Rangitikei Advocate. SATURDAY, APRIL 27, 1907. SECOND EDITION. EDITORIAL NOTES

Rangitikei Advocate and Manawatu Argus, Volume XXXII, Issue 8798, 27 April 1907, Page 2

Rangitikei Advocate. SATURDAY, APRIL 27, 1907. SECOND EDITION. EDITORIAL NOTES

THE cablegram which informed ns that the Admiralty lias agreed to the scheme for an Australian fleet to be kept in the home waters does not in any sense imply that it has accepted the Australian theory of naval defence. The Admiralty no doubt holds the view it has always hold that the object of a fleet is to follow the enemy wherever lie may bo and defeat him there. It apparently realises, however, that Australia desires to have » toy of its own to play with, and has submitted with a good grace to the force of circumstances, The suggestion that in case of war Australia might allow

tho Admiralty to have control of her flotilla on condition it never loft her shores shows a total misconception to tho whole theory of naval defence. In case of war a raid on Australia is very unlikely unless the British fleet has been wiped out, and then it would bo made in such force as to render tho Australian fleet quite powerless to prevent a successful landing. We do not imagine that tho fofficers and men of the proposed fleet will greatly enjoy the prospect of bsing tied to their own coasts when war breaks out, but confidently expect’ that they will demand the right to take their ships where jthb enemy is to be found instead of remaining moored by the apron strings of a timorous Government.

THE most noticeable figure in the Conference of Premiers is undoubtedly that of Mr Deakin. Even if we make every allowance for the fact that fuller details of his speeches are cabled to Australia than is the ease with the other Premiers

it is obvious that he is playing the leading part at the Conference. Besides being an eloquent speaker Mr Deakin has the enormous advantage of knowing : exactly what he wants, and he ha? sufficient tact to press his recommendations without offending : his hearers by such rude and hectoring methods as those of his colleague, Sir William Lyue. Mr Deakin’s first object was to obtain some permanent consultative body to carry on the work of the Imperial Conference between the sittings of that assembly, and he therefore proposed that a Secretariat should be established entirely independent of the Colonial Office, and witli the British Prime Minister as its head. This Secretariat was intended to he the means of communication between the self-govern-ing colonies and the British Government, ' and Mr Deakin wished it to bo composed not of officials, hut of men who had lived in the colonies, or at any rate wore fully acquainted with the outlying dominions of the Empire. The proposal lias not been carried in the form Mr Deakin wished, as the officials for the now department will be chosen from those of the Colonial Office, and Mr Deakin consequently asserts that the Secretariat will prove a failure and require to have its constitution amended at the next meeting of Premiers. There is no doubt that Mr Deakin can do much to ensure the correctness of his prophecy, and ■nra aVirmlri im.vn nreforred him to

accept the situation to the extent of promising to do his utmost to ensure the success of the new system, even although it was not exactly what ho desired. There is one point which wo think Mr Deakin has overlooked in his proposal. So long as the colonies are connected with the Colonial Office they have the support of its influence with the Cabinet and in the House of Commons for any action that the Office has approved. Should the self-gov-erning colonies, however, he represented at Home by a body consisting entirely of colonials or ex-colonials it would have no partcular influence on the Government from a political point of view. We can host appreciate the position by supposing that a committee of representatives of Britain were established in Wellington to advise onr Government as to points In New Zealand legislation which affected British interests, and to keep Ministers hero informed of the state of affairs in Britain. Even if our Prime Minister gwere nominal head of such a body we doubt whether it would he effective in influencing the House of Representatives to any great extent, and exactly the same position exists in Britain, hence our doubts as to the successful working of Mr Deakin’s scheme.