THE GERMAN ARMY

Southland Times, Issue 17763, 23 September 1914, Page 6

THE GERMAN ARMY

A MILITARY BUBBLE. CAN BE EASILY PRICKED. DEFICIENT IN MANY WATS. That German military power is a highlyinflated bubble, of brilliant hues, but susceptible of being pricked and burst, because the.German soldier is merely an automaton, incapable of adapting himself to circumstances to which he is unaccustomed, is the opinion of "En Avant." who contributes an article to the September issue of the London Magazine. The writer says he is one who is no believer in the invincibility of the German Army. “I admit,” he says, -'that on paper the German Army is not only the greatest, but the most perfectly organised, army in the world; but battles are not won by flourishing sheaves of statistics in the enemy's face, nor is there any sound criterion by which the worth of any army foi war can be judged in time of peace. There are a hundred and one qualifies which are supposed theoretically to make for efficiency in an army, such as numbers, material, discipline, leading, physique, training, organisation, and so forth, but the great deciding factor and those who have as much modern battlefield experience as myself will doubtless agree with mo—is the capacity of the Individual soldier to endure hardship and his individual determination to win through. Now. the German system of life and of military training is not designed to encourage Individual “(Tort, but rather to stultify it. and to reduce the Individual man or unit to the state of a disciplined automaton. ORGANISATION BAD. In most professions and trades such a training is excellent, for by dint of much practice each individual and unit becomes “past perfect.”—each learns to fit into his appointed place, just as do the component parts of nicely-adjusted pieces of mechanism. The business of an army, however, d ffers from any other, but it cannot be practised in peace-time. What men do at manoeuvres is no criterion whatever of what they will do in war. An army can never really practice war until it is in the presence of the enemy. The army that has not been proven in war is like the piece of machinery that has never been set in motion. Now, the more nicelyadjusted the machine, the more fatal will be the catastrophe when anything unforeseen occurs—take the Titanic as an example—-and it is common knowledge that it is always the unexpected that does occur in war-time. Wherefore. an army should be as clastic as possible in its organisation and training. This is precisely what the German Array is not. “The German Army is obedient, to a. rule of thumb. To the German tactician the science of warfare is cut and dried. Off leers and men alike know what they ought to do under a hundred different conditions; they learnt it all by heart, and when those conditions arise they act correctly, because (hey know their work by heart. But, supposing, as will invariably happen, other conditions arise, conditions the artidate to which has not been studied, what will happen? Untaught to think or act for themselves, they will ransack their memories for the correct reply. Under modern conditions of warfare, the best soldier is he who knows how to 'meddle through," and how to 'carry on' when in a tight place, without waiting for instructions. ERADICATING INDIVIDUALISM. “The whole training of the German soldier is designed to eradicate individualism, and to reduce soldiers, battalions. regiments and brigades to a slate of iron-bound automatism. If the enemy's action could be equally reduced, then such training wc uld bo perfect, hut. as things arc, I maintain that it is fatal, for it entirely destroys the personal factor, and it is only the personal factor of each individual in an army which will carry that army to victory under modern conditions of warfare. The German off'eer relies only upon discipline, and lie runs the risk of being let down at the crucial moment. Courage, determination, 'amour propre.' and individual enterprise are all stronger than the fear of death, but it lias yet to be proven that the modern educated man will risk death rather than contravene diseipline. Wherefore, I maintain that, in our present state of civilisation the German system of organisation and training is fundamentally wrong." 1 MPOSSI BLE EVOLUTIONS. The writer says that seven limes in the past ten years he lias been present at the German grand manoeuvres, but lie never saw elsewhere manoeuvres carried out with so little regard to the possibilities of modern fighting. At manoeuvres the German soldier or officer was taught to do tilings which he could not' possibly perform if the enemy were using ball eartrh’ge. Whole brigades of cavalry swept down upon unbroken infantry in most gallant fashion, and the umpires encouraged the sport. It was, perhaps, ‘magnificent, but it was not war.’’ What we uld be t lie mental attitude of poor fellows when they tried those child's tricks in real battle against an enemy. The first result would be a heavy death-roll, and then a dead stop of the machinery whilst the officers reconsidered the position. As regards the soldier, the bolts tli'al held Ihe military machine together would ho loosened, the machine would rattle and refuse to work. TECHMCAL WEAKNESS. The German cavalry were to be seen at their best when delivering an impossible charge, but the German was neither a horseman nor a housemaster; as a scout lie was beneath contempt. The Gorman infantryman had two great faults: He was too fat. and tried to carry w.don* -n his back, with

Tilt- result that he could neither march far nor fast. When in close formations the work of the infantry was distinctly good, and their drill wafs splendid, but once the men pot in'o anything approaching open order all iniativo ceased. The German infantryman lacked Urn dash of the French, the doggedness of the Russian, the fatalism of the Turk, or the practical adaptability of Ins British rival.

As regarding tlio art'-lery. it was very difficult lo speak, but at manoeuvres it was impossible to judge the vital points of picking up the target and hitting it, and such statistics as from time lo time leaked out were meant for foreign consumption, and were unreliable. The German engineer was too thooretcal Given the necesary material and unlimited time, he would construct the most model works imaginable, but in warfare what was wanted was a man wiio would contrive the esHnlial out of the most uncompromising material, and in the shortest possible space of time. “I have likened the German Army to a machine.” the writer adds, “but it is one in which all tiie parts are in an everlasting state of un-oiled friction against each other."