THE WAR

Southland Times, Issue 15183, 13 March 1902, Page 2

THE WAR

The intelligence of the defeat of Lord Methuen's force, and the capture of Lord Methuen and part of his force, with four guns, is among the worst that has come from the seat of war since hostilities began. Both Lord Roberts and Lord Salisbury have counselled the critics t<> stay their pens in the meantime, and it is probable that we shall not hear tbe full particulars of the reverse for some time. It is at present difficult to say how it happened that the pursuing force was broken up with heavy loss by the General of whom it was in search, how the hunter was hunted and put to rout But the publication of the details will hardly change the moral effect which the tidings have produced. It appears to the world, and to the British people, that Lord Methuen's column was surprised by an attack upon three bides simultaneously and scattered. There is the old familiar story of splendid British valour, especially at the guns, but in spite of it the commander and several of his officers and four guns were taken, and the remainder of the force dispersed over the veldt. British prestige has suffered a shock, the Continent rejoices as openly as it dares, and the British people bite their lips and resolve to persevere with redoubled energy. His latest exploits prove that General Delarey is, perhaps, the finest leader left to the Boers, and The Times has well urged that a specially chosen force should be sent to deal with him. The Boers have developed a facility in bringing their commandos quickly together which, though the stratagem lends itself to mobile guerilla bands, is none the less remarkable. The commandos appear to possess very rapid means of communication by which they are able to keep in touch though widely separated, and when required they can effect a junction with great rapidity. Recent experiences have clearly shown that the Boers aro unsurpassed experts in the art of playing a losing game, and ha/c taught the nation to appreciate with wiser judgment the difficulty of the task which Lord Kitchener has to accomplish. We can only hope that the British officers are learning the game better every day, and we can' be confident that such sharp losses as fcho_e inflicted on Colonel Van Donop and Lord Methuen will not change the policy of Lord Kitchener, or the determination of the people to bring the war to a final and complete issue. The work that the British Army has to do is necessarily slow work, it has to be done upon a plan which is necessarily vulnerable, and though Delarey and De Wet may succeed now and again they will certainly be overcome by superior tenacity and superior numbers. Reverses such as that which Lord Methuen has sustained are hard to bear and cannot be lightly passed over, but so far as affecting the ultimate conclusion is concerned they are of no importance.

Even worse than tbe news of the defeat and capture of the senior British officer in the field, is the informption that Sir Henry CampbellBan nerman's speeches, and those of his 'disloyal supporters, are being printed in the newspapers of the Boer leaders and being circulated among the combatants. It is this patience with pro- Boer utterances that is very largely responsible for the dragging of the war. The speeches of the leader of the Opposition of Mr Lloyd George, and of others were criticisms of the Government policy and of the conduct of the war by the military authorities. They would have been perfectly allowable if they had been in accord with the mind of the people, or if they had been incapable of injuring the British cause. But, being entirely adverse to the public mind, and excessively injurious to the national cause, they "were not allowable and public opinion should now become so unmistakably determined that no such speeches will be made in the future. It id intolerable that British blood should continue to flow and British money be thrown into the maw of war, because a few individuals in British politics are permitted to speak authoratively upon the barbarism of the British warfare, and the folly of the British policy. These opinions go forth as if they were the manifesto of a party in the House of Commons and of a large section of the nation. We may be sure that they lose nothing in the re- telling, arid so the Boers are encouraged to believe in the visions of their European " governments," somewhere in the Lowlands, and to fight on in the hope that a split will occur in Great Britain. Lord Methuen's reverse is galling enough in all conscience, but it is not so hard to bear up under, nor so detrimental to our arms, as the publication of Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman's disloyal speeches, and if reprobation is to fall upon General Methuen it should fall with ten times greater force upon the aiders and abettors of the Boers within the British Parliament.