The Southland Times. PUBLISHED EVERY MORNING. Luceo Non Uro. WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1914. HISTORICAL PAPERS.

Southland Times, Issue 17763, 23 September 1914, Page 4

The Southland Times. PUBLISHED EVERY MORNING. Luceo Non Uro. WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1914. HISTORICAL PAPERS.

By the London mail which reached Invercargill fast evening we received a copy of the White Paper containing the diplomatic correspondence which passed between Sir Edward Grey and the British Ambassadors in European centres during the fifteen days from 20th July to 4th August. This document, which appears as an ordinary Parliamentary paper, “Miscellaneous, Xo. G (1914),” contains the public history of the present great European war; its secret history may not be known for many years. The first despatch, dated from the Foreign Office on 20th July, Is addressed by Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen. British Ambassador at Berlin. It

shows that Sir Edward Grey was somewhat anxious as to what was going on in Vienna with regard to Servia Even at this stage the British Foreign Minister was thinking of the possibilities of war and using every endeavour so to shape the course of negotiations that Europe’s peace would not be disturbed. His object in opening correspondence with Sir E. Goschen was to bring influence to bear upon Austria to disclose her case against Servia, and to keep her demand within reasonable limits so that it would be easier for Russia to counsel moderation at Belgrade, the Servian capital. ■ “I hate the idea of a war between any of the great Powers,” Sir Edward Grey wrote, “and that any of them should be dragged into a war by Servia would be detestable.” Sir Edward Goschen in his reply reported an interview with the German Secretary of State whose comment was that he preferred not to interfere, and that he considered that Austria' had shown great forbearance towards Servia in the past. The whole correspondence is profoundly interesting, but it- becomes engrossing when we reach the famous despatches of which so much has been heard in the cables. The first of these is Sir E. Goschcn’s telegram to Sir Edward Grey of 29th July, in which the Ambassador's interview with the German Chancellor is recorded. We quote the despatch:

I was asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His Excellency had just returned from Potsdam. He said that should, Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany’s obligations as Austria’s ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. Ho then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far us he was able to judge tljc main principle which goverened British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might bo. That, however, was' not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided dial neutrality of Great Britain was certain, every assurance would V'O given to the British Government (hat the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in 'any war that might ensue . 1 questioned ids Excellency about the French colonies, and lie said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that, so long as Germany’s adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Tsetherlands, Germany was ready to give his Majesty’s Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might he forced to enter upon in Belgium, but. when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be' respected if she had not sided against Germany. His Excellency ended by saying that over since he hud been Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, (o bring about an understanding with England: he trusted that these assurances might form the basis of that understanding which lie so much desired. Ho had in mind a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it was. of course, at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which present crisis might possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to realisation of his desire. Sir Edward Grey's reply, dated July 30, was a clear and decided answer. “His Majesty's Government," he wrote, “cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor’s proposal that they should hind themselves to neutrality on such terras.” The Foreign Minister went on to point out that without loss of tcrritoiy in Europe France might be so crushed as to lose her position as a great power and become subordinate to German policy, and to make the bargain proposed by the German Chancellor would be “a disgrace from which the good name of Britain would never recover." Sir Edward Grey also declined “to bargain away whatever interest Britain had as regards (ho neutrality of Belgium." The conclusion of the despatch again shows how perseveringly Sir Edward Grey laboured to prevent the rupture of peace and how he strove to conciliate Germany. He wrote:

"Having said so much, it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between fngland and Germany offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for tying our hands now. We most preserve, our full freedom to pel as circumstances may seem to us to require in any such unfavourable and regrettable development of the present crisis as the Chancellor contemplates.

"Von should speak to tho Chancellor in the above sense, and add most earnestly dial the one way of maintaining tli o good relations between fngland and Germany is that they should continue to work together 1o preserve the peace, of Europe; if we succeed in this object tho rnutual relations of Germany and Fngland will. 1 believe, he ipso facto improved and strengthened. for Hint object: his Majesty’s Government will work in that way with all sincerity and good-

"And 1 will say this; If the peace of fnrope can he preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour "ill he to promote some arrangement to which Germany could he a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would he pursued against her or her •lilies by France, Pcssia. and oursi Ives, jointly or separately. 1 have desired this and worked for it, as far as T could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. Tito idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals. but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations. be safely passed. 1 am hopeful that, tho relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement 'between the Powers than has been possible hi th ert o."

In a despatch, dated hist .Inly. Sir Edward .Grey proposed a. way (n overcome the obstacles to a good understanding between Russia and Austria. He suggested that Germany should sound Vienna and he would undertake to sound St. Petersburg “whether it would be possible for the four disinterested Powers to offer to Austria that they would undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on Servia, provided that they did not impair Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory.” Again in his conclusion Sir Edward Grey shows how the preservation of the peace of Europe is the aim ever uppermost in his thoughts. He tells Sir E. Goschen:

I -said to German Ambassador this morning that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would lie unreasonable if they rejected it. I would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia, 'and Prance would not accept it his Majes-

ty’s Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences; but, otherwise. I told German Ambassador that If France became Involved xwe should be drawn in.

As everybody knows these wise and patient efforts to preserve peace failed because Germany was bent on war. On August 4th Britain asked for an assurance that Germany would not proceed with her threat against Belgium if she refused a free passage to German troops through Belgium, and also that Germany would not violate Belgian neutrality: and on the same day, having heard that Germany had notified Belgium of her intention to cross Belgium by force if necessary. Sir Edward Grey instructed Sir B. Goschen to repeat the request and failing a satisfactory reply by midnight to demand his passports and to notify Germany that “His Majesty’s Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium, and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves.” It was an ultimatum. The answer was not given and at midnight on 4th August, despite Sir Edward Grey’s unwearying labours, Great Britain and Germany were at war. But the White Paper vindicates Britain and clears her of all'responsibility for the European conflagration.