THE CONTINENTAL POSITION

Southland Times, Volume 2, Issue 75, 24 July 1863, Page 5 (Supplement)

THE CONTINENTAL POSITION

(From the Economist, 25th April.)

There is little to surprise us in the shudder of excitement which is just now passing through Europe. The power of France is so great and so ready for use, her activity for the moment so morbid, her resources so completely at the disposal of one very competent man, tbat any disturbance in which she is known to be keenly interested is sure to assume huge proportions. It is certain that France is greatly interested in the Polish revolt, and equally so that her ruler meditates with absorbing interest on the policy which events may compel him to adopt. At the same time, the direction of that policy is an obscure and much debated question, and the interest of a great riddle is therefore added to all the excitement of great political events. Just at present the doubtful force seems to tend in the direction of war, or rather the rumors about its direction are tinged with a warlike hue. Consequently, and very rightly, the Bourses are becoming excited. There may be nothing in all the stories so busily circulated, but then also there may be much, and if there is, the approaching danger is one of a kind and magnitude which m kes all men who understand either politics or finance pale with hope or anxiety. It is nothing less than a grand European war for a redistribution of the map, and it is hard to conceive an event which would more permanently influence the position, and fortunes, and hopes of this generation of men. It is the fashion of the hour, which affects even mercantile men, to underrate everything; but France in arms and in motion is a portent which concerns every human being,— a figure whose action the keenest observer will watch with the most alarm. This is the truth which gives to the Polish question all its European interest. In itself it is but a struggle of immense importance to the actors, but not very vital to the world— not half so vital, for example, as the American civil war. If Russia wins, the world is, politically speaking, much where it was, except that one military monarchy will be a trifle weaker ; while if Poland should win, Europe will have one more free nation, and therefore one more security for the peace this generation finds it so hard to attain.

Still the very magnitude of the stake very often disturbs the judgment, and it is well to examine occasionally the forces at work on both sides. It is the misfortune of the world that the conservative forces in politics, the reasons which make rulers unwilling to do very striking or very dangerous things are usually so little apparent. Flverybody can count the ships of war in a port, and estimate the result of their attack, but the facts that they cannot sail without biscuit, and that the biscuit is not yet baked, do not strike the popular eye. Of all the stories now alarming I the Continent, one-half are stories [ merely, with no better guarantee than ! the word of the half-informed persons j who prepare " news of interest" for MM. Reuer and Scarf's eorrespon- , dence. The remainder are probably j facts, but their value, strictly considered, is not perhaps very great. It ! seems clear that some negotiation of 1 some kind has been going on between France and Sweden, the Power which, in the event of war, could most readily assist the Poles, and thafc the Swedes are enthusiastic anti-Russians. It is also clear that the Polish insurgents, so far from faltering, are becoming bolder, and have succeeded in placing an income tax, varying from 2 to 10 per cent., upon most of the property holders in Poland. The French Emperor, moreover, does not discourage the strong Polish feeling in his capital ; indeed, rather lends it weight by t'entle recommendations to caution and patience. All these things, and particularly the sudden talk about Sweden, are in their dogree ominous, and so is tho language of the note addressed by M. Drouyn de Lhuys to St. Petersburg, and analysed in the Pays. It is not a pleasant letter at all for the Russian Government to receive — is unusually harsh in meaning, and abounds in those expressions which diplomatists, justly or otherwise, are apt to consider "grave." The Russian Government is by no means accustomed to be told that its acts may produce "regrettable consequences,'' or that the causes of a rebellion must be "definitely removed-' M. Drouyn de Lhuys is himself a moderate writer, not by any means given to menace, and there may be ground for the belief that the Emperor wrote the dispatch, and that he will not tamely endure a negative or evasive reply. It is more than probable also tliat the Emperor of Russia, unaccustomed to yield, relying on the complicity of his co-partners in the partition, and aware tbat to grant anything short of independence would be merely to place new weapons in the hands o the Poles, may stand upon his rights a King of Poland, and decline any and every offer of mediation between himself and unsubdued rebels. That, at all events, would be his natural attitude, only to be abandoned under intense pressure, to which he can at any time yield.

These few facts, crusted over as they are with verbiage and inventions, are ominous, but they are much more discussed than the huge facts on the other side. In the first place, it is always assumed that the French nation as a whole desires war. That is no doubt true of the educated classes, who have a deep if sentimental regard fov Poland — ofthe army, which at once thirsts for " glory and desires to avoid Mexico, — and of the priests, who hope to inflict a great blow on a rival and hated Church. But it is not equally clear that ifc is desired by the bourgeoisie who

will have to pay in money for the idea, or the peasants who must provide the extra "impot dv sang.'' On the contrary, every warlike rumor sends the funds down sharply, and the peasants are murmuring that their children are superseded by volunteers. Now it has been the Emperor's policy ever since 1848 to foster material wealth, and the classes who produce it, and to represent the opinion of the silent millions of France. Consequently, despite all the gossip, it is riot quite so certain that he feels himself under pressure from French opinion. That he relaxes the usual restraints on discussion in favor of intervention is true, but be is always slow to restrain any opinion favored by TJltramontanes, and knows well that till, he decides, loud talk on foreign affairs is a good safety-valve for much surplus steam. His character, too, forbids hini ever to close the door on a chance, and as "ong as the ii surrection lasts there is always a chance that some German hetise may open his path to the Rhine. Then the enterprise, vast in the eyes of any politician, must to him appear spi cially large. English observers perceive that it will cost a great deal of money, which M Fould will be yery unwilling to raise, — that the Mexican expedition, however Onerous, cannot be lightly abandoned — and that the neu- ; tvality of -Austria is a very doubtful; assumption. Austria does not want tqj fight, and does not regard Gallicia a? she does some other of her many, alien;, provinces ; but Austria gives up nothing for nothing, and the HapsburghSj-,; with all tbeir failures, have a tenacity] not pleasant to those who coerce them^ But Napoleon sees, besides all thesej things — and remember ho fears coalitions — other dangers more personal to! himself. He learned in Italy thaty though a good strategist, he must avoidv command in the field, and he is keenly aware that the General who should conduct the armies of France to great and successful fields, who should redeem Borodino and efface the disaster of the! Berisina, would be a more formidable rival than the Count de Chambdrd, orany Prince of the House of Orleans.: Yet he cannot afford to fail, for Tailtfr.e would at once consolidate all those elements of opposition, which are only kept down by his unbroken success. He knows, too, how difficult the task itself will be even if he can induce Sweden to] run the tremendous risk of a war] with a power wl ose regular army isvj nearly equal to the Swedish levee en massey Empires are not conquered in a day,andv a winter campaign in Poland is a cony tingency which would cause a shudders in the bravest soldier in France. Then; his habit is to fight with allies, audi they are not in this instance forthcom-j ing. If Austria could be induced toj join, then indeed he might advance; freely ; but Austria is- slow to move^ and the paragraphs so frequently circu-. lated in the p ipers about compensation are often the feeblest dreams. &&&ss£ is usually to have the Principalities, two States which belong to Turkey, Which cannot be alienated without Engi lish consent, and which have a very peculiarly bitter feeling towards the Austrian soldiery. Then there are reports about Italy, and no doubt Italy wo -.iid free Poland or anything else if in so doing she could free Rome. But what can Italy do if Austria is not to be attacked, beyond -lending a contingent — valuable, indeed, but a long way from the shores of the Baltic ? Sweden no doubt can afford most important assistance — assistance so valuable tbat with her, Poland, and Italy, France.i mi.-j-ht defy Russia and Germany united ; but Sweden will run great risk and will demand an equally great compensation. Finally, France doe 3 not war for ideas alone, and what proof have the jdarmists that when she asks her compensation, England will consent either to its amount or its form ? The Emperor up to a point is the most cautious of human beings, and has weighed well all the jealousies, interests, and risks which he must face, if for the third time in eight years he plunges into that dangerous sea — a great European war.

There are reasons for hesitation, no doubt, hut the balance of probabilities is alwa}S in favor of things remaining as they are, and in this case that balance is most unusually weighted. Only one chance, the Emperor's deters mi nation, can produce the war ; while the suppression of a revolt, a refusal from Sweden, a caprice on the part of Austria, or the death of any one of six or seven individuals, may all avail to prevent it.