The Wreck of the Waira rapa.

Southland Times, Issue 13089, 11 December 1894, Page 3

The Wreck of the Waira rapa.

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF ENQUIRY.

[By

Telegraph.]

Auckland, Dec. 10. The Court of Enquiry into the Wairarapa disaster in its deliverance blamed Capt. McIntosh for neglect in navigation, severely censured chief officer Moyes, commended the third mate, praised the engineers, eulogise the heroic conduce of the stewardesses, commended several of the passengers, and described the boat drill as a farce. No certificates were suspended. Mr Northcroft S.M., said that no censure was too severe to apply to the conduct ot the chief officer in regard to the raft he saw drifting. Boats were available but were not used, and no doubt people were drowned off the raft a considerable time after the wreck The second officer s conduct was of a negative character. Nothing could be said of the third officer, only that he rose to the occasion. Though the captain and two officers saw apparent signs of a fog coming, and, from their own showing, ought to have expected a current, no bearings were taken from the Three Kings to ascertain the true position of the ship. The chief officer at 8 pm., by dead reckoning, pricked off the position o{ * he Bhl P K °? A he chart and waited up to see the I oor Knights, whereas by the course he pricked out on the chart in the court the ship could never have been less than nine and a half miles distant from these islets. How he expected to see them in such a fog as described I cannot conceive. There is no doubt the ship overran her distance. It is quite clear the captain expected to see Mokohinau light on the port bow, whereas he must have passed it 8 miles off on the starboard bow. Again, when asked by Chief Officer Moyes where the ship was when she struck, he said on the Hen and Sens whereas she was fully twenty-nine miles east, and the course marked in court by the second and third officers put the ship on Mokohinau Island. I am of opinion that the Wa’rarapa was lost through Captain Mclntosh and the first and second officers not taking the correct point of departure at the Three Kings, and not allowing for the current, which, by the first and second officers’ evidence, they should have been aware was running to the eist and southeast Why accurate bearings were net taken at the Three Kings and carefully compared with the four point bearings taken at Cape Maria van Dieman and the ships course positively fixed, seems inexplicable. W .1 th.; time » “ the bearing taken at Cape Maria was iXect, as shown on the chart by the officer who took it at 8 a.m. No signs were wanting to make a prudent navitake every precaution for safely naviffng bSsffip down the coast, coming on with an apparent current and the subsequent wind from the north and north-east,with the heavy easterly swell. As the first officer says J “ There must have been a current to raise such a sea.” Knowing they had to allow for a current with an easterly swell, with the wind from the north and north east, still nothing was done, but the ship was driven at full speed through a fog so dense that at s.re.ruVH'tFS he alone was to blame for the loss of the vessel, and though neglect was shown, in my opinion, by the chief officer subsequent to the

wreck in not utilising the available boats at his disposal, still I do not think there is that degree of negligence to entitle the court to cancel or suspend his certificate; or any Of the other officers, but had the captain not been drowned there is no doubt his certificate would have been cancelled. Ido not think there is the suspicion of a doubt regarding the accuracy of the compasses. There was plenty of time to have got the boats out had orders been given and obeyed promptly, and if the ship’s company had known their places. From the evidence lam of opinion they did not, and so valuable time wasl ost. The so called boat drill as described by the first officer is a mere farce, and evidently, each member of the crew did not know what was required when called upon in an emergency, because one of the passengers was trying to knock away tho chocks under No. 2 boat with a capstan bar, which showed that had the boat’s crew been in their places the boat would have been lifted clear of the chocks before the passengers could have reached the deck. This and other instances prove that the crew did not know! what to do to get out the boats in the most expeditious manner. It could hardly be expected to be otherwise, they not having had even this farcical boat drill for six months. None of the crew went to No. 6 boat until all chance of lowering it safely had passed. It was mainly owing to this want of efficient' knowledge in handling the boats that so many valuable lives were lost. After the mismanagement the smashing of the boats occurred, and there was no longer any hope of saving passengers by the boats. The ship’s company still remaining on the vessel did not do what they might have done, and what we always expect of British seamen worthy of that name when there are women and children in peril. There should have been plenty of time for the ship’s company remaining on the vessel to get the remaining women and children to the rigging. It has been suggested that it was impossible to get them to the rigging, which we think is totally disproved when it is considered that from the deck to the rail was only four feet, and from the rail to the ratlines only three feet, but no effort was made, as is clearly proved by Miss Buckleton and others, having got there unaided at a much later period.