HOW WAR CAME

Southland Times, Issue 17763, 23 September 1914, Page 5

HOW WAR CAME

GERMAN BID FOR BRITISH NEUTRALITY. DISGRACEFUL BARGAIN PROPOSED “PEACE WITH DISHONOUR.” (From Our Spoclal Correspondent.) . LONDON. August C. “Tfs no good calling him names—hit him: - ’ should he the Briton's motto today so far as his chief enemy is eoncorned. But to those of us who have to stay at home whilst others tight a strong temptation to “call him names’* is provided by a perusal of the official “White Paper” issued \ osterday hy our Foreign Office, containing the despatches and documents that have been exchanged between the Foreign Secretary and the British Ambassadors abroad respecting tho European crisis produced by AustriaHungary’s attack upon Servia. There are Hi 9 documents, all included within a period of less than a fortnight, showing how sudden and intense was the crisis ami how extreme was the diplomatic activity that accompanied its progress. The first despatch is dated July -o—it is the account of a conversation between Sir Edward Grey and the German Ambassador respecting the disquieting situation between Austria and Servia —anti the last is dat-d August 1. It, is the 'ultimatum presented to Germany with respect to Ihe intt grily of Belgian territory.

Seldom, if ever, have official documents of so intimate and revealing nature been made public so speedily after the events to which they rotate. One may evert be permitted lo doubt whether it was entirely politic to publish them in extenso al this juncture. But if (lie publication was not politic it is certainly justifiable. for these State papers tell exactly how the present stupendous crisis was ft reed, reveal the excuses and pretences by which the efforts for peace were frustrated, and the illusions which served to stiffen tfie neck of German and Austrian obduracy. There are some passages in those documents that will be read with amazement, not only in tho Old Coun ry and the dominions, but in America and every civilised land. The tilings, however, that will especially arrest attention, and cause a wide opening of eyes are the three despatches in which are set forth the proposal which the German Government made to the British for the purchase of British neutrality in case of war between the Great Powers

AX OUTRAGEOUS PROPOSAL. In the first r>f those despatches our Ambassador in Merlin. Sir K. Ge.sehcn. 1 informs Sir Ed wa rd Grey how tiio Ger--1 man Chancellor lias sent for him and 'has suggested that if Germany iindcrlook not to occupy Etcnc.lt territory ! after a successful tear Great Britain I should be eontent not to intervene, even : though no undertaking were given not Ito seize the French colonics. In the j second despatch Sir Edward Grey sends i his indignant reply t ' the suggestion, ] remarking that "it would be a disgrace ! to us to make this bargain with Ger- | many tit the expense of France—a dis- ; grace from which the good name of this country would neve" recover." Those 1 who have been most persistent in the i view that British intervention has been unnecessary may perhaps find it a lit- ! tie difficult to reconcile this revelation : of German methods and purposes witli their theories, j Rut it is the third despatch that will ■perhaps claim chief attention. .It is dated July 31. and confirms the claim ! made in the House of Commons that ho : had gone to the extreme limits that could be suggested, and even beyond them, in bis effort to keep the peace of Kuropo. in this despatch the Foreign ■ Secretary instructs the British Ambassador in Berlin that if ihe German Government will make proposals lor an adiustment of the diftieulty between I.us- ■ sia and Austria, and Port if the Russian ■ Government unreasonably rejects those proposals, "his .Majesty s Government ’ will have nothing more to do with the i consequences. ’ He also mentions that be lias warned the German Ambass.i----i dor tip'll if France becomes involved in i the dispute we also should he drawn in. 1 All through the correspondence Sir Kdward G rev makes it clear to Getmunv : that, while a quarrel between Austin ■ and Servia and Russia will not be a direct concern of the Rritish Government. it must not he assumed that the same indifference would attend a situation in which Franco was involved. BRAVING BOR TIMK, Another circumstance that appears very ch-uriy from these documents is ih" il . i-mina! ion of Austria and Germane not 1 o allow an\ efforts towards npdiaUm! i.. hnv favourable result. . When Sir Edward Grey proposed a conference of lip- four lowers not immediately engaged. Germany declined on a question of form on ! y. When Germany was invited to make Imr own proposal there was first no response, and tlo-n the suggestion that conversations should proceed directly between Vienna and St. Petersburg. Before this ' suggestion could tie accepted Austria 1 bad already declared war: and when Ger- ; many came forwanl with another sug- ! gesßon of mediation Ih • Austrian Army was "il the march, and Mot only eitecl of *! 1-c u ssion. as liie Russian foreign Mini-':;- points out. could be- to give Vi’st' ia time to emsii Servla. d hroiigh gll pie di sc uss ion s, moreover. German; - ■ aisi A list ria feiiiscd 'o recognise the i right of Russia to interest herself in ! Sei". ia's case, and disr< garded utterly | repeated warnings troin Si. Pe-ters-i h„ r , : of the gravity ot the situation, jit is also marie clear by passages in Ihe correspondence that Germany anti ! .\ustri;' pni'ntt'fl eonfkicnl 1 y on n°u- ! traMf' «*f (; Kriunn unci uii the un- ■ pV.-r.a-ed ness of Russia and Branco: that ; th. - ' demands made upon Servia were de-si-nedlv srreh as could not he accepted; t! To the true Objective ~f Austria was Saloi.i anil that a mine was sprung r.a Europe in order tha' there might he no lira-• for diplomacy to get to work i to prevent Austria from attacking Servia.

■rHli AUSTRIAN C LTIMATI'M. On .I u 1 v 30 the German Ambassador as-u-cd sir Edward Drey that he had rue any news of wiiai was going on in Vi-nnn with regard to Sorvia. but that "Austria was. i 'ertai n I y going lo lake some step." Three day? later the Austrian Ambassador mentioned that demands were to be made on Servia witii a time limit. Next day (.Inly I •It tin: text ~ f iff. dcmatais was communicated, end Sir Edward Urey demurrer] to the shortness of tip- time limit and to too t ,. rms j;, which the demands were iuue|;ed, III! tin- same da v a despatch from the Rrinsl: Ambassador at St. Petersburg relates ho w the Russian foreign Minister had ’ih-seribi-d Austria's conduct as "both i ,ro Vue a t i and humeral.' - and had ask.-il whether the Rritish Government would proclaim their solidarity with Russ hi. and i-Tunee. The reply to that inquiry—a, reply approved by Fir Edward G rey —was that there was "no reason to expect an v declaration of solidarity from bis .Majesty’s Government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia and Frame by force of arms." To this M Sa/.mmff replied, tis related in a later d„- pu' ' bat lie did not believe Germany i-.'aiß wanted war. and that it England took her stand (irmly with j.-p.jp,.., ,n,i Russia there would be no war whilst if she failed then rivers of blood would Mow. and she would in the end t.e dragged inm war, GERM ANA* AND RFSSIA. iin .Inly 34. the German Foreign Secretary ask’d whether Austria's action might not excite Russia, said that h© "thought not." He remained of opinion tliat the crisis could be localised. "He said that he had given the Russian Government to understand tliat the last tiling Germany wanted was a general war, and he would do all in his power (o pi event such a. ealanvty.” As to the Austrian Note, ••lie repeated very earnestly Rial, though lie had been accused of knowing all about the contents ol tbal Note, lie bad. in fact, had no such knowledge." His view, however, was that "once she had launched that Note, Austria, could not draw hack." It may lie true that the German Foreign Seuretars did not know the nature of Austria's ultimatum to Servia, but if so Hie Kaiser was to blame for his ignorance, fur from a later despatch it transpired that the German Ambassador in Vienna telegraphed its text to the German Emperor before it was despatched by foe Austrian Government to the Servian. For' the next three days communications were passing from Sir Edward Grey to the various Embassies on the subject of the Conference of Powers that had been proposed. On July, 37 tie Foreign Secretary sent tit© follow-

ing very significant despatch to the British Ambassador a’ Berlin; “I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that In German and Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand aside. . . This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to bo dispelled by the orders we have given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it happens, at Portland, not to disperse for manoeuvre leave.” The “White Paper” concludes with a record of the dramatic “conversations” as to tho Intention of the British Government lo intervene, which have already been give.n to the. world; the requests for undertakings ns lo observance of the neutrality of Belgium, and so to the climax of the British ultimatum to Germany. THE WORLD WILL JUDGE. A perusal of this White Paper will .assist the world at large, to judge of the justice of the two muses for one or other of which Europe is now in arms. To Englishmen tho correspondence does not alter in any material particulars the history of tho negotiations Sir Edward Grey gave to the House of Commons last Monday, but seems to prove conclusively that Austria and Germany were acting in concert from before the despatch, of the ultimatum to Servia. And the impression given by a perusal of the correspondence is that the ultimatum to Servia was issued at a carefully-cal-culated moment, witli tb“ full knowledge that it would provoke Russia, and that the time limit was deliberately fixed so that there could be no international negotiations lo prevent the Austrian attack The words of tho German Chancellor on the 2!U hj of July, certainly suggest that Germany was acting on a predetermined policy of aggression. that her main purpose was to crush France, and that she was hoping to detach England from France and Russia so as to make tier prospects .of success the greater. It is somewhat startling to find Sir Edward Grey, until the last moment, declining to give either Russia or France the slightest assurance that Knpland would stand by them, though it is true that from the beginning he liner concealed from Germany the fact that if France were attacked England would not be able to keep out of tho war. Thus in order to keep open the chance of peace, even after that German mobilisation which lie was officially told would “moan war,” Sir Edward Grey ran the risk of estranging both Franco and Russia. No diplomatist could have gone further in his determination to leave nothing to avoid a war. Many Englishmen, indeed, think Sir Edward went a great deal too far, and that England's Foreign Secretary should have shown tho “mailed fist" considerably earlier in the day. These cavillers argue that Sir Ifdward Grey must have seen 1 (trough the Gcrrnan-A ustrian diplomatic manoeuvres and fathomed the inner meaning of Germany's desire for British nentrality. He that as it may. Sir Edward did everything to keep the peace, and this 'White Paper makes it clear that England could only hate escaped from ttiis war hy deserting Franco and abandoning cvcrv principle of right hitherto recognised in Europe. .She could have secured peace for herself —for a time—but it would have been Peace with Dishonour.