New Zealand Defences.

South Canterbury Times, Issue 8777, 12 March 1897, Page 3

New Zealand Defences.

A tremendous trumpet blast has just been blown in London on the subject of the utter and shocking defencelessness of New Zealand against foreign aggression. An anonymous writer, who describes himself as a New Zealander, maintains that “it is time that the British public knew that New Zealand is practically an undefended colony ; that if war broke out between Great Britain and any maritime Power the colony would fall an easy prey to the first of the enemy’s cruisers that attempted its capture.” Taking these premises as fixed facts the writer next proceeds to sum up the meaning of such a capture thus: “Asa fertile and richly endowed land it would be a loss to the British Crown ; as the security in which not less than 70 millions of British capital are invested it would be a loss to the British capitalist; and as a purchaser of British goods to the value of four millions yearly, it would be a loss to the British trade. More important than all, as the finest coaling station in the Pacific, it would be a loss to the British navy, and an important gain to some other Power’s navy.” And he deduces from these premises this conclusion : “As things stand you are liable to lose the colony at any moment, and if you are in ,earnest about retaining it you will have to take immediate steps to provide defences.” Having thus opened the case, the writer goes on to detail his arguments. He says that the two vessels of the Australian squadron allotted to New Zealand as coast defences are “ ancient,” and “ slow as a funeral,” only steaming about six knots, while these tardy tubs are supposed to protect liners of the Shaw-bayill and New Zealand Shipping Companies, steaming 16 knots, from hostile cruisers steaming 18 knots. Also they are supposed to patrol the coasts, on which, if a cruiser appeared, it would take them a week to shift themselves, say 800 miles to meet it, the New Zealand coastline being over 2000 miles long. He denies that this is any exaggeration, asserting that he has simply told the plain tale, adding “ and these ships are all we have to depend upon Sir William Jervois’s land fortifications are already obsolete, and the guns in them are fired but once a year, so that no one pretends to rely upon them as a defence.” He points out that the ports of Greymouth and Westport, with their magnificent reserves of coal, are at the mercy of the first comer, and declares that this information is in the War Office pigeon holes of France, Germany and Russia. The writer then goes on to recommend the recall of the present warvessels and the substitution of a much swifter class of vessels such as the “ torpedo and destroyers.”