressed objections to a naval attack, but after the War Council meeting on 13th January commenced working out the details for a systematic reduction of the forts by a naval bombardment.

Later Lord Fisher told Mr Churchill that he would attend the War Council but did not like this Dardanelles affair. Upon this Mr Asquith wrote to Lord Pishor stating that he thought it imperative that Lord Fisher should attend half an hour before the meeting on 28th January, for discussion. Mr Asquith, Mr Churchill, and Lord Fisher then fully discussed the proposal. Later at the War Council a dramatic incident occurred. After Mr Churchill had explained' the scheme on the map. Lord Fisher left the table Lord Kitchener followed end asked Lord Fisher what he intended to do. Lord Fisher replied that he would not return to the table and intended to resign as First Sea Lord. Lord Kitchener urged Lord Fisher that as he was the only dissentient, and as Mr Asquith had decided upon the venture, it was Lord Fisher’s duty to remain in the Admiralty.

Lord Fisher, after further consideration, reluctantly gave In to Lord Kitchener's entreaty, and resumed his seat. On 14th May, when the War Council decided to persevere with the scheme. Lord Fisher thought his great alternative scheme, which had been his main pre-occupation during this period, and to which his mind and energies had been almost exclusively devoted, was doomed. He said: •‘I am faced by a progressive frustration of two main schemes of naval strategy.” The following day he resigned his post. Meanwhile, on 12th March, Sir lan Hamilton was nominated to command the Dardanelles forces, leaving for the Dardanelles next day. He was assisted by no staff preparations, nor by any preliminary scheme of operations of any kind. It was still assumed that the navy would force the passage. The War Council, on 19th March, authorised Mr Churchill to inform Admiral de Roubeck to continue the Dardanelles operations as he thought fit. The War Council did not meet again until 14th May. The War Council concentrated its attention too much on political ends that would be gained by an eastern offensive. The War Council never had detailed staff estimates of men, munitions, and material, or definite plans showing what military operations were possible. The War Council under-esti-mated, without any real investigation, the strongUi of the Turkish opposition. The War Council rejected, without sufficient consideration, all previous expert opinions against a naval attack on the forts. Mr Churchill failed to present fully to the War Council the opinions of his naval advisers. Mr Churchill failed to consult the Board of Admiralty. Mr Koch decides that important political advantages were gained by the first success of the naval attack, and strongly urges that similar operations in future should be thoroughly considered by the joint naval and military staff.

US A. PXSHEB. A3BTP SIB, TSOS. LONDON, March 9. Received March 9, 9.45 p.m, Mr Andrew Fisher (Commonwealth High Commissioner) attached a minute dissenting from the view the report takes. He disagrees with the view that the naval advisers should have expressed their views to the Council whether asked or not, !f they considered the Council's project unpracticable navally, also with the Commission’s inability to concur with Lord Fisher's view that he should maintain silence or resign. Mr Andrew Fisher expresses the opinion that it would seal the fate of responsible Government if servants shared the responsibility of Ministers. Sir Thos. Mackenzie, in a minute, declares that it is premature for the report to express an opinion as to the general results. Sufficient evidence had not been taken to enable ft decision to be arrived at on the objects attained it would be necessary to hold a complete enquiry on subsidiary operations in order to secure true prospective. He agrees with Mr Andrew Fisher respecting experts giving their views unasked.