MR. SEWARD'S WAR DESPATCH.

Southland Times, Volume I, Issue I, 14 November 1862, Page 4

MR. SEWARD'S WAR DESPATCH.

'-i Times.) V \A On the ,28thlf last May, Mr.;. Steward thought that aleriod had arrived in .the American civil '\ AV which fairly entitled him to undertime the instruction of the States of Europeflnd toperdict confidently , tbe result of th&truggie. ■'•'' In default of any memorable f^Uit upon tvhich to hang this discourse.MiSeward takes note that the English ships \Nassau are supposed to be waiting to c advantage of a relaxation of thi' blockade. Another favorable ," circum| n ' cc rioted by Mr. Seward is that |he " pirates " — that is the ships : of vvl 0 f the Southern States which hayl occa9 iorially sought refuge in friendly po|— have withdrawn from the ocean. Ha&g thus constructed for himself, with morK n genuity than solidity, what he cohsidL a favorable platform, Mr. Seward pr&> e "ds to remind us lhat the industrial Sterns of Western Europe and of Americ%e to be regarded less as distinct nationaf«ystems than as one general combination of agricultural, commercial, and mahufiiuririg agencies. The principle is undou|edly true, philanthropic, and fruitfulbut when we ask for its application | are met by Protection, or prohibitiotitu its narrowest form — by laws framed, nopn the principles of combination, nor |t on national rivalry, but rather on prieipies of rigorous exclusion and bittei'hostility. As far as tariffs go, America i&lready at war with England, and all iheseijgh-sounding phrases can neither conceal pr extenuate the fact. Mr. Seward menti%, with what may be very sincere regret, | a t the civil war in America has been injurious to European industry, and dra's the very reasonable conclusion that | is for the interest both of America and«Jurope that the civil war should be brougtj to a close, far we can go heartilj* with mr mentor, bit here the divergence begin|for, whi c • Anei-ica considers the only p|ible conchsion of the war to be the repration of unity, Europe has been rash iough to thiik that the conclusion ca^only be fouidin the duality, or, perhapsye might say, the plurality of states. Till opinion Mr. Seward requests European tatesmen torevew, and we cau have no ohctionto accedt to His invitation, c-pecia-y as, in additioi to other advantages, it o|rs us a most si;nal instance of the vanitjpf human wbhes and the unsoundnesspf human expectations. \ We an first called upon to obsfre how much stronger the position of the 'ederal Government is than it was a yer. ago. The Fedenl Governtnet, we are toi*, has retaken all the positions on the senoaid it so early lost — especially, we supose, Mobile, Pensacola, Charleston, and feyannah. It possesses the Mississippi — specially, we suppose, Vicksburg andiron Kouge. It ha? forced the insurgents to baitle in the most inaccessible^ part ofthe insurrectionary \ district — but it has f»ot been victorious, The resources of he Federals are inexhaustible and ino^gfjsug;^ those of the Confederates are~dfminishiag' and nearly exhausted — although the terlble defeats before Richmond are excused on the plea lhat the Federals were outnumbered in every battle. Other grounds of confidence are thp strength of the Union sentiment in Maryland — where Baltimore is still kept down by armed force; the earnestness in the satae cause in M'^-^vi —where terror is fc.i \o tie so requisite that men are shot on their own thresholds, without accusation and without trial ; the neutrality of Kentucky and its firm devo *.ion to the Union,— while, in fact, tlie State is covered with guerilla parties, and hns even illustrated its fondness for the Union by the invasion of tM loyal and neighboring Sate of Ohio, pastern Vir ginia, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Louisiana— especially, we suppose, New Orleans — acquiesce under federal authorities ; and generally, Mr. Seward concludes it as a simple fact tiat loyalty reapperrs everywhere just assist as the government is able to protect it. As every one of these statemetts require the qualification of a negative t> bring it into accordance with fact, we may not unreasonably claim the right jo suggest the same modification in the jonclusion which they arc intended to prdj-e, and to assert that, whatever be the ca*e with the Confederates, of whom we know so little except by their actions, it is cernin tbat the Federal resources are not iicreasing nor unexhausted. Mr. Seward ut*es, tho' as yet facts do not bear him OUi in his opinion, that the struggle, if continued much longer, must terminate in a servile war. Let us grant him this, for tie sake of argument. It will not follow fiat the North will benefit because the Soith a,re injured. We are told that every jugitive slave brings a benefit to the North'jin the shape of an increase of productive! labor. But are the North sensible of this fcnefitl Do they wish for an increase of thdr pro ductive labor on such terms ? If so, why is it that from many States the negro (s absolutely excluded,and in many others his portion is so miserable thatexpulsionjtseff had been more merciful than such hbspu tality 1 The failure of foreign importa-' tion is, we are told, beneficial to tbe man facturers of the North ; but just in the same degree it is injurious to the consumer; of those manfacturers, and adds to th< other miseries of war the curse of dearnes' and the scarcity of articles of necessary consumption. Immigration is, we are tolc accelerated by the war and the demanc for labor. We greatly doubt the fact. Immigrants, as Mr. Seward would say, like other men, they go to America in searcl of freedom, cheapness, peace and plenty For freedom they are offered the suspen sion of the Habeas Corpus Act, supplemented by a conscription ! for cheapnesi they have exclusion of all foreign commodities ; of peace we need say nothing and as for plenty, it can hardly wait or those who cannot draw their pay from as Treasury of an insolvent government, Though it thus appears that there h hardly a word in Mr. Seward's letter in which it is possible to agree, we yet cordially subscribe to his conclusion, that^ as things now stand any idea at intervention would be quite absurd — not, as he argues, because it would uselessly protract the miseries of a useless struggle, hut because things being exactly the contrary of that which he asserts them to be, we may wisely and safely leave that which we begun without our advice to work itself out without out inteference. When the apples are ripe they will fall, though we do not lend a hand to shake the tree.

We are neutral, and neither the loss of the raw material of our manufacture nor the hard measures which has been dealt out to British subjects accused of intending to break the blockade will induce us to quit our present attitude of neutrality. There is nothing more to be said. The government of America need not seem to work upon the susceptibilities of the masses by perpetual recurrence to the topic of foreign intervention. They boast that they nre able speedily to finish the war; let them apply themselves to the task, for it will need all their strength and all their courage. We will give them no pretext for the recruiting of their attenuated legions, . no wind from this quarter shall fan the dying embers of that military spirit which burst up so fiercely a year ago, and now seems to sink so low. We will bear as patiently as we* can those

:\ T ~ 4 — " • * " mi-feries whichiiave> fallen jon a 3 portion 0 f ot'r^pobultftibff, and whicli have afforded so mifeh innocenCpleasure to the press and people of the Atlantic cities. ,We are S^-pVjo ths_ American Secretary of State for thustaking uninto hh confidence, and'giving us so clear a view bf the highly satisfactory position of his own affairs. AYe are perfectly convinced that the protraction of! „tbe, struggle .which he so reasonably deprecates and &o feelingly deplores must depend, not anything that we do or say, but on the later or speedier conversion of ihe government of Which he '° the" organ from the frantic policy in which it ' has unhappily embarked. 4»4 „an<l * 8 no obstacle in the way of peace.-' The true obstacle is to be found in those who stimulate the passions they ought tj> allay, and urge on with all -■ their-raigl-f the catastrophe whicli they clearly fojfsee and are yet able, to prevent;* - *