THE NAVAL ESTIMATES

Southland Times, Issue 16689, 18 March 1911, Page 5

THE NAVAL ESTIMATES

DISCUSSED IN THE COMMONS EXPLANATION AND CRITICISM. (By Telegraph—Press Association—Copyright). LONDON, March 17. ' Received March 17, 10.37 p.m. Mr McKenna said that the naval estimates represented the total expenditure for the year. Moreover they included £1,300,000 on former loans. We were paying our way to the last shilling. The navy must be supreme as long as the Empire was to endure. He would never adirtse the temporary expedient of a loan to meet permanent needs. It took two years to build a dreadnought. They did not need to begin five of the Orion and Lion type before December or January next. The cost of the first eight dreadnoughts would be the same as that of nine King Edwards. Maintenance would cost £50,000 a year less. The Orions would cost £1,900,000 each, an increase of £200,000 over the cost of the earlier dreadnoughts. The estimates, compared with Germany’s £22,000,000 appeared to represent upwards of the two-power standard; but £8,000,000 represented the expenditure which in Germany’s case was embodied in the civil estimates. A true comparison therefore was Britain, £36,000,000; Germany, £22,000,000. A further two and a-half millions was deductible in respect. of the fleets that we maintain in the Pacific and the Atlantic, making our total thirty-three and a-half millions. Mr McKenna added that Rosyth naval base would be ready in 1915.

Mr Lee (Unionist) said that the spring of 1911 would be a critical period. We should then have 29 dreadnoughts in European waters and the Triple Alliance 29. There was no margain for accidents. The cruiser programme was lamentably insufficient in view of the threatened privateering peril if the declaration of London were ratified. Mr G. Roberts moved an amendment to the effect that foreign events did not warrant increasing the expenditure, which was a menace to security. Mr Balfour, In a speech which aroused intense interest, said he felt, like others, that the constantly increasing estimates were more than a national inconvenience. They must be endured to avoid risk of disaster. If diplomacy and soft words could accomplish anything by means let them be tried again. Meanwhile the hard facts of 1914 detailed by Mr Lee must be faced. Besides our responsibilities in other parts of the world we must maintain supremacy in the Mediterranean. No other nation had such a task. Mr McKenna, interposing, said that the Admiralty did not accept Mr Lee’s forecast.